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SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

Japan at the Crossroads

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Shinkichi Eto
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Rinjiro Harako
G. F. Hudson
Fuji Kamiya
Richard Löwenthal
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Osamu Miyoshi
Mitsuro Muto
Saburo Okita

Moscow Correspondent

David Bonavia
Per Egil Hegge

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The Technology of an Expulsion

David Bonavia

WHEN the Soviet authorities decide—as they do once or twice a year—to expel a foreign correspondent, they usually attempt to justify their action in some way. The means they choose for this vary, and an interesting study could be made of them.

For instance, a correspondent may be libelled in the official press as a bad character who indulged in illegal transactions, etc. Extracts from his writings, or rather distorted and even fabricated versions of them, may be held up to the scorn of the Soviet public. Or he may be accused of subversion (too many dealings with Jews, for instance). Or he may simply be eased out by the non-renewal of his entry visa, by techniques of blackmail and *provokatsiya*, and by private persuasion exercised on his employers.

A favourite technique is to split the correspondent from his employers by implying to them that he is behaving improperly in some way, or damaging inter-state relations (which are anyway the concern of the diplomat and politician, not of the journalist, except in so far as he observes and reports on them).

It is a great pleasure for me to be able to state that *The Times* backed me to the hilt both before and after my expulsion. If *other* news organizations were firmer with the Russians about insinuations with regard to their correspondents, there would be fewer expulsions, and therefore better reporting.

Survey has been kind enough to ask me to write about the circumstances surrounding my own expulsion in May 1972, for 'activities incompatible with the status of a foreign correspondent' (never defined further).

THE entire justification for my expulsion rested officially on a campaign of five articles in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, organ of the Writers' Union, culminating in a campaign of 'readers' letters'. I had never received any official warning from the Foreign Ministry about my writings, though in the early stages, when I still thought it worthwhile to associate with Soviet journalists, *they* would sometimes take the opportunity to criticize something I had written. (Yuri Zhukov of *Pravda* virtually forbade me to write about Sino-Soviet relations, one of my favourite topics both before and after meeting him.)

But by the Foreign Ministry, I was called in only once, and formally warned by an official called Fedorenko that the publication of the Khrushchev *Memoirs* by *The Times* could not but affect the Ministry's attitude towards the paper's *korrespondentskii punkt* (i.e.

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myself) in Moscow. I felt this slightly unjust, since I had nothing whatever to do with the Khrushchev *Memoirs,* and learnt of them only shortly before their publication. I was mainly perturbed by the possibility that they would cut down on my travels round the Soviet Union, which had been a highlight of my time there so far. I ended up by going to Leningrad, Kiev, Novgorod, Riga, Vilnius, Yerevan, Murom, Yaroslavl, Samarkand, Tashkent, Irkutsk, Birobidjan (a unique trip for a Western correspondent), Ulan Ude, Khabarovsk, Kursk, Orel, Vladimir, Suzdal, and various minor places round Moscow. For some reason I always seemed to fail to get to Tallinn, and I think this was because the authorities knew that I used to speak a good bit of Finnish (though I was very rusty by that time). Or it may have been pure coincidence.

I was also refused permission to take the normal day-trip out of Moscow to Zvenigorod, as a form of retaliation against *The Times* for printing the Khrushchev *Memoirs,* and the Foreign Office *did* make an official protest about this ban. But I am not aware that any reciprocal ban was imposed on a Soviet correspondent in Britain.

Then, in September 1971, along came the great Anglo-Soviet crisis, with the expulsion or exclusion of 105 Soviet officials from London, and the question of travel in the Soviet Union by British citizens became pretty academic. A British diplomat and I did put in a few applications for joint trips, including one to Vologda, but these were refused or discouraged. And later there were the funerals of Khrushchev and Tvardovsky, the build-up to the Bukovsky trial, and the continuation of the Jewish story. I became generally more involved with work in Moscow, and less inclined to travel.

The only time I received anything approaching an official warning was when I had a row with an Intourist girl in Khabarovsk (she had almost succeeded in wrecking our precious trip to Birobidjan), but then that sort of thing is routine when travelling in the Soviet Union, anyway. I was taken aside privately by a Ministry official in Moscow and warned not to 'insult a Soviet worker' again. I was never publicly or privately accused of speculation, lechery, drunken driving, urging Jews to emigrate, distributing Bibles, smuggling gold, pot-smoking, or any other misdemeanours whatsoever. The *entire* case against me was based on my writings, and on a very small selection from them, which narrowed as the campaign progressed.

The monthly magazine *Zhurnalist* (*Journalist*) published an offensive cartoon in its issue No. 2 of 1971, showing the Foreign Editor of *The Times* sitting with his feet up on his desk with an empty liquor bottle containing a flower in front of him.

Of course, my wife and I both *feared* we would be expelled eventually, because of our involvement with the various 'Movements', and the fact that I wrote a good deal about them from late 1971 on. But, as I explained in my post-expulsion article in *The Times,* a journalist is not the master of his own fortunes in such cases, and we

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just hoped—as a famous Sovietologist wrote in a very kind letter to me—for a 'long innings'.

NOW I wish to examine the campaign in the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (hereafter to be referred to as the LG), in order to expose its *oddly perverse* mendacity. They could have found dozens of perfectly genuine quotations in my articles which would have brought many loyal, if misinformed, Soviet citizens up in arms against me. Instead, they chose to lie, take out of context, distort, fabricate, and do everything in their power to create an illusory campaign. This perversity is an aspect of Soviet political psychology which, I think, is little understood, and merits close investigation on a serious scale.

The first article, entitled '*Zlopykhateli*' ('Slanderers'), was dated 3 February 1971. It began by accusing the 'respectable' *Times* of spending 53 years systematically slandering the Soviet Union and distorting the situation there. Strange that the adjective *respektabelnaya* is so often still used about *The Times*, and indeed specially reserved for it in the Soviet press. Again and again they allege that *The Times* has or has not 'done credit to its *respektabelnost*' by some article or other. They also attribute to it all forms of devious financial connexions, and have accused it (on one occasion in the same sentence) of being both pro-Zionist and anti-semitic.

Then there was a description of the take-over of *The Times* by Lord Thomson, and the assertion that this did *not* change the newspaper's attitude towards the socialist (communist) countries. The only overall 'deterioration', it appeared, was the publication of the Khrushchev *Memoirs*.

After this prelude, they got on to me. They defined me with a quotation from the 'Inspector General', saying that I was distinguished by 'an unusual lightness of thought'. For everything I witnessed in the Soviet Union I found some single or simple explanation, they maintained. (Would that it could have been so!)

The LG complained that, having visited a Moscow park, I had said that only people who lacked housing space visited it. I was so astounded by this 'quote' that I combed my writings for it, to no avail. Taking exception to my article on Armenia, the LG attributed to me the following quotation: 'In Armenia, on Moscow's orders, industrial enterprises are built which could be built elsewhere.' The actual quote was as follows (*The Times*, 9 March 1970): 'Moscow attends to them (the Armenians) in a paternalistic way, building factories which might have been more profitable in a less remote and mountainous region, and littering the mountains with electricity pylons.'

Further, the article attributed to me in quotation marks the following 'recipe' for saving the Soviet economy: 'Restoration of capitalist orders and unlimited access of foreign capital investments in the Soviet Union.' I can only imagine that, if this 'quotation' referred to any

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article of mine at all, it must have been one I published about the problems of Siberia in *The Times* of 24 December 1970, after a two-week tour. I had mentioned the difficulty of attracting foreign investment to Siberia, and the irony of the LG's attack is that such investment is at this moment being desperately sought by the Soviet leadership in Japan, America, Britain, and Western Europe.

They ascribed another 'quotation' to me: 'Propaganda for sport in the USSR is carried out with the *unique* [emphasis in original] aim of reducing the consumption of spirituous liquors.' I could not find this quotation either, and was equally flabbergasted by it because I am totally indifferent to sport and try never to write about it. I subsequently discovered that they were referring to a leader in *The Times*, sparked off by an article I had written about alcoholism in the Soviet Union (practically every correspondent writes once a year or so about this subject). In that leader, the following sentences occurred: 'Exhortations of all kinds have been made: sport has been encouraged. Now our Moscow correspondent reports a new campaign' (29 January 1970). This was not the sentence 'translated' in the LG, and they ought to have known, in any case, that correspondents of *The Times* do *not* write leaders, as a firm principle. They are written by editors and special leader writers, so any complaints should be addressed to London.

Then there came a rare genuine quotation. Again, very soon after my arrival, while I was still suffering from that peculiar cultural shock which hits most Westerners seeing the Soviet Union for the first time, I had written an ironical piece (the Russians would label it a *felyeton* or 'feuilleton'), in which I had indeed said, with regard to a talent contest on television: '. . . apparently the main technical failing of Soviet television today—(is) a shortage of microphones. The mike is passed from speaker to speaker, with much grabbing and fumbling, and you keep expecting the wire to get tangled up in someone's ankles.' (A BBC television reporter agreed, but the LG were indignant.)

The LG went on: 'Having visited Leningrad, he did not notice either the monuments to the glorious history of the hero city and its feat in the Great Fatherland War, nor its advanced industry and science, nor its rich cultural life. The only thing (again the only thing) which in his, Bonavia's, opinion, beautifies the city on the Neva is the "picturesque groups of foreign tourists, seamen and students"' (a phrase I had not used, though the sense was not too far off).

Now here are some quotations from my actual article on Leningrad, published on 11 May 1969, which show the falsity of the LG's complaints: 'great monuments to the revolution . . . a proud and lovely street . . . celebrates above all two men—Peter the Great and Lenin . . . being slowly and meticulously restored . . . splendid, costly work . . . plenty in Leningrad to catch the eye and the breath . . . people were more colourfully and stylishly dressed. . . .' As I said in a subsequent letter of complaint to the editor of the LG (see below), my article criticized public drunkenness (though I realize now that *some*

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of the drunks might possibly have been Finns, in town for the day in order to get cheap vodka), and unrestored buildings (for which I was roundly attacked by some experts on the subject in Britain). It was perhaps not a very good article, but it contained honest impressions from a short trip, and it certainly did not bear out the criticisms of the LG.

Regarding the siege of Leningrad and the city's industry and science, a Western correspondent is expected to be neither a historian nor a technological writer, as a matter of course. (And as a matter of reciprocity, how often does the Soviet press write about the progressive industry of, say, Manchester, or the Battle of Britain, or the science of Cambridge? Practically never.)

The LG also took exception to my having referred to the case of some Estonians who were sentenced to death in Pskov (not in Estonia) for war crimes allegedly committed 27 years previously, a year or two after Stalin had grabbed their country. Some Russians interested in legal matters agreed with me that such long-delayed sentences presented a serious problem of human rights.

The LG concluded this first attack with the observation that if its correspondent did not stop writing such nonsense, people would stop reading *The Times* altogether. (What excellent advice that would have been to a Soviet newspaper!) The article was signed 'D. Kulikov', the surname being that of my official, KGB-sponsored driver. Neither he nor I was amused.

I was so incensed at the time—I had not yet learnt to take such fabrications lightly—that I suffered from attacks of nervous tachycardia for some months after the publication of this article. The sense of unbelief and indignation was heightened by my subsequent interview at the 'foreign relations department' of the LG.

I had cornered Chakovsky, the editor, at a press conference, and asked him in front of witnesses why he allowed his journalists to print falsified quotations. He brushed the matter off, but told me to write him a letter about it, which I did, pointing out the false 'quotes' in detail. I received no written reply (one rarely does from any Soviet organization), but in the end there was a telephone call inviting me to meet a Mr Prutkov (if my memory serves me right), and another person whose name I cannot remember, but who claimed to have worked as a correspondent in London. Subsequently we were joined by a middle-aged lady whose name also escapes me. Coffee and cakes were served, and the interview was conducted in Russian, though they offered to do it in English.

With the air of psychiatric consultants, the LG officials asked me what I wanted. I asked whether they had read my letter to Chakovsky, and they said they had. Did they agree that the quotations were false? *Yes, they admitted, some of them they had been unable to find in my writings.* Then what measures did they intend to take in the case of

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'Kulikov'? None, they replied, because he had 'correctly illuminated' (*pravilno osveshchal*) the spirit of my writings.

I was decidedly taken aback, and explained that in British journalism, at least of the better variety, the 'quote' was considered sacred. They retorted by producing a file of my other articles, which they proceeded to criticize, one by one. And here came the most interesting part of the interview.

I had visited Sergei Obraztsov's new Puppet Theatre on the Sadovoye Ring shortly before Western Christmas, and written what I thought was a very complimentary and seasonal piece. But I had reported the ironical 'cinema adverts' which are shown in the interval of the show 'Unusual Concert', and which came close to political and social satire. For instance; 'Buy tinned crab' (long unobtainable except for foreign currency), or: 'Our liquor department has the best present for your husband!' The audience were in fits of laughter.

The LG men said they had gone to the length of inviting Mr Obraztsov, who is now well over 70, to discuss this, and he had 'indignantly denied' that any such things were shown in the New Theatre. They were only shown in the Old Theatre, now out of commission. And yet I had *never visited* the Old Theatre, or even been aware that it showed such ironical materials. Whether Mr Obraztsov lied, or the LG men lied, I do not know. But somebody did, and it was a whopper, as my own eyes testified. Interestingly enough, another foreign correspondent reported more than a year later that he had seen the same show at the New Theatre, and that it was still showing the same ironical adverts; so Obraztsov clearly cares little for the LG.

The LG people also took exception to my interpretation of the name given to a puppet cellist—Apollon Peredelkin. I had suggested that this was a reference to the fact that he was supposed to have a *dacha* in Peredelkino, the woody suburb where successful artists and writers live (I wrote) 'in furtive luxury'. The lady present said there was nothing furtive about Peredelkino—she lived there herself. (It is, however, off-limits to foreigners, though they often defy the ban to visit Pasternak's tomb, or Viktor Louis.) The lady explained that the name Peredelkin was a pun on the verb *peredelyvat,* meaning 'to plagiarize'. (Odd, that this irony about the Peredelkino artistic community is not a standing joke in Moscow.)

They then went into the matter of the TV microphones. They had telephoned the Ostankino TV centre, they said, and asked them how many microphones they had. Ostankino had been good enough to count them and reported some such figure as 1,108. Was this sufficient? Certainly, the Ostankino engineers had reported. My efforts to point out that my article was a form of *felyeton* or satire were of no avail.

As to the leader about drink and sports, they said they understood that leaders were not written by correspondents, but it was based on materials sent by me, so I was at fault.

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Matters came to a head over a smallish article which I had written, mainly on the basis of Soviet press materials, about the continued practice of *kalym* (bride-money) in Central Asia, considered shameful in Soviet eyes. (Why it should be more shameful than the Western dowry system I cannot understand. It seems to me to be much more of a compliment to a girl that someone wants to buy her, than that her parents want to pay to get rid of her.) They took especial exception to the heading, 'Brides Still Being Sold in Central Asia', and were not interested when I told them that correspondents did not write headlines either—sub-editors did, and correspondents did not always agree with them, though I saw no objection to this one.

There seemed to be a genuine linguistic misunderstanding here. They felt that the heading would be taken as a generalization, meaning that *all* brides were still sold in Central Asia. I said that an English reader would take it simply as meaning that some such cases still occurred, and the reader would certainly learn this if he read the article.

I had concluded this article with a report that a foreign engineer (a Swede) had told me in Tashkent that Uzbek friends had offered to sell him a bride for a few hundred rubles. Having seen the way traditional patterns of Central Asian life continue around the bazaars of Samarkand and Tashkent, I was not surprised, and reported it. This, the LG men said, was impossible. No-one, not even a foreigner, could have told me such a 'lie', they said. I asked them if they were accusing me of lying, and after some hesitation, they agreed that they were. Thereupon I told them I had not come to the interview to be insulted, and took my leave. We all shook hands and wished each other *vsego khoroshego* and *vsego dobrogo* ('all the best'), in that surrealistic gesture which usually follows the most unpleasant interviews in the Soviet Union.

ON July 7th of the same year I was attacked again by the LG, under the heading 'David Bonavia's "Speciality"'. This was to be expected, since I had written about the Fifth Congress of Soviet Writers, and described the relatively dull scene in modern Soviet literature. They wrongly asserted that I had tried to set myself up as a 'specialist' on Soviet literature. I wrote not as a literary critic, but merely as an observer, drawing on the opinions of people who concerned themselves with these matters. Clearly the LG, as the organ of the Writers' Union, had to reply. They took offence primarily at my observation that there were few pessimistic endings in Soviet literature. (Anyone who subscribes to the English-language monthly *Soviet Literature*, which is supposed to represent the best in Soviet writing today, will get my point.) Allegedly, I wanted there to be more 'renegades, to whom socialist ideals are not dear.' I had, however, got it right when I said there was no 'ferment' on the Soviet literary scene. Ferment, apparently, is not considered a good thing in the Writers' Union.

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In this article, they used a particularly offensive phrase, to the effect that my 'little fingers had grown thin from permanently sucking out of them all sorts of anti-Soviet nonsense.'

They returned to the piece about the microphones—which was a real favourite with them—and said I had become a bit more subtle since then. Interestingly, they concluded this article with the observation that I was by no means alone in my attacks on Soviet literature, and that others of my Western colleagues were capable of the same sin, which was true.

This article was signed by one 'V. Gvozdev'. *Gvozd* means 'a nail' (of the metal variety), and this was perhaps intended to be a pun or a warning. It is conventional wisdom among Russians that such press attacks are commonly not written by Soviet journalists, but by professional KGB officers, perhaps using pseudonyms, or by paid stooges.

Soon after this, there was a particularly long, rambling and silly attack on a humorous piece I had written about the adoption and distortion of English and other foreign words in Russian, and which *The Times* had found entertaining enough to print on the front page. The LG's attack showed a total lack of humour and inability to appreciate the light touch. I believe that even the senior people responsible for the series of attacks were ashamed of it, because they always omitted it in their subsequent enumeration of the number of times it had been their 'unpleasant duty' to write about me. In their next attack, for instance, printed on 23 March 1972, they said they were having a go at me for the *third* time. Actually, as is obvious, it was the *fourth*. They persisted with this 'error' even in the final onslaught of 'readers' letters'.

THE fourth attack, heralding my expulsion, was fairly tough. They pursued the now familiar tactic of kicking off with exactly those 'quotes' which I had proved to be most falsified or misunderstood: the parks, the drink and sport, and the microphones. (As far as the sport was concerned, they elaborated by saying I had visited a Soviet stadium, whereas I have only done so once in my life, not to watch a match, but in order to try (unsuccessfully) to arrange a telephone for the chief sports correspondent of *The Times*, who wanted to report a match against Northern Ireland at the Lenin Stadium. Interestingly enough, the sale of vodka near football stadiums has recently been restricted in Russia.)

This fourth attack for the most part reiterated the allegations in the previous ones, but it used the ominous word 'anti-Sovietism', which suggested I was becoming more than mildly unwelcome. By this time I was fairly deeply involved in reporting the Dissident Movement, the Jewish Emigration Movement and the scandals at the Writers' Union, but strangely enough this was never once mentioned.

They accused me of propagating a 'growing flow of disinformation

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and slander'. However, the examples they chose were mild. They professed to be annoyed because I said the BBC series 'The Forsyte Saga', shown on Moscow TV after a three-year delay since its purchase, had been enormously popular in Russia, but that, because of the present bad relations with Britain, the press had largely ignored it. They also criticized me for saying that a story published by Sergei Mikhalkov, the author, in a recent edition of that unhappy journal *Novy Mir,* had been a political allegory. It was perfectly obvious that it *was* an allegory, attacking dissidents, and Jews who wished to emigrate, but I could never find anyone else who had gone to the trouble to read it and confirm my view. Mr Mikhalkov is said to be an exceptionally proud and touchy man, so he might well have taken enough offence to demand a further attack on me. But the decisions in these matters must be taken at Central Committee level—no-one less senior would start a deliberate campaign to have a correspondent expelled. Mikhalkov might just have had enough 'connexions' to pull it off, and I *had* called his story 'nauseating'. Views among my Russian friends and acquaintances differed on this matter.

A Soviet acquaintance pointed out to me that a few days after this article, *Pravda* (which I no longer have in front of me, unfortunately) published a cartoon showing some British figure or other carrying a copy of a newspaper called *Rubbish Times,* and that the caption consisted of a sarcastic couplet penned by Mr Mikhalkov.

This article also attacked me for interpreting a Soviet press article as showing a loss of Soviet interest in Dr Jarring's Middle East mission. It concluded by explaining its title: 'David Bonavia, The Twaddling Bleater' (?), apparently a reference to the Dickensian correspondent of a periodical of some such name. I have never read enough Dickens to know who this character was in the original English, and could not find anyone in Moscow who had, either.

The irony was that this Dickensian character was accused of always seeking—'a novelty of quotations, which cannot be found in that form in which they are printed, in any single source'. Was this a way of telling me that the whole sorry tale of fabrication of my alleged quotations had been deliberate? Soviet propaganda is quite capable of such subtleties.

They also said that this Dickensian character 'is not only familiar with all great writers, but even commands the secrets of their souls. He comprehends their treasured meanings and hints. He knows the themes and names of their books even before they are begun.'

This could have been a reference to some articles I had written (with the help of a Soviet source now happily in the West), on the various scandals in the Writers' Union early in 1972, and about the publishing plans of an author who intended to bring something out in the West. Once again, *The Times* was warned that it was not doing justice to its 'respectability' by keeping me in Moscow.

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THE final act of the *comédie en noir* came on 26 April 1972, with the 'readers' letters', under the heading 'How much longer?' This made it fairly obvious that I would be expelled from the country, but I thought the authorities would take the sensible way of doing it, by waiting till my wife and I went on leave, then failing to renew our re-entry visas. We were nearing the end of our psychological tether anyway, and during leave would probably have asked *The Times* to have us replaced by Christmas at the latest.

The article 'How much longer?' went through exactly the same ritual of the parks, sports stadiums and TV microphones, just to show me that they cared not a fig for my refutation of these 'quotations' or their significance. (By this time, the 'quotes' were all nearly three years old.) It used all the most ominous terms about 'blackening Soviet reality', and so on.

A reader identifying himself as A. Suyetin, a 'plumber from Minsk', wrote that I was 'sucking anti-Soviet inventions from my fingers and not occupying myself with journalistic activity'. Another, calling himself A. Kurnosov, 'a teacher, from Dzerzhinsk', said this was no longer my private business, but a question of denigrating Soviet reality, unworthy of such a 'solid' newspaper. R. Zhenevskaya, from Orsh, described how local children had been given swimming pools, and not in order to overcome a longing for alcohol on their part. 'A lathe operator' from Vitebsk insisted that he and his friends did not visit parks in order to cure themselves from alcoholism, or because they lacked living space.

The only touch of humour came from a Candidate of Philological Sciences, identified as D. Fedorov, who wrote: 'Why did you not, while reporting on the shortage of microphones at Moscow Television, straight away add that the announcers had sold them in order to get drink?' (An ingenious idea!) N. Lobov, said to be an English teacher in Kiev, said that if a correspondent did not serve to strengthen mutual understanding among nations, he should be sternly denounced. It was inadmissible that the 'dispatches of a slanderer should facilitate a deterioration of Anglo-Soviet relations'. L. Vysotsky, 'a retired worker in Minsk', quoted Chekhov: 'Be so kind as to get out.'

The parting shot—actually the disclosure that I would shortly be asked to leave—was by L. Belyanko, identified as a pensioned-off worker in Minsk. He stated that I had been slandering the Soviet Union since 1971, although *all* the articles referred to were published in 1969. 'How long will this go on?' he demanded to know. He ascribed my writings to a desire on the part of 'the bosses' of *The Times* to hold up European *détente*. Thus my writings—entirely the product of my own researches and reflections—were ascribed to my editors as part of a conscious anti-Soviet policy.

Readers of *The Times* in England were not slow to point out that it was impossible to obtain the paper in either Minsk or Vitebsk. This, in a way, missed the point, and in a way got it exactly. Soviet citizens

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were working themselves up into a lather, real or synthetic, over 'quotations' from my writings which they could never see in the original, two of which were actually fabricated from the start, and one of which was ironical. A strange business, to say the least. Why not do it in a more straightforward way?

A good Soviet acquaintance once told me that all such 'readers' letters' are solicited or dictated by the local party committees from their trusties (Tvardovsky, the late editor of *Novy Mir*, once unearthed and published the fact that someone who had written as 'a worker' to denounce him was actually a senior Party activist).

Even if a newspaper receives a perfectly orthodox letter of protest about a foreign correspondent, from a Soviet citizen who is genuinely indignant about the quotations he has seen ascribed to the correspondent, the newspaper will not use it. If it is not written by, or dictated to, one of the people whom the Party really trusts, it might just contain hidden ironies or errors, and prove a source of embarrassment. It is, from the Party's point of view, a rational procedure, but extremely alien to Western newspapers, even those which sometimes make up letters in order to get a good controversy going. The use of two quotations each from Minsk and Vitebsk could suggest that the Party organizations there were particularly zealous in this stage of the campaign.

MY own theory, and it *is* only a theory, about the way the campaign was conducted, is as follows: the Powers disliked me from the start, considering me sardonic and anti-Soviet, at any rate more so than my predecessor. The KGB were instructed to try the routine *provokatsii* to scare or get rid of me. These failed, because I am happily married, and did not indulge in any form of economic speculation. Women would ring anonymously from time to time, obviously offering their services. My official driver, who also acted as a kind of secretary, spent months trying to persuade me to undertake an illegal car sale (I overlooked such trivia because he did his work so well for me in other ways). I slipped, by sheer luck, through the net of a particularly clever attempt to set me up as a pseudo-spy.

They let me travel a good deal, happy to have me out of Moscow, and safe in the knowledge that I did not try to cultivate dissidents in the provinces (which would have meant instant expulsion or a travel ban). But then along came the Khrushchev *Memoirs* and the Anglo-Soviet crisis, and I became more involved with 'Movements' and the goings-on at the Writers' Union, and it was all getting a bit too much. So they carried out a completely illegal, half-hour detention, by force, of myself and my wife, in the hope that *The Times* would 'get the wind up' and withdraw me. But *The Times* stood firm. Then they resorted, probably reluctantly, to the final absurdities of the campaign which they had been building up and holding in reserve for so long. Or perhaps it was all much more random and haphazard than this analysis

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would suggest. The Russians have a saying that 'lies walk on cockroach legs' (i.e. they are fragile). I am glad to have had the opportunity to demonstrate—as one has had to do so tragically often in the past—how apposite this saying is when applied to the Soviet authorities and their organs of propaganda.

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Reporting from Moscow

Per Egil Hegge

MOST journalists, together with most newspaper readers, radio listeners and television viewers, may well have an idea that working as a journalist in Moscow is in many respects quite different from working anywhere else. Without having experienced it at first hand, their understanding of what this difference consists in must needs remain fairly vague. Even if they have experienced it, it can be difficult enough to systematize the differences and to acquire the distance necessary if things are to be kept in their true perspective. It is harder still to judge how the special conditions affect news coming from Moscow, and to demonstrate in concrete terms how and why it must be of a different order to reporting from other places. The purpose of this article is to attempt to provide a basis for such an assessment, or at least to make the reader aware of the fact that news from Moscow is qualitatively different from that coming from elsewhere. This can hardly be done by means of a general summary. Instead it must be allowed to emerge from individual episodes and from a description of purely external working conditions. . . .

Raw Materials

In one particular a Moscow correspondent is in a better, more favourable position than his colleagues in other capital cities. He will, in practice, have access at any time to an expression of the Soviet authorities' views on the most topical domestic and foreign issues. They may be read in the Soviet newspapers, which are centrally directed to such an extent that only in exceedingly rare cases do they express clearly diverging opinions in matters which can be called important. This central control is enforced with the aid of the censorship agency, known by the abbreviation *Glavlit*. *Glavlit* controls all literature and all news material in the Soviet Union, and all publications are furnished with a coded mark of identification on the back page, as evidence of the censorship's approval. Even newspapers such as *Izvestia* and *Pravda* carry this mark, although they are the organs of the government and of the party respectively.[1]

[1] A description of *Glavlit's* control over the press is to be found in *The Russians* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968) by Leonid Vladimirov, a Soviet journalist who defected to the West. Vladimirov tells how representatives of the editorial boards of all the newspapers gather one day in the week at the head office of *Glavlit*, where they are given an account of the official view on different problems. Moreover, they receive directives as to which domestic subjects should be given special emphasis during the week in question, and which ones may no longer be mentioned. In addition, at least one censor serves on each newspaper, and the censors must stamp every manuscript before it goes to be set up.

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This was the system which was abolished in Czechoslovakia in June 1968 by a resolution of the National Assembly, and that resolution became one of the main grounds for the accusations made against the Czechoslovak leaders' policies in the period before the Russian invasion. In the polemic on this subject the word censorship was never used. What the Czechoslovak leaders were reproached for was weakening the working-class's control of the mass media. At an early stage in the so-called Prague spring a special TV programme was broadcast in which the newsreaders held up for the viewers to see the stamps with which a manuscript had to be furnished before it could be read on the radio or television.

Only extremely rarely do 'working accidents' occur in the Soviet press, i.e. only rarely does the censorship misfire. I know of three cases within the past 10 years. There have probably been more cases, but the number must at all events be very small.

The most important mishap happened during the Cuban crisis of October 1962. One afternoon the government newspaper, *Izvestia*, published a commentary containing scornful references to people in the West who thought it possible that the Soviet Union might propose an exchange deal whereby the Soviet government would remove its rockets from Cuba in exchange for the United States withdrawing its missiles from Turkey. Unfortunately, the commentary chanced to be published on the very day when Nikita Khrushchev had, with the utmost secrecy, made precisely the same proposal.

The text had been removed from those editions which were distributed in the provinces and abroad, and which were not printed until getting on for morning. Another case occurred in the spring of 1970 when *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* the organ of the Central Committee, praised a book by the anti-semitic author, Ivan Shevtsov. *Sovetskaya Rossiya* was sharply critical of the Communist Youth Organization's paper *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* which had slated the book. In July the main newspaper *Pravda* entered the dispute, taking its stand alongside *Komsomolskaya Pravda.* According to rumours circulating in Moscow, the editor of *Sovetskaya Rossiya* received a severe reprimand for his praise of Shevtsov.

More serious consequences befell the chief editor of *Meditsinskaya Gazeta* when, in April 1971, presumably through sheer oversight, the paper printed the word 'applause' in parentheses after the names of those whom the international communist movement had lost during the years 1966 to 1971. The names had been read out at the 24th Party Congress, and *Meditsinskaya Gazeta* was the only paper which had included the word applause after the names of the deceased in its report of the session. According to news agency reports reproduced in Western papers early in May 1971 both the editor and many of his colleagues lost their jobs.

How such slips can happen is not something which the outside world knows much about, nor, of course, is it intended that it should

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know. As far as the Cuban crisis is concerned the circumstances seem clear. Here the situation developed so swiftly and was so extremely dangerous that the central apparatus hardly had time to pass up-to-date information down to subordinate agencies.

There can be no doubt that the decrees of the censorship authorities are obeyed, and that in some mystical way even the mightiest in the land are subject to censorship; even Khrushchev and Brezhnev had some sentences excised in print. In the report of Brezhnev's speech to the 24th Party Congress two sentences were omitted, although he did make these statements when he stood at the podium. They concerned the ratio between the heavy and the consumer industries, which he gave as approximately 3 : 1. The speech was broadcast live and in its entirety on both radio and television, and it was thus possible to compare a tape-recording of it with the speech as reported in the following day's *Pravda*.

It is fairly obvious that in the Khrushchev era a Moscow correspondent was able to find out a good deal from such episodes. This would presuppose, however, that he was in a position to devote a considerable amount of time to a project which would not always yield any results at all. Besides, the task of a journalist in Moscow is not solely to report the news: he also seeks to interpret what he is reporting. It is reasonably certain that those who have the authority to determine what shall appear in print are not entirely in agreement. But beyond this the Moscow journalist knows nothing. He does not know how influence is distributed among these divided persons; he does not know whether such disagreement extends to other points; he does not know what kind of political alliances, what political constellation is in the process of emerging; and he has no idea at all when and if this disagreement will lead to a shift in power.

BOTH during and after my stay in Moscow I used to be asked the following question: What chance do you have of finding out what is going on in the Kremlin? My reply is that the chance is in all probability approximately zero. The Communist Party was constructed as a *conspiratorial* organization (I am using the word in a descriptive, rather than a derogatory sense, for it was just such a party that Lenin founded) and no reliable reports of what goes on in the Kremlin leak out. On the very morning of the day Khrushchev was deposed, even he knew nothing about it. He was quite unsuspectingly enjoying a holiday in the Crimea. When things like this can happen, it is hardly to be expected that foreign journalists will learn of important decisions in advance.

Like his counterpart in other countries, the Moscow correspondent gathers most of his information, and practically all his background material, from the national press. This remains his most important source of raw material. However, in the Soviet Union the possibilities of subscribing to newspapers are limited, evidently purely for political

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and security reasons. In 1969 I tried to get a subscription to the Khabarovsk local paper, something which could have been quite a titbit for a journalist that particular year, since a series of border clashes with the Chinese had taken place in the district. My attempt was, however, fruitless, due to the fact that the paper is not included in the list of publications to which a Moscow resident may subscribe (this applies to ordinary Soviet citizens as well). In 1970 it ceased to be possible to subscribe to the Leningrad local paper *Leningradskaya Pravda*. I had been a subscriber to it during 1969 and received permission to become one again at the beginning of 1971. Care is taken to see that such a resolution is adhered to: all SAS and Finnair planes leaving Leningrad bound for Scandinavian countries were searched before take-off to ensure, as far as possible, that no copies of the local paper were taken out of the country. For a Norwegian correspondent it would doubtless have been of interest to read the Murmansk local paper, but anyone residing in Moscow is barred from subscribing to this paper too.

As I have already mentioned, it is the political *decisions* which are presented in the press. The alternatives which were considered before the decision was made seldom find expression. It is therefore impracticable in the great majority of cases to infer anything about the possibilities under debate. Under the most favourable circumstances one can now and then register the fact that there is a debate going on.

Here, in my opinion, the difference between news from Moscow and that from other countries is particularly obvious and significant. When Senator Fulbright criticizes President Nixon, he says outright that it is Nixon he is criticizing. In the Soviet Union one gets a glimpse of a debate when a newspaper criticizes ' certain persons who maintain that . . .' and this is followed by a compressed and perhaps slightly distorted description of views which could have been read in any journal or paper a few weeks before. It takes a lot of doing to get a clear idea that a debate is taking place and to register that someone is being publicly criticized at all, to say nothing of how complicated it is to ascertain who is behind the different ideas, how strong their positions are or where they stand politically. The most one is likely to be able to achieve is to establish that a debate is actually going on, and at best to work out who is involved in it.

However, this kind of thing is not so much journalism in the true sense as research work. I know of no book which better illustrates this research aspect of the Moscow correspondent's existence than Michel Tatu's *Power in the Kremlin*. In his book, Tatu, former Moscow correspondent of *Le Monde* and probably the most outstanding and skilful journalist in the Soviet Union during the post-war years, has undertaken a study of the period 1960–64 and has carefully documented and analysed the various indirect attempts to criticize Nikita Khrushchev till his fall in October 1964. But it should be noted that this is a book which could only have been written after the event, i.e. after

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the fall of Khrushchev and after the events, which were foreshadowed by the tendencies under investigation, had become reality. Moreover, if the book had been written in Moscow it would have required a staff of at least half a dozen secretaries with a knowledge of Russian and a flair for research work, and a medium-sized computer, to boot. In fact, the book was written at Columbia University.

On rare occasions it can happen that information is released concerning circumstances which were insufficiently illuminated at the time. An example which is not only instructive in this context, but is also significant as the beginning of a line of development which culminated in one of the most important events in the history of post-war Europe—the invasion of Czechoslovakia—is the East European summit meeting in Dresden at the end of February 1968. Participating in the meeting were the leaders of the East European communist states, with the exception of Rumania's Nicolae Ceausescu. It was generally assumed that there had been specific discussion of the situation in Czechoslovakia (the meeting took place immediately after Antonin Novotny had relinquished the presidency in the face of strong pressure). Furthermore, the final communiqué stated that the new party chief, Alexander Dubcek, had reported on the situation in the country.

In late summer 1969 a detailed and circumstantial report of this meeting was published in Czechoslovak and Soviet papers. It emerged from the report that Dubcek had been exposed to a number of forthright questions. Thus the Soviet party secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, wanted to know what exactly Dubcek meant by the expression 'socialism with a human face'—one of the central slogans of the Prague spring. Brezhnev felt that the expression was sharply pointed against the kind of socialism which Czechoslovakia's allies were in the process of building.

The Polish party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka and his East German colleague Walter Ulbricht also attacked Dubcek vigorously.

The report was of course published first and foremost with a political aim in mind: the intention was to show that Dubcek had already been sharply warned by his allies at an early stage of events. It is possible that the report is incomplete; nonetheless, it shows that the outside world would have had a far better basis for its assessment of the Czechoslovak question if these statements had been generally known at the time they were made.

SOVIET journalists are not subject to the same restrictions, provided of course that they are trusted. They draw their information in part from foreign newspapers, depending upon their linguistic abilities. For them, however, the main source is the so-called *White Tass* (*Belyi Tass*), a special service with duplicated information sheets which are distributed to journalists at a high level within the hierarchy. The materials contain a rich selection of foreign news, editorial comment and articles from leading foreign newspapers, reproduced directly,

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without the propaganda slant which characterizes most of the news material in the Soviet press. I have never read *White Tass,* but I have seen the bundles of duplicated sheets lying on a Soviet colleague's desk. Of course, he was not allowed to show them to me, nor did I ever ask to see them. I know a famous American journalist who was allowed to hold one of these sheets in his hand during a visit to one of the very highest officials in the Soviet news agency. However, this American, who was on a short visit to Moscow, does not understand Russian and therefore did not realize just what he was sitting there holding. Most of the permanently based Moscow correspondents would almost have been ready to sell their souls for a look at *White Tass.* For these materials do not simply cover foreign news. They also contain important domestic reports, such as statistics on criminality, accidents, production deficiencies and the like—all in all, information which could give a far more complete picture of the situation in the Soviet Union than the official one.

One of the permanently crisis-stricken industries of the Soviet Union is the paper industry, which is nowhere near able to supply the country's increasing demands. Late in the autumn of 1970 a meeting was held to consider the position of the paper industry, and a short notice in the press told how the managers of this industry had been urged to take measures to strengthen it further. I spoke with a journalist who had read the speeches delivered at this meeting. He did not give a detailed report, as that would have constituted a breach of his 'vow of silence', but he said that the situation was really serious and that the criticism had been very severe.

At the discussion of the crisis, and also in the complete but unpublished transcript of it, statistical materials were presented which could doubtless have formed the basis for a pretty satisfactory appraisal of the state of the paper industry. Journalists and other Western observers are thus in no position to give such an appraisal because of the inadequacy of the material at their disposal.

RESTRICTIONS on access to information are a problem which the journalist in Moscow meets with practically every day in the course of his work. And even the statistics which are accessible to him often conceal factors which make it extra difficult for him to make a sound evaluation of the material unless he is a specialist.

This was the case when the eighth five-year plan (for the period 1966 to 1970) was revised before the completion of the plan, probably some time in 1968. It was not publicly disclosed that the plan had been revised (the goals for the production of certain goods by the end of 1970 had been reduced by between 20 per cent and 50 per cent), but the proportion became clear when the plan quotas for 1970, as laid down by the party congress in April 1966, were compared with the figures published for 1970 at the turn of the year 1969–70.

Similar difficulties await anyone wishing to compare the directives

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for the ninth five-year plan (for the period 1971–75), as adopted by the 24th Party Congress in April 1971, with the final plans as presented by Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin in his speech before the Supreme Soviet at the end of November of that same year. The production norms for certain types of goods, which had been stated in April, were not included in Kosygin's speech. And whereas the production targets for certain food-stuffs were given as totals in April, they were expressed in November in units per capita of the population. This makes it difficult to discover what changes the plan has undergone *en route* right up to the final resolution. This is made all the more difficult by the fact that the projected population for 1975 is unknown to anybody except the Soviet Union's demographic experts. All these restrictions imposed upon the information given in the Russian press necessarily lead to restrictions on the information which the correspondents themselves can give from Moscow. As an additional consequence, the official Soviet assessment of important international events may be shrouded in silence for quite long periods, and this is naturally reflected in journalists' reports from the Soviet Union. An obvious example from 1971 is the manner in which the development of relations between China and the USA was treated. In this matter the rule about the Moscow correspondent's relatively privileged position did not apply, since in this case—as distinct from the 'normal' case—he did *not* know the Soviet authorities' official attitude in an important matter.

When news of the American table tennis team's trip to Peking became known in mid-April 1971, it was in fact a long time before any Soviet comment on the Chinese invitation was forthcoming. And it was precisely the Soviet interpretation which interested people most. When the weekly *Novoe Vremya* finally published a sharp commentary, journalists in Moscow at last had something to go on, and could issue the journal's commentary, as an expression of a semi-official response, and a little more besides. Before the commentary was available, however, they had to work in that vacuum which a Moscow correspondent knows all too well. For in such an important matter no official or semi-official spokesmen (I shall include Soviet journalists in the latter category) were willing to risk an opinion before they had been given some guidelines from above.

This vacuum likewise made itself felt when on 15 July 1971 President Nixon announced his intention of travelling to Peking. On that occasion it was 10 days before an official comment was to be had, this time in the form of a detailed article signed by I. Alexandrov in the party organ *Pravda*. Although it has never been admitted by the Soviet authorities, Alexandrov is the pseudonym of a group of highly trusted members of *Pravda*'s editorial staff and of the secretariat of the Central Committee. (In *Pravda* 'he' has no christian name, only the initial 'I', whereas Tass's English news service refers to him as *Igor* and the Russian radio station in East Germany calls

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him *Ivan* Alexandrov.) The information that the name is a pseudonym was given by Czechoslovak journalists in the summer of 1968; the initiated knew that articles bearing this name should be treated as especially important.

The authoritativeness of 'Alexandrov's' views is revealed by the fact that Foreign Minister Gromyko, commenting on the relations between Peking and Washington late in the autumn of 1971, formulated his remarks in a manner which coincided exactly with what *Pravda's* correspondent had written.

Unofficial Sources

One of the most difficult tasks which falls to the Moscow correspondent's lot is to evaluate the news material connected with different groups of dissidents. The difficulty concerns the assessment both of the news value and of the reliability of such material. There are a good many rumours in circulation regarding what goes on in dissident circles, yet it is hardly ever possible to verify them, and in many cases journalists are compelled by pressure of time to put out a report without having been able to check the details. Furthermore, having too extensive contacts with dissidents involves certain risks, risks which are naturally less great for the correspondent than for his Soviet contact. I do not think that there is any significant disagreement among present and former Western correspondents in Moscow over the fact that dissident groups in the Soviet Union have enjoyed a broader news coverage than is warranted by their actual political influence in the early 1970s. Consequently, any tolerably alert Western newspaper reader will, in all probability, have an exaggerated idea of the extent of opposition and of the possibilities open to it. On the other hand, what the correspondent cannot ignore is that the Soviet authorities' way of treating this opposition is news and does have news value. That is why the journalist must write about this subject if he wishes to give a meaningful picture of what is happening in the Soviet Union. For a regime reveals its own character through its attitude towards minorities, be they ethnic, political or religious. If a correspondent is free to make his own judgment in this respect, I can hardly see how he can avoid treating this burdensome task as part of his work. It is of course a different matter if his superiors in the editorial office at home order him to avoid such subjects, either from fear that he will be expelled, or for other motives.

Environmental and Psychological Conditions

The difficulties involved in assessing the Moscow correspondent's psychological condition will be evident to everyone. As one human being differs from another, so too are individual correspondents affected in vastly different ways by being under guard and observation, or by living in foreigners' ghettos as most correspondents, diplomats

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and foreign businessmen do in Moscow. It is my view that this ghetto existence probably solves more problems than it creates—not only for the Soviet authorities, but also for the foreigners. It ensures quite a high standard of accommodation in a country where the norm for Soviet citizens themselves is nine square metres of dwelling space per head. Another advantage is that one's neighbours are in the same position as oneself; they are people one can talk to without having to know Russian. Even if the ghetto existence amounts at the same time to a form of isolation from the local population, it does not lead to any isolation within the ghetto itself. Foreigners who have lived for a longish time in other big Russian cities which do not have foreign colonies as large as the one in Moscow consider the psychological burden of staying there to be significantly greater than in Moscow. (For the sake of clarity, it should be stated that, in the language of a foreigner living in Moscow, the word 'ghetto' is free from those emotive associations which naturally and necessarily adhere to it in Western Europe. I am using it here to designate the blocks of dwellings which are reserved for foreigners.)

Most of the ghettos are surrounded by high railings, and a policeman stands at the entrance. Every time a car passes in or out through the gates he phones through to some department or other. All foreigners' cars in Moscow are furnished with a distinct code number, so that the owner's nationality is evident from the first two figures of the car's number.

Direct shadowing was a relatively rare occurrence during my time in Moscow, but it did happen in autumn 1970. The psychological effect of knowing that you are being shadowed seems to be very strong as far as most people are concerned. At all events this was true in my own case and in the case of those of my colleagues who were also exposed to it. It went on fairly openly; perhaps one of the purposes is precisely to make the person concerned realize that he is being shadowed. Once he is aware of this, he quite reasonably becomes more cautious, if not for his own sake, then for the sake of his Russian acquaintances.

However, about the turn of the year 1970–71 there began a new and, as it now seems, passing phase. The plain-clothes men who shadowed correspondents no longer confined themselves to keeping watch on what went on, but also attempted to prevent journalists physically from meeting Soviet citizens. This was done by means of direct force or arrest. The psychological effect of these incidents was, naturally enough, quite significant.

In the summer of 1971 an episode occurred which is without parallel. Two Western correspondents, one from the British news agency Reuters, and one from the American Associated Press, were summoned for questioning by the KGB. The summons came directly from the KGB without passing through the Foreign Department, which is responsible for accrediting foreign correspondents and which is the authority through which they have all their official contacts. Both journalists

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were advised to regard the interrogation as secret and not to discuss it publicly, a piece of advice which both of them followed. The American correspondent gave his explanation in the presence of the American consul, who could demand to be allowed to attend in accordance with the consular treaty between the USA and the Soviet Union. The British correspondent gave his explanation without any official representation. It was generally assumed at the time that the interrogation was connected with the Bukovsky affair.[2] In spring 1970 another American correspondent was subjected to fairly extensive harassment because of his contacts with Bukovsky, who at that time had recently been released after serving a sentence of three years. In a lengthy interview [3] with the American correspondent Bukovsky told of the methods of torture which are applied in Soviet prisons. Amongst other things the interview gave details of the so-called 'linen' method, which consists in wrapping a prisoner up in wet linen and allowing it to dry on his body. The linen shrinks as it dries, exerting such a pressure on the prisoner that he loses consciousness.

A short time after the interview was published, the correspondent was informed that he had been reported for having driven into a pedestrian and knocking him to the ground. Thereupon, he was alleged to have got out of the car, seized the pedestrian by the collar, lifted him up, knocked him down again with his clenched fist, and left him there with serious injuries. None of this had happened, but when his Moscow office protested to the Press Section of the Foreign Department, the only outcome was a communication advising him that he was not to leave the Moscow city limits, since a legal investigation of the incident was under way. A short time later he was reported for drunken driving as well. Some time after this he left Moscow 'voluntarily'.

IT goes without saying that this form of official attention affects all correspondents and not simply those who are directly confronted with it. I have often been asked: 'Didn't you try acting in concert when you were exposed to such outrages? Couldn't you organize yourselves?' Concerted action or organized behaviour of the type my interlocutors had in mind is hardly feasible in Moscow. In the first place the authorities would doubtless regard with the utmost disapproval any attempt to influence their policy towards correspondents. In the second place, correspondents (I refer here to Western correspondents) are grouped in different camps. Competition between the American telegraph agencies AP and UPI is keen the whole world over, and this has its effect on the press milieu in Moscow too. Some of the correspondents ally themselves with UPI, others with AP. The latter bureau collaborates with Reuters, since these two do not regard each other as rivals.

[2] Bukovsky was arrested in March 1971 and sentenced in January 1972 to 12 years in prison, labour camp, and exile. Cf. *Survey*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1972), pp. 123–60.

[3] Cf. *Survey*, No. 77 (Autumn 1970), pp. 139–46.

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However, immediately before I was expelled in February 1971 attempts were made to collaborate in a way which cut right across this 'demarcation line'. Some of us met to discuss what we could do in the hope of being spared some of the chicaneries in store. It was the understanding of those who took part that such attacks ought to be given as wide publicity as possible in the belief that this was the only means of defence which we had at our disposal in the present situation. The negative effect which publicizing such episodes would have might possibly help to make the authorities desist from such methods in the future.

The majority of the correspondents seemed not to be especially in favour of tactics like these, but settled down to wait and hope that the blunt methods would come to an end. (They did cease later in the spring.) Those who did not want to accept the strategy of wider publicity considered, as far as I can judge, that it could undermine their own position vis-à-vis the authorities if they wrote about such sensitive matters. I find no cause to reproach the advocates of a more cautious policy, yet I cannot personally subscribe to it, since I considered, and still do consider, that the publicity could have both increased our own personal safety and informed our readers about a very important and sudden change in the external conditions which newsmen faced in Moscow.

The events of that time had a kind of parallel in something which had happened in January–February 1968, a short time after one of the trials of dissidents which took place during the 1960s.[4] On that occasion the relatives of the sentenced men had invited a number of Western correspondents to their home for some form of press conference. When the correspondents reached the house where the relatives lived they were stopped by hefty men in plain clothes, who advised them not to enter. Some of the other correspondents had been phoned by the Press Section of the Foreign Department and reminded of a law dating from the end of the 1940s according to which all professional contacts between foreign newspapermen in Moscow and Soviet citizens are to be arranged through the agency of the Press Section. Some of the reporters were told about this law at the time they were accredited, others were not. Moreover, under normal circumstances it appears that the law is interpreted relatively liberally. It would be almost unthinkable that a journalist who, for example, made contact with someone in the management of a Moscow theatre, should be reprimanded by the Foreign Department for failing to allow the Department to arrange the contact.

From time to time situations arise in which one is probably justified in disregarding the regulations which circumscribe journalists' contacts and freedom of movement. Such was the situation for instance during the trial of the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel in February 1966. If the foreign journalists on that occasion had all without exception made

[4] Cf. *Survey*, No. 68 (July 1968), pp. 120, 159.

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do with the official material—which, from the authorities' point of view, would have been the ideal state of affairs—the outside world would have received a decidedly distorted impression of the case. At the same time, the protests made by members of the Writers' Union would have been kept quiet.

It is difficult to construct a situation which parallels this one. Perhaps one could imagine a Washington correspondent who in reporting the trial of Lieutenant William Calley (for the My Lai massacre) relied exclusively upon a pro-Calley local newspaper from Georgia as his source. The distortions in such a case would be of approximately the same sort as those which the official Russian papers produced in their reports of the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial. (I am not of course making any comparison here between the substance of the two trials, but simply between their news coverage.)

Knowledge of the Language

It is well known that the majority of the Western correspondents in Moscow have a fairly poor command of the Russian language—at least when they arrive. For those who are stationed there for a longer time, the problem is a temporary one. But it is uncommon for most American correspondents to stay in Moscow for more than two years, which is as short as it could be.

In such cases the correspondents may turn first of all to the Tass agency's English-language information service and accept help from their colleagues. Furthermore, they often have a secretary who reads the papers on their behalf and translates anything which is of interest. These secretaries are supplied by a bureau which helps foreigners, and my impression is that most of them are good at their work.

Nevertheless, under these circumstances the correspondent is less independent and more reliant upon the help of others than he would be in a country where he is familiar with the state of affairs. Under the conditions which prevail in Moscow he is also more dependent upon the large international telegraph agencies.

These bureaus have a sizable staff of Russian secretaries, who go through all the publications which can be subscribed to. By late morning a bureau has as a rule sent out its telegrams, and, in editorial offices the world around, people already know what the day's news from Moscow is. The correspondent knows this too, the moment he visits the bureau's office to acquaint himself with the day's material. It is generally true to say that this set-up does not have a detrimental effect as long as the bureau's reporting service is of high quality, and as long as the bureau realizes what is the most important news material.

A contributory cause in cases of faulty reporting is extreme central control from the home country. I am opposed in principle to such central direction and especially so where Moscow is concerned. There it is only the correspondent who can appreciate the situation, and in

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most cases he must be left with the right to decide for himself. In cases where the home editorial office takes a strong line with the correspondent, situations can arise which are almost grotesque due to the *home editors'* defective knowledge of the actual state of affairs.

One such case made a strong impression on me. The Lithuanian sailor who was handed over by an American coastguard vessel after his attempt to desert from a Soviet ship in December 1970, was brought back to the Soviet Union, and one of my colleagues was requested by his home office to film him as he landed! At about the same time the same man was instructed to film the presentation of the Nobel Prize in literature to Alexander Solzhenitsyn at the Swedish Embassy. But these examples are, to the best of my knowledge, without parallel, and ought, indeed, to remain so.

Problems can of course arise in the relations between foreign-based journalists and their home editorial office irrespective of the geographical location. However, I know of occasions when a situation arose which ought to have been tackled quite differently from the way it actually was.

After writing a number of critical articles a certain Moscow correspondent was informed by the Press Section of the Russian Foreign Department that he would not automatically be granted a new entry visa when next he left the Soviet Union. He would have to apply for one from the Soviet Embassy upon arrival in his own country. (All correspondents have to put in a request for an exit and entry visa when they are going to leave the Soviet Union, to go on holiday, for instance, and the application must be handed in at least 48 hours before departure. Without a visa they may not cross the frontier in either direction.)

It was obvious that this instruction amounted to a *de facto* expulsion, which would come into force the moment my colleague crossed the Russian border on his way home. Thus he was prevented from taking his holiday. His editors accepted this 'order' without a murmur, instead of letting the Soviet authorities know that they would not agree to having a correspondent stationed in Moscow under entirely different and considerably worse conditions than his colleagues.

The correspondent had to put up with constant telephone calls, often at night, and other forms of quite serious harassment. He had to withstand pressures which must, beyond doubt, be described as injurious to his health. It would not be surprising if his condition affected his reporting, through no fault of his own. Such conduct hardly redounds to the honour of his employers. To my mind, it was marked by quite considerable irresponsibility, both from the point of view of journalism and as regards the state of his health.

(The possibility of a similar development in my own case had been discussed in advance, and it had been made clear that the three papers which I represented would not have accepted this manner of restricting an accredited journalist's privileges, modest as these privileges are to begin with in Moscow. An expulsion is a day-to-day

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hazard, since every country decides for itself which foreigners it finds undesirable on its own territory. But half or at least a third of expulsions are the kind of occurrences which ought not to be accepted.)

In circles which take an interest in questions of the press there is a quite widespread idea that the Soviet authorities prefer to see correspondents with no command of Russian. This assertion calls for some qualification, but there are instances which may be adduced to support it. Thus, not long ago an application for a correspondent with a solid command of Russian to be accredited was turned down. The person in question had worked in Moscow as a correspondent before and had a very wide circle of acquaintances. After moving to another country he visited Moscow and had no difficulty in obtaining a visa on that occasion. It is difficult in his case to detect any other motives than that he was very well acquainted with the state of affairs in the Soviet Union and with the Russian language. No reason was given for the rejection of his application, a practice which is however followed by almost all states, and which is not therefore peculiar to the Soviet authorities.

Censorship and Self-Censorship

Prior censorship of news cables from Moscow to foreign countries ceased in 1961. The abolition of censorship was part of the liberalization measures of the Khrushchev era (they also included the publicizing of what went on at sessions of the Central Committee, a practice which has now been entirely abolished), and it led to a very sharp increase in the number of foreign correspondents in Moscow.

Ironically enough, preventive censorship had an intrinsic value as an indirect source of news. The most illuminating example is the way in which the news magazine *Time* was treated during the French crisis of April 1958, when de Gaulle came to power. As a contribution to the feature *Time* was preparing, the magazine's Moscow editorial office submitted to the censor the article on de Gaulle from the Large Soviet Encyclopaedia. This article is extremely critical, to put it mildly. For 'g' is the fourth letter in the cyrillic alphabet, and the first volumes of the encyclopaedia came out while Stalin was still alive. The article had probably been written shortly after de Gaulle's peculiar interlude with the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*, and there was precious little to be found in the Soviet encyclopaedia which reflected credit upon the new French head of government. The Moscow censors did not let the article through. And if anyone wishes to track down the first slight indications of the improved Franco-Soviet relations which in many ways set their seal on developments in Europe during the 1960s, is this not perhaps the place to look?

For *one* group of journalists in Moscow, however, prior censorship still applies—I refer to the TV newsmen. They are not allowed to photograph on their own initiative, or to use their own cameramen,

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unless they are accompanied by a Soviet inspector. It is the inspector's task to see that no 'untypical' scenes are filmed, and the truth of the matter is that there is a great deal that is not typical. The account given by one of my colleagues will serve as an illustration.

He was preparing a report on everyday life in Moscow and had settled a time for filming inside a large department store. When he arrived in the morning to collect his camera crew he was informed that the scene could not be shot as it had been discovered that the location was not light enough. Now my colleague had been at the place a few days earlier and had taken a light-meter reading together with a Soviet cameraman. They had found that it would be all right to film there. He therefore asked in some irritation if he might be told the real reasons why he was not allowed to make the film.

Well, came the answer, the real reason was that there was now such a short time left before the anniversary of the Revolution that there were untypically long queues in the shops, with people buying in lots of things for the celebrations. The viewers would get an entirely false impression and would think that there was a shortage of goods in the Soviet Union.

My colleague pointed out convincingly that this was, on the contrary, very favourable for the Soviet Union: the fact that the anniversary of the Revolution should be celebrated so thoroughly bore witness to the political interest and the level of political development among the population. They gave way before this superior argument, and the correspondent took his camera crew to the shop, where a film was duly taken.

When the scene was edited my colleague made the following discovery. The opening shot was of the goods on the meat counter. As the camera turned towards the long queues in the shop, the film grew gradually darker, and quite soon it was completely dark. What had happened was that the inspector had turned the shutter so that what was 'untypical' was underexposed. In other words, there really wasn't enough light. . . .

Moreover, the TV journalist knows that he may not say anything in his accompanying commentary which conflicts with the content or tendency of the film. This directive is seldom made more explicit, but one can well imagine how difficult it is for a TV reporter to convey in a report on housing construction an important piece of information such as the fact that the Soviet Union only builds between 60 and 70 per cent of what is built in Sweden, calculated in terms of living space per head of the population, or that in a newly built Russian town only about seven square metres of apartment space is provided per head of the population (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 14 April 1971).

Self-censorship is an expression which is often used in the context of correspondents' work in Moscow. What is meant is that the journalist himself, without any pressure being applied from outside, avoids

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treating subjects which are unlikely to meet with the authorities' approval, or that he avoids writing in a way which may lead to the imposition of restrictions, for instance in the form of a refusal to grant him permission to travel within the country. In other words, the correspondent is for ever peering over his own shoulder.

It is of course difficult to generalize about the way in which correspondents censor themselves. It is perhaps more difficult still to give any kind of objective account of how one acted in Moscow oneself. I see no reason, though, to conceal the fact that I occasionally chose my subjects and wrote about them, thinking to myself that here was something the Soviet authorities were bound to approve of. And I find it hard to believe that most of my colleagues were never affected by similar thoughts.

Here is one illustration. At the end of November 1970 I received from a Soviet source which I had every reason to regard as reliable some information which indicated that the Khrushchev memoirs were genuine. The source also stated that Khrushchev had been summoned to see one of the members of the Politbureau, Arvid Pelshe, and had been requested to sign a *démenti*. (This so-called *démenti* was dated 10 November, and was released on the 16th.) At first Khrushchev refused to sign, but finally he gave in and put his name to the statement, after making a few corrections. (The reader will perhaps recall that he did not deny the existence of the memoir materials, only that *he* had handed them over to anyone.)

I immediately informed some colleagues of what I had been told. The debate over whether the memoirs were authentic or not was going on at that time, and hence the information was not without interest. One of the most experienced Moscow correspondents warned me not to send out anything about the matter. It would be grounds for expulsion, he said, because you would be reporting the words of a member of the Politbureau.

I sent the story. He did not—and he is still in Moscow. In other words, this was a situation in which it was wise to exercise self-censorship, wise, that is, on the understanding that a Moscow correspondent's first aim is to remain in the Soviet Union, with all the restrictions this entails. However, the correspondent can but guess at these restrictions, and self-censorship must therefore be largely a matter for the individual.

Most Moscow correspondents are convinced that travel opportunities are exploited by the authorities as a kind of regulating device. A journalist who has not given a favourable account of things in the Soviet Union is more likely to encounter travel restrictions and to be refused permission to travel than one who avoids treating negative topics. My impression is that this measure was not used so frequently during the time of my stay. In 1969 no one was allowed to travel in Siberia, but that was no doubt connected with Sino-Soviet relations. A journalist who applied in September 1970 for permission to travel to Siberia had

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his request turned down on the grounds that it had already got too cold. Three weeks later President Georges Pompidou came to Novosibirsk during his official visit. I think that the rejection of my colleague's application may be put down to a simple bureaucratic decision, and was not intended to intimidate the journalist in question. All the same, the hope of avoiding travel restrictions persists, and it tends to make journalists behave more cautiously. The point here is not that there is a possible link between conduct and travel opportunities, but that the journalist believes this to be the case and acts accordingly, i.e. he exercises a stricter or milder form of self-censorship.

I HAVE often been asked by both readers and colleagues whether it is worth the trouble and expense, all things considered, of having a correspondent in Moscow.

I had no doubt then, and do not now, that the answer must be in the affirmative, if only because a correspondent in the Soviet Union has the opportunity of travel. Although by far the larger part of the country is closed to foreigners, there is a considerable number of large areas left which are open to them, and even a protracted stay in the country would not be sufficient to visit all of them. Only through these trips can the journalist, and hopefully the reader or listener too, gain an impression of how endlessly varied the land is and how great the difference is between, for instance, Estonia and Central Asia. Of course, one can imagine that there must be differences, and one can read about them, but nothing can replace the immediate impression which the journalist gets on the spot.

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The Soviet Union, China and Japan

Richard Löwenthal*

A EUROPEAN who has studied both Soviet and Chinese foreign policy, but who lacks a solid knowledge of Japan and the driving forces of its policy, can only make a limited contribution to this subject. He may attempt to show the objectives pursued and the strategies used by the communist powers in dealing with Japan, but he can only advance tentative hypotheses about the nature and order of Japanese interests. Yet it is only from a comparison of the objectives and strategies of Russia and China with the interests of Japan that conclusions of practical importance may be drawn.

The Background: Russia and China

Ever since October 1949, Japan has found itself in the neighbourhood of two communist states of great actual or potential power, who started by viewing it as a traditional enemy, as a dependent ally and outpost of their actual chief enemy, the USA, and as a potential threat to their interests in its own right, owing to the productive energy and national discipline shown by its people.

In the Soviet case, the fear of 'Japanese militarism' goes back to the traumatic memory of Russia's defeat in the war of 1904–05, to the occupation of important parts of Siberia by Japanese forces between 1917 and 1920, and to the renewal of a Japanese threat to the Far Eastern regions of Russia after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, which culminated in repeated major military clashes in the late thirties. The fact that Japan kept the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union throughout the second world war, and that the Soviet Union broke it at the last moment when Japan had been hit by the atomic bomb and was seeking Soviet good offices for obtaining peace is not often recalled in Soviet publications and has left no impact on the Soviet public image of Japan, while the importance of this last-minute Soviet attack on the Japanese forces in Manchuria for the end of the war is vastly exaggerated in Soviet publications. On the other hand, the American refusal to let the Soviets share in the post-war occupation of Japan has again acquired traumatic importance for the Soviets not only as evidence of early post-war hostility by the US, but as the starting-point of an American plot to rearm yesterday's common enemy as a potential ally against Russia.

* Based on a paper read at a conference held in March 1972 and sponsored jointly by the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

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In China, fear of Japan has a far more recent and serious basis than in Russia—the experience of the occupation first of Manchuria and then of most of the mainland after 1937. To Communist China, too, the US became the main enemy, first by its support of the Nationalist government, and then by the approach of American forces to the Chinese frontier in the course of the Korean war and the subsequent fighting with the Chinese 'volunteers', by their naval presence in the Taiwan Straits, and by their role in the defence of Quemoy in 1958, so that US-Japanese cooperation appeared as an alliance of Peking's chief enemies in the recent past and the present.

The Soviet-Chinese alliance, concluded in February 1950 before the Korean war, was explicitly directed against Japan and powers allied to Japan; only the revised version of the treaty agreed in October 1954 no longer mentioned Japan as a primary target. From about this time, soon after the conclusion of the peace treaty between Japan and the non-communist powers and the end of the occupation regime, the Soviets have tended to see the principal danger in the link between Japan and the US rather than in Japanese strength as such, even while remaining anxious to prevent Japan from becoming a nuclear power, and accordingly ended the state of war with Japan in 1956. The Chinese, on the other hand, have continued to regard Japan as dangerous not only owing to its ties with the US, but in its own right, particularly in connexion with Japan's friendly relations with Taiwan which excluded the creation of normal diplomatic relations with Peking, and also in the context of Japan's improving relations with South Korea.

The Background: Japan

It may be said that post-war Japan was originally ranged in opposition to the communist powers not by its own choice, but by the externally imposed fact of US occupation resulting from the war. Yet so long as the communist camp was represented mainly by the Soviet Union, the imposed choice was supported by a large majority of public opinion, owing to the recent memory of the Soviet breach of faith in 1945 and to the fate of Japanese prisoners of war in the Soviet Union no less than to the support and scope given to the reconstruction of Japan by the American victors.

Support for the alignment with the US became far more controversial after the emergence of Communist China. A powerful mixture of cultural sympathies with and guilt feelings towards the Chinese people, regardless of the nature of their political system, now made many Japanese feel ill at ease with an international orientation that seemed to range them once more against Asia's oldest and most numerous nation, and conscious that this orientation had originally been chosen not *by* them, but *for* them. The conflict and ultimate break between Peking and Moscow, by making it possible to advocate friendship with China without doing the same for Russia, reinforced this tendency

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not only among the greater part of the Japanese left-wing opposition, but among considerable sections of the business community and the governing party.

As the dispute became more bitter, the debate was conducted in increasingly unreal terms. Instead of asking which were Japan's long-term interests as a nation and how far they were compatible with the interests of either the US or the two major communist powers, one side took the broad identity of Japanese and American interests for granted, whereas the other painted a picture of a choice between being dragged into increasingly bitter conflict with China, possibly culminating in war, in the wake of US policy or achieving a reconciliation with the Chinese brothers by a clean break with the American imperialists.

The New Constellation

Ever since the final breakup of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1963, the traditional hostility of both communist powers towards Japan has been increasingly modified by elements of a competition for future influence on Japan. In the case of the Soviets, the weapons of the new courtship as of the continuing old pressure—the carrots and the sticks—have been primarily those of traditional diplomacy: threats of isolation and conditional offers of cooperation, strict refusals to discuss outstanding territorial issues alternating with conditional readiness for negotiations, and proposals for major economic deals. In the case of China, the main weapon has been the exploitation of internal disagreements within Japan; while the statement of formal conditions for a normalization of diplomatic relations and the lure of an expansion of trade have played their role, both have appeared to be addressed to various opposition forces in Japan rather than to the governments in power.

Since the development of the 'Nixon doctrine' by the United States and the appearance of visible efforts to achieve a *rapprochement* between Washington and Peking, the situation has undergone a further change. From the viewpoint of Japan, dependence on the US is clearly declining and scope for the pursuit of an independent foreign policy increasing; on the other hand, neither the indefinite continuation of American protection nor that of Japan's role as America's preferential partner in the Pacific region can be taken for granted any longer. As the ideological dispute between the supporters of alliance with the US and of reconciliation with China is overtaken by events, a sober reappraisal of basic Japanese interests can no longer be postponed.

For China, the two main aspects of the new constellation are the prospect of an end to the American presence on the South Asian mainland and in Taiwan, and of greater Japanese political and possibly military independence. The first means that the United States is ceasing to be China's principal enemy and that the ideological priority given to the confrontation with the Soviets may be maintained with declining risk. The second means that an increasingly strong and independent

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Japan could continue to be a danger to China, with or without American backing and even more so in the case of a Russo-Japanese *rapprochement*, so that the effort to curb the growth of Japanese strength and activity by controlling it with US help, isolating Japan or influencing the direction of Japanese policy is acquiring increased urgency in Chinese thought.

For Russia, the new constellation means both an increased chance for loosening the ties between the United States and Japan and an increased urgency of preventing a *rapprochement* between Japan and China. The result is a greater eagerness to improve relations with Japan, mainly by economic deals, but if necessary also by limited territorial concessions.

Some basic Japanese interests

In order to examine the prospects of the emerging new Soviet and Chinese policies towards Japan, it is necessary to make some assumptions about Japan's own basic interests in the new constellation, at the risk that the reappraisal of those interests that is now in progress may lead the Japanese themselves to come to different conclusions.

We shall assume, then, that these interests will be viewed from the angles of Japan's external security, of its continued freedom of internal development, and of its increasing freedom of political and economic activity in its wider Asian environment. This amounts to an interest in security against military attack or interference with vital economic supplies, against political or economic blackmail threatening either, and against any intervention by foreign powers in Japan's domestic affairs, as well as to an interest in broadening Japanese political and economic influence within the region.

Japanese interest in external security and freedom from blackmail has in the past been mainly assured by the American alliance, supplemented by a limited effort for self-defence; it has been potentially threatened mainly by the other leading nuclear and now also naval power, the Soviet Union. The same is true for the protection of vital Japanese supplies from overseas, which are also becoming more vulnerable with the growth of Soviet naval power and Soviet influence in the Middle East. The effort to reduce American defence commitments under the 'Nixon doctrine' has not changed the willingness of the US to maintain the Japanese alliance nor its basic usefulness for Japanese security, but has opened the way to a change in the proportions in which that security will be assured in the future by American and Japanese forces.

Japan's freedom of internal development has gradually been recovered with the loosening and final disappearance of the US occupation regime, and has subsequently been increasingly respected by the US despite occasional attempts to exert influence. It has been recently endangered mainly by massive Chinese efforts at intervention in Japanese

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domestic politics, compared to which the means of intervention available to the Soviets have been minor.

Japanese regional economic and political influence, ranging from Taiwan and Korea to South-East Asia, has been deliberately fostered by the United States and been opposed chiefly by China, with very different intensity in different places. In the context of the American-Chinese *rapprochement*, the chances for continued Japanese influence in Taiwan are disappearing. At the same time, new chances of economic influence are offered by the Soviets.

The Soviet Union and Japan

The Soviet Union does not feel threatened by Japan, and would not feel threatened even in the case of a considerable expansion of Japanese non-nuclear forces. It has felt potentially threatened by the alliance between the United States and Japan, particularly in the context of Japan's unsatisfied claim for the recovery of its 'Northern Territories'—the islands annexed by the Soviets after the war and known to them as the 'Southern Kuriles'. But it could live with a continuation of that alliance, even while disliking it, provided a territorial settlement was reached, provided Japan did not become a nuclear power, and, above all, provided the *rapprochement* between the US and China did not lead to close political cooperation between China and Japan.

Soviet objectives in relation to Japan are therefore to prevent a development towards Sino-Japanese cooperation, to loosen and if possible break up the alliance between Japan and the US and to prevent Japan from becoming a nuclear power. But the achievement of these maximum objectives would leave an isolated Japan at the mercy of Soviet nuclear blackmail and liable to be forced into cooperation with the Soviets against both the US and China. This appears to be obvious to Japanese policy-makers.

While Soviet policy thus meets little sympathy in Japan for reasons of Japanese security reinforced by historical memories, the Soviets are in a position to back it up both by territorial concessions and by offers of major economic opportunities. On the territorial issue, Soviet agreement to open negotiations on a peace treaty suggests a willingness to return at least Habomai and Shikotan, the small islands adjoining Hokkaido, to Japanese control; but the Soviets may well try to make a return of the more important islands, Etorofu and Kunashiri, dependent on military conditions that could create difficulties for the Japanese alliance with the US, such as the retention of a Soviet base on one of the islands or a ban on the passage of American ships between them. In this way, they might hope to face the Japanese policy-makers with a choice between their territorial claims and the alliance that ultimately ensures Japan's external security.

The projects for Japanese cooperation in Siberian economic development are of major potential interest to both sides. So far, the Soviets have only offered terms regarded as unattractive by the Japanese,

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possibly wishing to give the impression that they could do better in return for a better political understanding. But the keen Soviet interest in Japanese technological know-how suggests that Russia is hardly in a position to insist on a major reversal of Japanese foreign policy—as distinct from the kind of *détente* which a peace treaty would naturally bring about—as a condition for a major economic deal.

It would thus seem likely that Soviet leverage may prove sufficient to obtain a normalization of relations with Japan and to prevent a Japanese alignment with China against Russia, as well as to prevent a Japanese decision to become a nuclear power in the near future, but not to detach Japan from the US or to align it with Russia against China.

China and Japan

While Russia is, broadly speaking, more concerned about Japan's alliance with the US and a possible *rapprochement* with China than about Japan's independent military power, China's attitude is the opposite: an increase in Japan's military strength, particularly in mobile ground forces, is seen as a threat to Chinese security in itself because of memories of the thirties, whereas in the context of the US-Chinese *rapprochement*, Peking has at times given the impression that it even regards the US-Japanese alliance as a possible brake on 'Japanese militarism' and urges the Americans to hold down Japanese rearmament.

Japan in its turn does not, generally speaking, feel militarily threatened by China in the foreseeable future. But in the context of the Nixon doctrine the continued reliance on US nuclear protection clearly depends on the continued presence of US forces, most of all of US naval bases, on Japanese territory; and in view of pressures to shift the Seventh Fleet away from the Western Pacific, this presence can be assured in the long run only by Japan's assumption of a greater share in the naval protection of its islands, their approaches and their vital supplies—not from China, but rather from Soviet naval power. The Americans cannot, therefore, play the restraining role on Japanese armaments which the Chinese would like them to play, except probably in the nuclear field, but are on the contrary urging a greater defensive effort on their Japanese allies and are likely to continue to do so, even if unrealistic fantasies about a Japanese naval role in the Indian ocean are corrected; and the Japanese, for all the serious economic and ideological difficulties of even a moderate naval expansion, may not be able to avoid it for long.

The actual reaction of China to a moderate increase in Japanese strength is likely to depend on whether a normalization of relations between Tokyo and Peking has been achieved beforehand, and above all whether the conflict of interests over Taiwan has been solved and how the competition for political and economic influence in Korea and in South-East Asia is developing. Japan has not only substantial invest-

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ments and trading interests in Taiwan, but has long based its official China policy on a peace treaty concluded with the Nationalist government there in which the latter claimed no reparations. Peking on its side, having always denied that government's right to speak for China, denied the validity of that treaty and claimed that any normalization of relations with Japan must be preceded by Japan's 'ending its state of war with China', i.e. by its admission of the nullity of the treaty with Taiwan and the negotiation of a new one with Peking. When Peking achieved a clear American commitment to recognition of Taiwan as part of China, which effectively bars the possibility of a prolonged independence of Taiwan under Japanese protection, a reorientation of Japanese policy became inevitable. As soon as the Tanaka-Chou En-lai communiqué was signed, the present Japanese Foreign Minister, Masayoshi Ohira, announced that the treaty with Taiwan 'ceased to be valid' and relations between Japan and Taiwan were formally severed.

An American withdrawal from South Korea does not seem to be envisaged at present, but if it should come about, a substitution of Japanese for American influence there is also unlikely; rather, Tokyo is preparing to join in the incipient *détente* between the two Korean states. On the other hand, Chinese efforts to win lasting influence in South-East Asia have suffered severe setbacks in 1965 and again recently with the breakup of Pakistan, and seem to have poor prospects in the near future with the possible exception of the Indochinese states and Thailand; while Japanese economic influence at least has been rising in insular and maritime South-East Asia, and Japanese interest in the security of the Malacca Straits and the surrounding area is nothing short of vital. The prospects of normalization and improved relationship during the last quarter-century and to put the change on an understanding in which Japan writes of hopes for lasting influence on Taiwan, but also on whether China would silently accept a measure of Japanese influence in maritime South-East Asia with its appropriate naval protection.

What remains as potentially the most serious source of conflict between China and Japan is the extent of Chinese reliance on manipulating pro-Chinese ideological or interest groups in Japan so as to influence Japanese policy: no stable coexistence seems possible while such massive intervention in Japanese internal affairs continues. On the other hand, any attempt to pursue a sharply anti-Chinese policy in Japan would necessarily perpetuate such intervention and would prove a source of Japanese division and weakness. A continuous effort at a normalization of Sino-Japanese relations will thus have to deal not only with the questions of diplomatic representation, of the status of Taiwan, and of Chinese acceptance of a realistic measure of Japanese regional influence and military power, but also with the need to put relations on a correct government-to-government level. The readiness of Japan for an 'acceptance of realities' is clearly great: it depends on Chinese realism whether the opportunity for lasting normalization will be pursued.

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An 'Era of Negotiations' in East Asia?

The foregoing analysis suggests that the readjustment of relations between Russia, China and Japan to the new international constellation is not taking place in an atmosphere of dramatic confrontation. On every side, groping and uncertainty may be observed as the interests of the powers and their conflicts are reappraised by the principal actors. But as the examination proceeds, the impression emerges that owing to the increased flexibility of the new situation, there is scope enough for partial compromises to avoid the formation of new rigid blocs and to live with the remaining conflicts in an atmosphere of comparative normality.

Japan is not likely to want to renounce the security of the American alliance, or to be forced into such a step which no power except Russia now really desires. Nor is it likely to wish, or to be forced, to make an option for aligning itself with Russia against China, e.g. by joining the 'Asian Collective Security Treaty' proposed by the Soviets, or with China against Russia. Instead, it will probably benefit from the fact that neither of the communist powers can risk pushing it into the other's arms by intransigence, and may use its growing freedom of action for settling some of the outstanding conflicts by negotiation. But Japan, of course, cannot afford to be intransigent either if it wishes to avoid isolation—that is the logic of the new flexibility.

To say this is not to claim that the settlement of long-standing conflicts will be easy, quick or complete, in this region of the world any more than in others—normalization may well require 'an era of negotiations.' Nor is it to assume that the basic contrast between the industrially advanced democracies and the powers dominated by communist party regimes has lost its relevance for international affairs—what we said about the nature of the Soviet threat to Japan's external and the Chinese threat to its internal security should be sufficient to prove the opposite. But a contrast of systems that has remained relevant may nevertheless become less dangerous in a more flexible world—provided only that we do not forget its continued importance.

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The New Age of Japan-US Relations

Fuji Kamiya

The shock of bereavement

The 'Post-war Era' in Japan's relations with the US and the rest of the world breathed its last with President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 and the ratification of the Okinawa Reversion agreement in March. One would expect most Japanese to have welcomed its demise, since it is difficult to feel at all settled during a transitional period such as the post-war years have been. Moreover, in Japan's case, popular aversion to war in general has made the post-war era particularly frustrating.

Now that the long-awaited day has arrived, is there rejoicing in Japan? Are we overjoyed at the prospect of a more 'equal' relationship between Japan and the US and a more 'mature' relationship following the reversion of Okinawa? Are we happily optimistic that the Sino-American *rapprochement* will bring about a relaxation of tensions in Asia, thus leading to increased autonomy in Japan's foreign policy and wider options? Apparently not. In fact, one rarely hears such opinions expressed. Japanese have begun to feel deeply anxious that 'mature' relations with the US will be increasingly tougher for Japan; that increased 'autonomy' will lead only to more bewilderment on the part of the Japanese; and that Japan will be left to founder in the wake of the Sino-American *détente*.

For the Japanese, whose foreign policy has for a long time consisted primarily of cooperation (anti-government groups call it servility) with the United States, phrases like 'dissolution of the cold-war structure', 'reduction of tensions', 'multi-polarization', and 'autonomous foreign policy' naturally have an attractive ring. Hence it was not strange that at one stage they were widely supported. But why is it that, with the exception of the Japanese Communist Party, all the opposition parties and the government party as well welcomed the Sino-American Joint Communiqué? Throughout the entire quarter-century since the Pacific war, a fundamental lack of agreement concerning important foreign policy issues between the ruling party and the opposition has been characteristic of Japanese politics. That being the case, their recent consensus could only be interpreted as either the result of a lie or a misunderstanding, and/or just a bluff on the part of the government and/or opposition parties. I tend to think their perplexing concurrence of views reflects an anxiety and puzzlement shared by the Japanese people.

In so far as the international politics of the post-war era can be described in such terms as 'cold war', 'bipolarization', 'tension', and 'confrontation', they often cast a shadow as melancholy as a snowy

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winter sky over Japanese spirits. Some have feared that Japan would get enmeshed in conflicts arising out of Russo-American or Sino-American confrontation; others have deplored the lack of autonomy in Japanese foreign policy.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that, on the whole, Japan has been one of the primary beneficiaries of the post-war cold war structure. Whenever problems arose, we were able to get by just because we could fall back on the United States, or merely by identifying with the free world without worry about the consequences. Despite voices of doom crying in unison, we were not drawn into either the Korean or the Vietnam wars. We have been able to concentrate in the meantime on internal affairs, especially the economy, and have achieved today's high level of prosperity. For Japan, which had not fully recovered from the Pacific war, the outbreak of the Korean war was like manna from heaven, signalling the turning point towards economic independence. In some senses the same has been true of the Vietnam war. It has not brought the level of special procurements that proved so highly profitable during the Korean war, but it is often quipped in Saigon that out of the $100 billion-plus that the US has spent on the war, Honda Motors has taken home more than anyone else.

It is true that Japan has felt considerable unrest as a result of international tension in Asia, but it has not been serious and Japan has taken no positive diplomatic action to ease it. Avowals in the 1969 Nixon-Sato Joint Communiqué that the security of South Korea was ' essential to that of Japan ', and that Taiwan's security was ' most important ' to Japan, created widespread suspicion and debate, but in fact the Japanese government has taken no steps to follow up on these statements. Japanese passivity has been well-suited to an American proclivity to handle matters in Asia and the Pacific region unilaterally, as America saw fit. In effect, Japan left the management of this area to the US and responded passively to international tension, while establishing itself as an economic super-power.

But times have changed. As revealed in many of his foreign affairs speeches, President Nixon is seeking world peace and stability based on a balance among five independent power centres: the US, the Soviet Union, China, the European Community, and Japan. Nixon's America is clearly withdrawing from Asia. This withdrawal, however, does not signify complete abdication of leadership. The US desires to remain in Asia as the deciding weight in a four-poled Asian balance of power; it is searching for a new, though detached, style of leadership. To that end it was desirable to establish a direct channel to China ' over the head ' of Japan.

From China's point of view as well, some form of US presence in Asia is necessary to counterbalance a tangible Soviet threat. China saw a useful opportunity in a dramatic handshake with President Nixon. Thus, mutual self-interest is the core of the Sino-American *rapprochement*.

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Does Japan have the capacity to take on the role, explicitly prescribed by the US and implicitly accepted by China, of a major power centre in the five-poled (in Asia, four-poled) international structure? The answer is no. It is precisely because the Japanese people realize Japan's inadequacy that the demise of the post-war era has caused such confusion and unease. The US, the Soviet Union, China, and the European Community as well, have nuclear weapons. Japan does not, and in view of its small area and high density, both of population and of communications and technology, it is clear that it will continue to lack a strategically rational basis for possessing such weapons. Moreover, the US, the Soviet Union and China are economically self-sufficient, and the European Community is nearly so. Japan, on the other hand, is not. Such discrepancies in basic military and economic requirements clearly eliminate Japan as an active power centre which could contribute to a new world order. Through direct contact with China, however, the US has helped to *establish a system which may in the future function to restrain Japan.* At the same time the US is encouraging Japan to play an active role as a power centre in the world, stating that 'The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds' (Sino-American Joint Communiqué). It is a transparent scheme that betrays the long-range and ulterior motives of the US. Such manoeuvring should be watched very carefully.

Nothing is gained, however, by saying merely that Japan cannot become a power centre in the newly emerging world order. Japan may not be a power centre in the true sense of the word, but the Japanese can no longer afford to feign ignorance about international problems as they did during the post-war era. Herein is the dilemma as the new era approaches: Japan does not have the resources to become a mature, active power centre, but its economic power is such that it must function, at the very least, as an immature, passive one.

Compound image of Japan

As we enter the 1970s we are struck by the variety of attitudes towards Japan's role in international politics held by the US, China and other nations of the world. According to George Ball, one can identify 'two quite distinct roles that Japan plays in the present-day world'.[1] The first, as 'the one large modern industrial power in the Far East', is a role of 'regional leadership'; the second, as 'one of the principal world industrial powers', is to contribute to the 'effective functioning of the world economy'. Mr. Ball believes that the Japan-US relationship, which was shaken by last year's economic policies, can be restabilized on the basis of Japan's performance of these two roles. He also pointed out, however, that Asian countries have another hope concerning Japan: not that Japan should act in a certain way but rather that it should avoid

[1] Ball, George W., 'A shift of emphasis in U.S.-Japan relationship', *Pacific Community*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (January 1972), p. 248.

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certain actions. Thus, he observed that '. . . any significant Japanese move toward remilitarization would have far-reaching results of the most disturbing kind, creating ripples of concern throughout the whole Far East'. Full rearmament is condemned not only by the countries of Asia but by the US as well. Hence, he says,

> . . . instead of asking Japan for a greater military contribution, the United States should make quite clear that it intends to continue to provide not merely a nuclear umbrella but continual military defence for the Japanese islands. Japan should substitute for military expenditures an immensely expanded programme of economic assistance to the poor nations of East Asia and the Pacific.[2]

The American attitude towards Japan has changed greatly in just a few years. The age when voices in the US demanded the termination of Japan's 'free ride' in defence, that Japan should 'pay her own way', is still fresh in our memories. Now, when it is suggested that Japan should 'pay her own way' with a military capability, the usual response is 'Aha, a revival of militarism!'

The intricate Chinese view of Japan was graphically portrayed in James Reston's interview last year with Chou En-lai:

> *Reston*: Could I ask you, sir, what you want us to do about Japan? Because it seems to me there is a dilemma here. If we stay allied to Japan, with some control over her, particularly in the nuclear field, that is one thing. If we end the security pact with Japan, is it your view that it is more likely then that Japan will become more militaristic or less militaristic?
>
> It seems to me that . . . freed from us and our pact, she would almost certainly have to go nuclear, would she not? . . .
>
> *Chou*: That argument is quite a forced argument. Despite this treaty, Japan with her present industrial capability is fully able to produce all the means of delivery . . . and nuclear weapons can be produced readily. She cannot be prevented from doing so merely by the treaty. You have helped her develop her economy to such a level. And she is bound to demand outward expansion. . . .
>
> Economic expansion is bound to bring about military expansion. . . .
>
> *Reston*: Is there a conflict between the so-called Nixon Doctrine or Guam Doctrine and our efforts to reach an accommodation with China? The thought I have in mind is this: I am afraid there is a puzzling and troubling point here that as we try to reduce our commitments in the Pacific, we encourage Japan and other countries to assume a larger military role, and that, in turn, leads to greater dismay and anxiety on the part of China. . . .
>
> *Chou*: You put it well. It is indeed a contradiction. I also discovered this contradiction. There should be an effort at relaxation by all parties concerned . . .[3]

Although the Chinese premier has bitterly and subtly criticized the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty and Japanese 'militarism', the wel-

[2] Ibid. p. 258.

[3] *Asahi Evening News*, 13 August 1971.

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come extended to Japanese business and industrial leaders last fall indicates another part of the image—China also has strong positive expectations with regard to Japan. Thus images of the role Japan should play held by other countries, including the US and China, tend to form along different lines. These mixed expectations boil down to a situation where any conspicuous action taken by Japan will underline negative expectations, leading to anxiety and distrust, while moderate action will fail to live up to positive hopes, leading to increased dissatisfaction and unrest. Negative expectations are limited primarily to military matters, while positive hopes are primarily economic. In any case, it will be very difficult for Japan to meet the various expectations of international society, especially those of the US and China, and simultaneously comply with domestic demands that spring out of the greatest turning point in Japan's entire post-war history.

Prospects for Japan-US relations

The joint statement issued after the Sato-Nixon San Clemente Conference in January 1972 confirmed that the 'close, friendly relations' between Japan and the US, built upon 'mutual trust and interdependence', will be maintained. It is 'an indispensable factor of peace and stability in Asia'. The actual date for Okinawa's reversion to Japanese control was set at May 15, which was slightly earlier than expected by most Japanese. President Nixon informed the then Prime Minister Sato that despite his coming trip to China, there would be no change in American policy towards the Republic of China and the commitment to defend Taiwan under the US–Republic of China Mutual Security Treaty would be maintained. Attempting to dissolve anxiety and restore harmony, he also promised that the 'sudden diplomacy' which produced the 'Nixon shock', causing such resentment in Japan, would not be repeated. As if in response, when Sato returned home, he declared that 'the stiffness in Japan-US relations has dissipated' and asserted that Japan and the US have become 'real partners'.

During 1971 occurred the sharpest tremors of the entire post-war Japan-US relationship, resulting first from the textile problem, and secondly from the 'Nixon shocks', which jarred not only the Japanese economy but also relations with China. Both sides made subsequent efforts to demonstrate some consideration for the other, however; Japan supported the US stand on the United Nations China resolutions, as well as making concessions on textiles. Early ratifications of the Okinawan Reversion Agreement in the US Senate and President Nixon's meeting with the Japanese Emperor in Anchorage were gestures made on the American side. At the San Clemente Conference, the US and Japan agreed to freeze for one year the most troublesome issue between the two nations, the trade problem. From some areas, therefore, primarily in the US, we are told that the worst crisis is past. But is it really? I myself cannot share this optimism.

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In the first place, the 'Nixon shock' and Sino-American *rapprochement* have forced policy-makers of both nations to take account of an issue which has not been raised throughout the entire post-war period—the credibility of the Japan-US alliance. The Japanese response to the Sino-American communiqué revealed concern about this factor. The communiqué was skilfully prepared, lending itself to various interpretations; some observers felt that the United States had conceded nothing of substance, while others believed that it had made concessions on matters of principle. Nevertheless, as revealed in the Japanese mass media, analysts who leaned towards the rational interpretation were very few compared to those who adopted the second, arrogant view. To some of these, it was a third 'Nixon shock'.

A raging tempest in a teacup arose in March as a result of a slip of the tongue by ex-Prime Minister Sato to the effect that 'Taiwan is a part of the People's Republic of China' (the Sato Cabinet has held that China is one, and Taiwan is a part of China). The statement was hurriedly revised but through this incident the public caught a glimpse of a national leader glossing over what actually presaged a crucial change in policy. He may have believed temporarily that American policy towards Taiwan had changed, despite American denials. Perhaps suspicion of the US lurked in Sato's subconscious, and was brought to the surface by the nervous tenor of press editorials. After the reversion of Okinawa, Sato resigned and was replaced as Prime Minister by Tanaka who promptly set out to normalize relations with China. The new policy was inaugurated by Tanaka's acceptance of Chou En-lai's five points as a precondition for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Before visiting Peking, Tanaka met President Nixon in Hawaii; during their talks he made some economic concessions to improve the negative American balance of trade with Japan, but stuck to his guns on the new Japanese policy towards China.

The year 1971 was decisive in the sense that new developments in Sino-American relations have begun to lead to a qualitative change in the Japan-US alliance. Clearly, Japan will no longer be the only country in Asia about which the US is vitally concerned. The Sino-American Joint Communiqué revealed dissension between the US and China, with statements to the effect that China firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism, while the US 'places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan'. There can be no doubt, nevertheless, that the American stance in Asia has reverted in a fundamental sense to the traditional policy of supporting a multi-polar balance. The communiqué refers to Taiwan, Indochina, Korea and Japan, but makes no mention of the Soviet Union. The average Japanese nationalist must wonder at the term 'highest value', supposedly placed on Japan, and its meaning in view of such a glaring omission.

Secondly, apart from the psychological uneasiness affecting the citizenry, it will not be a simple matter to resolve future economic frictions between the US and Japan. Despite the fact that economic

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problems will be a governing factor in future Japan-US relations, neither country has yet established a posture conducive to competitive mutual prosperity. The Japanese attitude towards the US, which runs through party politics, government and the mass media, has been characterized by inadequate understanding and inappropriate responses. Rejection of US demands, whether for self-imposed controls or an intergovernmental agreement, has been seen as 'autonomous diplomacy' while giving in is regarded as 'servility'. Such a simplistic dichotomy has been widely accepted, accompanied by slogans such as 'no damage, no controls' and 'fair competition'. In themselves, these slogans may have had legitimate grounds, but excessive concentration on the trees (textiles) diverted attention from the wood (Japan-US international trade). In principle, as nations become equal, increasing give-and-take becomes part of their relations. Obviously 'autonomous diplomacy' does not develop in proportion to the number of 'No' answers given in the course of negotiations. Nevertheless, having become accustomed to protection by the US for many years and increasingly eager to find an outlet for nationalism, to the extent of making 'anti-Americanism' the equivalent of 'autonomy', the Japanese now tend to interpret appropriate concessions to the US on the textile and currency issues as complete surrender.

In the US, on the other hand, the dilemma of stagflation has been a deeply-rooted, structural problem for many years, and is basically an American responsibility. It does not originate primarily in Japan's economic advance. Despite this fact, the US did not hesitate last year to make a scapegoat of Japan. It is true that Japan's trade surplus with the US went from $868,000,000 in 1969 and $380,000,000 in 1970 to a whopping $2,517,000,000 in 1971 (customs clearance), but there is little possibility that the overall American balance of payments will go into the black in the near future anyway, and hence it is very natural to put the blame on Japan. The slower the American economic recovery, moreover, the more danger there will be that the US will do this.

It is clear that the one-year freeze on US-Japanese trade problems is no more than a stop-gap measure; once the truce has ended there is no guarantee that greater trouble will not occur in the future. In order to avoid that, it is essential that during the present freeze period we rethink the Japanese failure to comply completely with American demands for liberalization of trade and capital. In the same way, the US side should reconsider the administration's high-pressure demands on Japan, exemplified by the 10 per cent surcharge of summer 1971. These tactics have created more of a sense of rejection and paranoia in Japan than was necessary. The chance that this warning will be heeded is, of course, very slim.

In the third place, even though the importance of the Japan-US security system was reconfirmed during the talks at San Clemente and Hawaii, compared to the 'post-war era' it is clearly diminishing. It is

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true that the Sino-American Joint Communiqués made clear that the US held to a policy of 'one China, but not now' and avoided the embarrassing spectacle of the complete conformity with Chinese demands displayed by the various Japanese groups which have visited China in the last couple of years, demands which became part of the dilemmas faced by Prime Minister Tanaka in his policy of accommodation with China. The resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries has become a realistic policy for Japan, because, considering the Sino-American *rapprochement* within the limits of a Japan-US-China game, it is now clear that the Japan-US security system has reached a point where it may move from a system of 'fixed exchange' with China as the common target, to a form of 'floating' system, within a triangle, the three sides of which are the Japan-US, Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relationships.

In order to justify the Japan-US Security Treaty to the Japanese people, the Soviet Union was portrayed as a threat during the 1950s, as was China during the 1960s; in either case, the need to deter communist influence sufficed. From now on, however, this kind of logic is less persuasive. On the contrary, as shown by the Reston-Chou talks—although Chou denied it—a convergence of Sino-American interests upon the Japan-US Security Treaty as a system of restraints upon Japan has become conceivable.

Despite its growing theoretical fragility, it is necessary that the security structure be maintained. Assuming that from now on it will be impossible to avoid competition and conflict in the area of economic relations, the significance of the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty will increase as a symbol of the amity between the two nations.

At present there are two possible situations in which the task of maintaining the security system would be made more difficult. The first would arise if Japan, in the course of, or as a result of, normalization of relations with China, were to state formally that Taiwan is outside the purview of the security treaty. If Japan took such a step, the principle of American commitment to defend Taiwan under the US-Republic of China Mutual Security Treaty would collapse. The second is the possibility that the US might seek to impose some of the financial burden of maintaining American troops in Japan, including Okinawa, on Japan itself. It has never been possible to define clearly the extent to which American troops are in Japan for Japan's sake rather than to protect American interests, but there is an additional danger that the demand to share expenses would undermine the treaty's *raison d'être*.

Each of the above factors can decisively endanger Japan-US relations in the future. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, maintenance of the treaty will continue to be in the interests of both nations. Maintaining the pact intact, however, as the Nixon-Tanaka talks in Hawaii have already demonstrated, will tax the political wisdom and rationality of the governments and people of both countries.

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Prospects for Relations with the USSR

Rinjiro Harako

LOOKING back on the post-war history of Russo-Japanese relations, we find that, although there were certain complicated manoeuvres at times, they have followed the same basic pattern throughout those years. The changes in the international situation and particularly the US-Chinese *rapprochement*, however, point to the possibility that this pattern may be broken; one indication of this is the agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union to start negotiations for a peace treaty by the end of 1972, a decision which was arrived at in the course of talks between the Japanese leaders and Foreign Minister Gromyko in January 1972.[1] But this is no more than a possibility and it is by no means certain that the pattern of post-war Russo-Japanese relations will necessarily be broken.

No matter which side took the initiative in the attempt to improve these relations, the greatest stumbling block has always been the question of the northern territories. Japan has consistently demanded a settlement of the territorial issue and the Soviet answer has always been 'No'. At times Moscow felt obliged to take a more flexible attitude, but on each occasion it failed to maintain it when faced with Japan's demand for the return of the northern territories.

The Soviet aim has been to detach Japan from the United States, thus isolating and neutralizing it, but behind these tactics there was uneasiness about Japan's potential military power after it left the US camp. The Soviet Union did not expect these tactics to be immediately successful; its aim was to make its position vis-à-vis Japan as advantageous as possible. In other words, it has regarded Japan as a potential threat irrespective of whether it is tied to the US in any way, or whether it may try to take over the position in Asia at present held by the US. The Soviet Union could not approach Japan while it was under US occupation or during the intense cold-war period, when its major concerns were the diplomatic battle with the US and the consolidation of its control over Eastern Europe. In these circumstances, there was no possibility of improving Russo-Japanese relations.

The Soviet attitude to Japan did not change when Japan regained its independence in 1953. Moscow tried to obstruct the revival of the defence power of a Japan tied to the US by the security treaty, expressing its strong opposition to the treaty and urging the removal of US military bases from Japan; and it put some effort into attempts to stir up trouble when disagreements on economic matters developed between Washington and Tokyo.

[1] *Pravda*, 28 January 1972. See Japan-Soviet Joint Communiqué.

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However, as the Sino-Soviet split emerged and gradually intensified, the character of Soviet policy towards Japan in the context of the triangular US-Soviet-China relationship began to show subtle signs of change. The Soviet Union's major fear was that an economically strengthened Japan might ally itself with China, and as the Japanese inclination to approach China became more marked, Soviet diplomatic policy was directed towards the obstruction of any such move. The intention was twofold—to alienate Japan from the US and at the same time to check its approach towards China. During this period Moscow was less vociferous on the subject of US military bases in Japan than previously.

As Japan's economic power increased, the idea of putting its diplomatic relations with China on a normal footing became steadily more popular. At the same time relations between Moscow and Peking were deteriorating, and what most concerned the Soviet Union in its policy towards Japan was no longer the United States but China. Here Soviet diplomacy faced insuperable obstacles.

JAPANESE feelings about the Soviet Union have deep roots in the past. Russia had been a powerful rival of Japan in the Far East both before and after 1917; moreover, it had inflicted a deep wound on the minds of the Japanese in the last days of the second world war, by declaring war against Japan just as it was about to surrender, thus making the defeat more cruel. As a result of this experience, the Japanese were convinced that 'to trust the Bear is to be devoured by him'. Japanese defeat was certain before the Russians joined in, and they played a negligible part in this theatre of war, but, as Moscow continues to assert, Soviet participation in the war against Japan helped to speed the Japanese surrender. The Japanese, however, do not believe that the one-sided abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact by the Soviet Union was a 'legal measure' to hasten the end of hostilities,[2] and it is out of the question for them to accept that the Soviet action was aimed at 'saving the Japanese people from danger and destruction'.

Stalin stabbed Japan in the back by breaking the neutrality pact and entering the war against Japan. He regarded this as an opportunity to 'collect the special bill which Japan owed to Russia'.[3] Russia had been defeated by Japan in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905. This was in Stalin's eyes a 'stain on my country', and he wanted to erase this stain by occupying not only southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles but also the islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu, Habomai, and Shikotan, which have been Japanese possessions from time immemorial. Of these the Soviet Union had agreed in the Joint Declaration on Normalization of Diplomatic Relations signed on 15 October 1956 to return to Japan the islands of Habomai and Shikotan upon the formal conclusion of a peace treaty,

[2] *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Moscow, 1970), Vol. 5, Part 1, p. 628.
[3] Stalin's statement on 2 September 1945.

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but it made no official mention of any intention of returning the other two islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu, which are also Japanese territory.

Stalin told the late General Nikolai Voronov at the end of 1943 that he did not want 'any territory that did not originally belong to us',[4] yet the Soviet Union retained possession of the four islands, using them as a lever in its policy towards Japan. Khrushchev sent a memorandum to Japan immediately after the January 1960 revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty, stating that the Soviet Union would not return Habomai and Shikotan to Japan even after the conclusion of a peace treaty, unless Japan abrogated the security treaty and cleared its territory of any US military bases, because the return of these islands would only 'accelerate the expansion of territory which might be used by foreign [i.e. American] forces'. The Soviet leaders who replaced Khrushchev in October 1964 did not refer to the conditions of reversion specified by him, but argued instead that the northern territorial question 'had already been settled on the basis of various international treaties', and this has since become the basic Soviet position on the issue. By 'international treaties' they meant the secret agreement at Yalta, two declarations at Cairo and Potsdam, and even the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which the Soviet Union had refused to sign.

The Japanese people's insistence on having the four islands returned to them does not spring from any strategic value or economic importance these tiny islands may have. It is true that they are very important for the safe operation of Japanese fishing boats in the northern waters, but this is not a predominant reason. For the Japanese, the demand for the reversion of these islands is inseparably connected with their assertion of national identity. Such national sentiments do not negate Japanese awareness of having waged an unjust war of aggression. It may be difficult for Westerners to understand the relative importance of the northern territorial issue in Russo-Japanese relations; to them it may appear as incomprehensible emotionalism on the part of the Japanese people. But for Brezhnev to say that 'certain Japanese circles are deliberately trying to make use of the so-called "territorial question"'[5] shows total misunderstanding. It is a national question for all Japanese, including even the communists.

ALTHOUGH in the past the issue of the northern territories has been a stumbling block in any attempt to improve Russo-Japanese relations, the dawn of the 1970s brought new hope that some kind of change might occur in the established pattern. The first, and most important, factor suggesting this possibility was the change in Sino-American relations. The Sino-American *rapprochement* was the product of calculation on both sides: China wanted to use the US against the Soviet threat from the north, the US wanted to use China to gain a more

[4] *Istoriya SSSR*, No. 4, 1965, pp. 13–27.
[5] *XXIV syezd KPSS: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1971), Vol. 1, p. 51.

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advantageous position in its relations with the USSR. It is impossible to tell what may evolve from this *rapprochement*, but it has served to upset the balance of the existing triangular US-China-USSR relationship. For one thing, the Soviet Union had to recognize that the United States could no longer be counted on as a link in its strategy of containing China diplomatically, which had been a Soviet *idée fixe*. Now it had to look around for a substitute and hoped to find it in Japan.

The US-Chinese talks had an impact of similar intensity on Japan, whose basic line vis-à-vis the communist countries, including China, had been cooperation with Washington. It now felt that the US had destroyed the bridge between itself and Japan in building one to China; the foundations of Japan's policy towards China seemed suddenly to have crumbled.

Because of their historical links with China, the Japanese people are emotionally drawn to that country, whereas their attitude towards the Soviet Union is one of hostility, and both predispositions were reinforced when the mass media in Japan, for their own reasons, encouraged an uncritical attitude to China in the name of an 'independent' Japanese diplomacy. Surprising as it may seem to people in the West, newspapers and broadcasting stations in Japan were desperately anxious to send their correspondents to Peking, and to keep this 'privilege' they refrained from carrying *any* news unfavourable to China. When it comes to the question of China, most Japanese, not just the mass media, become extraordinarily uncritical. For example, they tended to regard the change in Peking's diplomatic line from the rigidity and hostility of the Cultural Revolution period to Chou En-lai's more flexible and amiable diplomacy as reflecting a fundamental change in the political and socio-economic system of China. Such a superficial approach to international affairs is typical of the present attitude of the Japanese people.

It is difficult to tell how far the Soviet Union understands the Japanese fellow-feeling for China. An alliance between Japan and China may not be a realistic proposition in the short run, but in the long run, especially if the United States should assume the attitude of an onlooker adhering to a new non-interventionist principle, a Peking-Tokyo axis might well enter the realm of possibility.

A third factor to be considered is the relationship between Japan and the United States. There is no doubt that the 'distance' between Japan and the US has widened since the shocks administered by the new US economic policy and by its *détente* with China. Pressure from the people for more independent Japanese initiatives in the economic and diplomatic spheres is being increasingly felt. They have come to believe that Japan must abandon its former practice of looking to the US in these areas and turn its attention elsewhere. Such thinking may turn Japan towards China, but it also produced an opportunity for the Soviet Union to try to win Japan's favour. If the Kremlin wanted a breakthrough in Russo-Japanese relations, this was its chance to make the attempt.

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The fourth factor concerns Okinawa. The Japanese are apt to connect Okinawa and the northern territories: they used to think of both as lost territories. In June 1971, Japan and the US signed the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. Khrushchev had told a delegation from the Japanese Diet that if the US returned Okinawa to Japan and there were no US military bases in Japan, then the Soviet Union would return Habomai and Shikotan without waiting for the signing of a peace treaty. When the Okinawa reversion treaty was signed, however, the Soviet Union claimed that it was not a genuine reversion, since the US would continue to maintain its bases on the island. (Although, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union had kept five divisions there, Radio Moscow emphatically stressed, when referring to the Okinawa question, that it is fighting to remove all foreign bases.) It was generally felt, however, that when Okinawa was returned to Japan on 15 May 1972 Japanese attention would be centred on the 'northern territories', and anti-Soviet feeling in the country would become stronger.

The final factor to be considered is the Soviet domestic situation. Its ninth five-year plan was started in 1971 with the usual political propaganda, but Brezhnev's ambitious goal of improving national welfare while at the same time making the Soviet Union the greatest military power in the world seems impossible of realization. To achieve a new 'take-off' for its stagnant economy, the tempo of Siberian development must be accelerated and this made it all the more necessary for Moscow to persuade Japan to join in the development of Siberia, which will also help to meet the requirements of the Soviet troops stationed along the Sino-Soviet border.

THE US-China talks have triggered off a number of important changes in the international scene and the Soviet Union has been obliged to reassess the position of Japan in the Far East and Asia as a whole. Until recently, the Soviet Union developed its strategy of confrontation with China solely in terms of the triangular relationship between Washington, Peking, and Moscow, but it now seems to have realized that its Asian strategy must be shaped within the framework of a quadrilateral relationship between these three powers and Japan.

When President Nixon's visit to China was announced in July 1971, the Soviet Union moved quickly to conclude a military alliance with India in the hope that India, which had also felt the impact of the US move, would play its part in the Soviet strategy of diplomatic encirclement of China. The war between India and Pakistan and the emergence of an independent Bangladesh have greatly strengthened the Soviet position in Asia by giving the USSR a foothold on the Indian subcontinent. By these moves Moscow was trying to fill the vacuum created by the gradual military and political withdrawal of the US from Asia, to put more pressure on Communist China from the south, and to extend its influence in South-East Asia.

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The countries of South-East Asia have manifold relations with Japan. Their first concern in the era of US-China *rapprochement* and US disengagement from Asia is the possibility of China's becoming predominant in this area, but they are also afraid of Japan. They fear that their independence may once again be lost.

It was against this background that the foreign ministers of the five ASEAN nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand) met at Kuala Lumpur in November 1971 and adopted a declaration expressing their desire for neutrality, which was favourably received by the Soviet Union a month later; *Pravda*[6] and *Izvestia*[7] welcomed the declaration, indicating thereby that the USSR will act to prevent the advance of China in the area. It was also a warning to Japan, which has close economic ties with the countries of the region, that it should not forget the existence of the Soviet Union in its dealings with them.

The new Soviet attitude towards Japan became more noticeable in 1972. For example, Soviet press commentaries on the San Clemente talks between President Nixon and ex-Premier Sato in January were unusually mild. Sato was reported to have asked President Nixon to 'mediate' in the reversion of the northern territories when he went to Moscow in May; but even this elicited only a mild reproof from *Pravda*, to the effect that it would 'not be in the interests of Russo-Japanese relations',[8] while *Izvestia* made no reference to it at all.[9]

Furthermore, when Gromyko's visit to Japan was announced, *Pravda* merely cited Brezhnev's statement on the 'northern territorial' issue made at the 24th Party Congress without going into the subject further,[10] and *Izvestia* published a lengthy commentary on Russo-Japanese relations in which no mention was made of its favourite themes of the revival of Japanese militarism or imperialist economic expansionism. Instead it painted a rosy picture of future Russo-Japanese relations, which could be 'improved both qualitatively and quantitatively' through economic cooperation and scientific-cultural exchanges between the two countries.[11]

This showed a marked change in the Soviet attitude towards Japan when we recall that, soon after the signing of the Soviet-West German treaty in August 1970 in which the two countries undertook not to use force to change the existing borders in Europe, Moscow told Japan that the 'demand for the return of territories is extremely dangerous not only to peace in the Far East but also to world peace'. The Kremlin now seems eager to impress its change of attitude upon the Japanese mind. The fact that the Soviet foreign minister gave precedence to a Tokyo visit over attendance at the Warsaw Treaty summit talks in Prague seems to indicate the importance attached by the USSR to Gromyko's visit and

[6] *Pravda*, 27 December 1971—B. Vetin, 'After the Kuala Lumpur Conference'.
[7] *Izvestia*, 7 January 1972.
[8] *Pravda*, 12 January 1972.
[9] *Izvestia*, 12 January 1972.
[10] *Pravda*, 14 January 1972.
[11] *Izvestia*, 14 January 1972.

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the new policy line towards Japan. In his talks with Japanese leaders in Tokyo, Gromyko said that, as the question of the 'northern territories' was very complicated, it was necessary to consider it carefully, a remark that seems a clear indication of a departure from the former position of maintaining that the 'territorial question has already been settled'.

The Japanese government noted the Soviet change of attitude and agreed to begin negotiations for a Russo-Japanese peace treaty in 1972. Hitherto, it had always maintained that the settlement of the territorial issue was a precondition of any improvement in Russo-Japanese relations. However, Japan does intend to include Kunashiri and Etorofu, in addition to Habomai and Shikotan, in its demands for the return of the lost territories when negotiations actually begin. Tokyo understands that the new Soviet attitude must be considered in the context of its desire to hold China in check. However, it would be too rash to conclude that the USSR has already made up its mind to return all four islands to Japan, even though it is far more flexible in its attitude. For, as China has pointed out,[12] the Soviet Union is afraid that the return to Japan of its 'northern territories' would set a bad example in Europe. Historically, Russia has always been loath to give up conquered territories, but if the need to win Japanese friendship should become acute, the Kremlin might make this concession, improbable though it seems at the present time.

At the moment, the Soviet Union's most important objective in its overtures to Japan is to involve Japan as deeply as possible in the joint development of Siberia. By so doing, the Kremlin hopes to drive a wedge between Japan and China, and to get Japan and the US to compete with each other in the development projects, in which the US has begun to show great interest.[13]

JAPANESE opinion on relations with the Soviet Union and China is divided and there is no national consensus. On the one side, there are those who maintain that economics and politics are separable, that economic cooperation with the USSR and the territorial issue are different questions, and that consequently Japan should go ahead and cooperate with the Soviet Union economically even before the territorial issue is settled. Others argue that politics and economics are inseparable and that Japan should not get involved in economic cooperation with the Soviet Union unless and until the northern territories are returned. Between these two positions lies a whole spectrum of different views.

Moreover, the influential China lobby in Japan is vociferously opposed to the strengthening of Russo-Japanese relations on the grounds that it would hamper normalization of diplomatic relations with China.

12 *Peking Review*, Japanese edition, No. 7 (15 February 1972): 'Backstage at Gromyko's Tokyo Visit', p. 15.

13 After the revelation in November 1971 of US interest in expanding trade with the Soviet Union and in the Siberian development through the despatch of the then Secretary of Commerce, Stans, to Moscow and the warm reception of Soviet Trade Vice Minister Alkhimov, Japanese business circles, in their usual anxiety not to miss the boat, showed renewed interest in laying a petrol pipeline from Tyumen.

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It is as though the Sino-Soviet confrontation exists among the Japanese themselves, and the resulting situation is extremely complicated. Heated discussions and arguments are going on over the question of whether the national interest would be better served by giving priority to the normalization of diplomatic relations with China or with the Soviet Union.

Inside Japan, the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party is deeply split over the China question, and the factional strife typical of Japanese politics makes the position of the government internally unstable. However, the new Premier, Tanaka, moved resolutely towards the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, a decision anticipated during his Hawaii talks with President Nixon. Yet this is not a move to establish a new Tokyo-Peking axis, only a part of the new balancing act which a more independent Japan is going to perform vis-à-vis the USA-USSR-China triangle.

Among the opposition parties, the Communist Party is the only one to criticize China vehemently, vigorously attacking the mass media for their 'flirtation' with Peking. The Communist Party of Japan was at one time nothing but a satellite of Peking, but it severed relations with the Chinese Communists in 1966, and their differences have become steadily more acute ever since. Its relations with the Soviet party have improved since the leaders of the two parties met in Tokyo in February 1968. Although the Japanese Communists adopted a critical attitude towards the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the visit to Moscow of the JCP delegation led by its Chairman, Miyamoto, in the autumn of 1971 seems to have brought about a better relationship between the two. The Communist Party of Japan has proclaimed an independent policy line and maintains close relations with Rumania and North Vietnam, taking a position similar to that of the Italian Communist Party. But it is not neutral in regard to the Sino-Soviet confrontation, and its relations with Peking are almost as bad as those of Moscow. The peculiar position of the JCP only adds to the complexity of the relations between Japan and the USSR.

It is easy to see the reason behind the sudden Soviet interest in Japan. Until the Sino-American *rapprochement*, Moscow saw the US as part of its own strategy of encircling China in Asia; now, as we have remarked, Japan is seen, somewhat optimistically, as a possible replacement in this role, and potentially of far greater importance in this respect than India. The most direct, in fact, the only, means of securing Japan for the Soviet camp is to involve it as deeply as possible in economic relations with the Soviet Union, especially in the Siberian development. By so doing, the USSR hopes in the long run to hamper the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations and to obstruct possible future Sino-Japanese cooperation.

One notable development in this connexion has been the renewed Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security system, first officially put forward by Brezhnev in June 1969. The *Izvestia* editorial supporting

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the neutrality declaration of the five ASEAN nations in 1971 related the implementation of the idea of South-East Asian neutrality to the Soviet proposal for a collective security system in Asia, saying the achievement of the former would promote the establishment of the latter. Obviously, the Soviet Union regards the South-East Asian countries as a base for its Asian security policy, and is trying to draw Japan into it.

THE Soviet attitude was revealed more clearly later, when, at the 15th Congress of the Soviet trade unions, Brezhnev made an unexpected reference to Russo-Japanese relations. He greeted the agreement to begin negotiations for a peace treaty as an 'important fact' and explained for the first time the details of the Asian collective security system which he had in mind. His address seemed to suggest the following Soviet strategy in Asia:

For the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union does not apparently conceive of the Asian collective security system as a specific treaty 'organization' but rather envisages a collection of bilateral or multilateral state-to-state agreements. Neither China nor the United States would be included, for the system is envisaged as being composed of several Asian nations, some of which may have individual and some collective relations with the Soviet Union. This would form the basis of an Asian security system.

The visit to Moscow of Premier Rahman of Bangladesh and President Bhutto of Pakistan in March 1972 indicated that the Soviet Union is considering a security setup in the Indian subcontinent which would include India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, with the Soviet Union itself acting as protector. The USSR conceives of a similar setup in South-East Asia—a collective security system in which the Soviet Union and South-East Asian nations would be partners. This would serve as a link connecting the Soviet Union with Japan (which is linked to the United States through the Japan-US Security Treaty), and Moscow is even ready eventually to establish relations with Taiwan, which is linked to Japan by another treaty.

In this picture, three international groups tied to the Soviet Union by different strings are to provide the basis for the Soviet version of an Asian security system, which is, of course, directed against China. The presence of powerful Soviet forces stationed along the Sino-Soviet border acts as a restraint on a possible attempt by China to conquer Taiwan by armed force, should American protection be withdrawn from the island, and both Taiwan and the Soviet Union are fully aware of this. In short, in pursuing his Asian collective security proposal, Brezhnev is indicating the Soviet intention to encircle China from north and south. Moscow is confident that it can contain China along the Sino-Soviet frontier in the north, while any southward expansion of China could be kept in check by Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean, supplemented by a cooperative relationship with Japan, South-East Asia (and Taiwan, though indirectly), and the Indian subcontinent.

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Post-War Japanese-Chinese Relations

Shinkichi Eto

A STRANGE kind of Sino-Japanese friendship has begun. When the Sato Cabinet was in power in Japan, Peking adopted a policy of 'having no dealings with the Sato Cabinet'. In those days, Peking also maintained that it could not yield on the so-called Three Principles for the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations as these were matters of principle, and that unless the Japanese government accepted them, it would never enter into any negotiations.

The Three Principles are: (1) the government of the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate government of China; (2) Taiwan is a territory of the People's Republic of China; and therefore (3) the peace treaty between Japan and the Nationalist government in Taiwan is illegal and should be abrogated.[1] The Sato Cabinet accepted the first of the three principles but not the second and third.[2]

However, on 9 July 1972, only two days after the formation of the Tanaka Cabinet, in spite of the fact that the new Prime Minister, Mr Kakuei Tanaka, was a member of Mr Sato's faction and one of his most loyal cronies at that, and in spite of the fact that Peking had scornfully refused to respond to repeated signals from the Sato Cabinet indicating its desire to start government-to-government negotiations between Japan and China, Prime Minister Chou En-lai announced that he welcomed the Tanaka Cabinet's efforts towards the normalization of relations.[3] Subsequently, leading figures in Peking ceased to make references to the Three Principles. And on 15 August, less than six weeks after the formation of the Tanaka Cabinet, China declared that it would 'heartily welcome' a visit by Mr Tanaka to Peking.[4]

On the Japanese side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo suddenly started to assume a subservient attitude towards Peking following the change of Foreign Minister. While the Peking government maintained silence on the Three Principles, and whereas Prime Minister Tanaka went no further than saying that 'the Three Principles are understandable as basic concepts for China',[5] the Japanese Ministry of

1 Cf. *Joint Communiqué of the Japanese Diet Members Group for the Normalization of Japanese-Chinese Relations and the Chinese Sino-Japanese Friendship Association*, 2 October 1971; appeared in the *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi Press), 3 October 1971.

2 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Japan Economic News), 25 May 1972.

3 *Jenmin Jihpro* (People's Daily), 9 July 1972.

4 *Mainichi Shimbun* (Mainichi Press), morning ed., 16 August 1972.

5 Jiyuminshuto Nitchu Kokko Seijoka Kyogikai (Committee for the Normalization of Japanese-Chinese Relations, Liberal Democratic Party), *Nitchu Kokku Seijoka Kyogikai Daiikkai Sokai Kaigiroku* (Proceedings of the First General Meeting of the Committee for the Normalization of Japanese-Chinese Relations), 24 July 1972, p. 5.

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Foreign Affairs deliberately omitted the phrase 'for China' and asserted that 'the Three Principles are understandable as basic concepts'.[6] This ambiguity in Japanese could easily be taken to mean that the Ministry has already accepted the principles as basic concepts of Japanese government thinking in any future Sino-Japanese negotiations. And in spite of Peking's silence, the Ministry also served advance notice that the peace treaty between Japan and Taiwan will be dissolved [7] and that it will adopt the view that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory.[8] And, indeed, this has been confirmed in the Tanaka–Chou En-lai agreement.

The purpose of this article is not to analyse the rapidly changing aspects of current Sino-Japanese relations, but to investigate the relationship during the last quarter-century and to put the change which is now taking place in historical perspective. Its main conclusions are that the Japanese government ought to have adhered to the principle of non-involvement in the China question, that three grave errors had been committed in the past, and that we cannot expect true friendship between Japan and China to descend suddenly from heaven one sunny day simply by accommodating all the wishes of Peking. Serious troubles and difficulties have to be overcome in order to achieve such a friendship.

Let us start with a historical analysis focusing on Sino-American and Russo-Chinese relations.

RELATIONS between Japan and China after the second world war can be divided into eight periods, the first of which runs from the end of the war in August 1945 to the formal establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949. During this period, the Chinese Communist Party had no actual say in the formation of China's policy towards Japan apart from the fact that its army took some part, in certain areas, in forcing the Japanese army in China to disarm.

The second period runs from the founding of the People's Republic of China to the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. It was a time when Sino-Soviet relations were on a good footing. Although the Chinese Communist Party must have had hidden reservations about the Soviet Union, it tried its best to improve relations. In December 1949, Mao Tse-tung, at the head of a team of more than a hundred Chinese, visited Moscow and stayed there until the 14th February of the following year, patiently negotiating with the USSR. The result was the Sino-Soviet treaty, emphasizing 'eternal friendship between China and the Soviet Union'.

At the beginning of this period the US showed some intention of approaching the People's Republic, leaving some of its diplomats in

[6] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, evening ed., 3 August 1972.
[7] *Mainichi Shimbun*, evening ed., 9 August 1972.
[8] Ibid. evening ed., 11 August 1972.

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mainland China and thus keeping open the possibility of a reconciliation with the new government in Peking. When in October 1949 the State Department held a conference on a new China policy, inviting to Washington 35 specialists in Chinese affairs such as Owen Latimore, J. K. Fairbank, etc., the majority of the conference supported the recognition of the Peking government.

It was against this background that President Truman made the famous declaration of 5 January 1950 in which he asserted that 'the United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa.'[9] The Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, stated in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on 10 January that 'the US defence perimeter runs along the Aleutians, Japan, and the Ryukyus to the Philippines', thus excluding Taiwan and Korea.[10] This attitude of non-involvement in Taiwan continued until the outbreak of the Korean war.

The People's Republic of China adopted a flexible foreign policy during this period with a view to improving what little international standing it had. As a result, the new Peking government was recognized after its establishment not only by communist countries but also by the majority of non-aligned countries of Asia and Africa. Nationalist China found itself not only internationally isolated but also in imminent danger of invasion, with hundreds of thousands of the People's Liberation Army concentrated in the Fukien Province across the Taiwan Straits.

In this period, the Chinese Communist Party started its campaign against 'Japanese rearmament'. Even before the formal establishment of the Peking government, it had formulated a fairly concrete policy on Japan in its declaration of 7 July 1949. In this 29-point manifesto commemorating the outbreak of the war against Japan, only six points were concerned with foreign policy, three of them with Japan. They were as follows:

(1) A peace treaty with Japan should be concluded as soon as possible;
(2) Japan should be demilitarized and democratized;
(3) The peoples of China and Japan must unite in the struggle against the US occupation of Japan.[11]

What should be noted about this declaration is that the Chinese

[9] US Department of State, *American Foreign Policy 1950–1955* (Washington, DC, 1957), pp. 2448–49.
[10] McGeorge Bundy (ed.), *The Pattern of Responsibility* (Boston, 1952), p. 199.
[11] Ajia Seikei Gakkai (Japanese Association of Asian Political and Economic Studies), *Chugaku Seiji Keizai Soran* (A General Description of Chinese Politics and Economics), Hitotsubashi Shobo (Tokyo, 1954), pp. 264–65.

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Communist Party's advocacy of an early conclusion of peace with Japan seems to have been merely a counter to check the US occupation, which it considered permanent, and not a serious effort for peace. Secondly, it expressed a serious fear about Japanese rearmament and the building up of military bases there. This fear led China to state frankly in the preamble to the Sino-Soviet friendship and alliance treaty of February 1950 that the treaty presupposed Japan to be a potential enemy, and was aimed at preventing Japanese rearmament and the establishment of US military bases in Japan. Thirdly, it reflected Peking's expectation of a revolution in Japan. The editorial of the *People's Daily* of 17 January 1950 asserted in support of the Cominform's criticism of the Japan Communist Party that 'the Japanese people . . . should carry out a determined revolutionary struggle against American imperialism and the reactionary forces in Japan'.[12]

THE third period starts with the outbreak of the Korean war on 25 June 1950 and ends with the ceasefire in June 1953. It was marked first of all by a complete change in American policy on China; the United States now opted for the neutralization of the Taiwan Straits, sending in the Seventh Fleet on the second day after the beginning of the war. The Peking government thus lost any hope of liberating Taiwan. US involvement with Taiwan was further strengthened with the visit there on 31 July of General MacArthur, General Commander of the UN forces, and the subsequent dispatch of a US military mission.

The Soviet Union pressed China to send troops to the Korean war and China found itself fighting directly with the US troops in Korea. In spite of the enormous cost (which is variously estimated at 500,000 to 1 million lives), the People's Liberation Army succeeded in securing the present ceasefire line.

During this period, Japan was incorporated into the American strategic system against the strong opposition of the Soviet Union and the Peking government. While preparations for concluding a separate peace with the US went on, the Chinese repeatedly asserted that 'the US occupation authorities' policy in Japan has been to preserve Japan's militarism and to prevent the democratization of Japan',[13] that 'the US government and the Yoshida government in Japan are plotting together for the rearmament of Japan'.[14] But it is interesting to note that during this time, Peking actually changed its position on Japanese rearmament from one of total opposition to a demand for arms limitation. Chou En-lai, then Foreign Minister, stated in a letter to the Russian Ambassador on 22 May 1951 that 'in order to ensure that Japan's militarism should not revive, the Treaty should contain a

[12] *Jenmin Jihpao*, 17 January 1972.

[13] Chou En-lai's letter to the Soviet Ambassador in Peking dated 22 May 1951 appeared in *Nitchu Kankei Kihon Shryo-shu* (Selected Basic Documents on Japanese-Chinese Relations), Tokyo: Kazankai, 1970, p. 15.

[14] Chou En-lai's statement on 15 August 1951 appeared in ibid. p. 22.

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clause limiting the size of armed forces, which should not exceed the minimum required for self-defence'.[15] Peking was apparently following the example of the Soviet Union which hurriedly accepted the case for limited rearmament of Japan at the last stage of Japanese preparation for a separate peace.

IN the situation which arose with the outbreak of the Korean war the Western countries moved rapidly towards concluding a peace treaty with Japan. The result was the Peace Treaty of San Francisco. There had already been disagreement, especially between the US and the UK, as to whether the Peking or the Nationalist government should be invited. In the end, neither government was invited to San Francisco. Later, after a strong hint from John Foster Dulles, then adviser to the US Secretary of State, that ratification by the US Senate of the San Francisco Peace Treaty could not be guaranteed unless Japan, in concluding a peace treaty with China, opted for the Nationalist government in Taiwan, the Yoshida government decided to negotiate a peace treaty with the Nationalists. Prime Minister Yoshida sent a letter to Mr Dulles at that time, known as the First Yoshida Letter.[16]

In this letter he made the following three points: (1) that Japan's ultimate wish is the establishment of peace and trading relations with its continental neighbour, China (thus hinting that Japan expected to achieve peace with the Peking government in future); (2) that the forthcoming treaty was to apply only to those territories currently under the control of the Nationalist government or those which might come under its control in the future; and (3) that as the communist regime in China was assisting the Japanese Communist Party in its attempt to overthrow by force Japan's government and constitutional system, the Japanese government had no intention of concluding a bilateral treaty with it. Treaty negotiations between Japan and the Nationalist government were conducted along the lines of this letter.

As far as can be ascertained from published material,[17] there were three main points of dispute between the two governments.

Firstly, the Nationalist government claimed that the forthcoming treaty should follow the lines of the Treaty of San Francisco, that it should be called a peace treaty, and that Japan should recognize the Nationalist government as the legitimate government of China. Japan conceded these claims. Secondly, it demanded reparation, claiming that Chinese national sentiment would not allow China, the chief victim of the war with Japan, to forgo its claim for reparation. Japan, on its part, maintained that war damages suffered on the Chinese continent

[15] Ibid. p. 18.

[16] Ibid. pp. 27–29.

[17] Gaimusho Hyakunen-shi Hensan Jinkai (Committee for the Editing of a Centennial History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ed., *Gaimusho no Hyakunen* (A Hundred Years of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1969), pp. 812–13.

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were outside the scope of the treaty. In the end, clauses relating to reparation were deleted. Thirdly, Japan insisted on inserting a clause limiting the application of the treaty to those territories only which were currently under the control of the Nationalist government or might come under it in future. The Nationalist government objected to this, and it was omitted from the actual text of the treaty, but Japan's position was accepted in the exchange of Notes. Japan relinquished the form but retained the substance of its attitude.

This was repeatedly made clear later during the debate in the Diet on the ratification of the Treaty, a few extracts from which may be cited here. On 26 June 1952, in answer to a question from Mr Hirabayashi in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Councillors, Prime Minister Yoshida replied '. . . the Sino-Japanese Treaty is being concluded only with the Nationalist regime in Taiwan, and has nothing to do with the Chinese communist regime. As to what sort of relationship we shall have in the future with Communist China, we can do nothing but await future developments.'[18] On 30 January of the same year, the Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kaniichiro Ishihara, said that 'We consider that the state of war will cease in relation to the area under the actual control of Nationalist China'.[19] And on 28 April, Cabinet Minister Katsuo Okazaki stated that 'This treaty covers the area under the control of the government of the Republic of China, irrespective of whether it expands or contracts'.[20]

AT that time, Japan had three alternatives. The first was to reject the San Francisco peace treaty itself, i.e. to continue in a state of occupation under American rule, in the hope of achieving an overall peace in the future. In this respect, Austria, which achieved an overall peace in 1955 (although, unlike Japan, it was separately occupied by the Allies), can perhaps be taken as an example. It can be argued that if Japan had waited until around 1955 it might also have been able to achieve an overall peace. But in view of the feelings of most Japanese at the time, it would have been difficult for the government to persuade the nation to acquiesce in the continued humiliation of the American occupation. This alternative was even more difficult because of the fact that Japan's economy had just recovered from its miserable state at the end of the war and any friction with the US might have led to some form of economic retaliation. This alternative thus entailed much more than a mere rejection of the San Francisco treaty.

The second alternative was to take full advantage of the international situation arising from the outbreak of the Korean war by actively

[18] *Dai Jusankai Sangiin Gaimuiinkai Kaigiroku* (Proceedings of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Committee of Foreign Relations, House of Councillors), Vol. 5, No. 43 (Tokyo: Finance Ministry Printing Office, 1952), p. 6.

[19] *Dai Jusankai Shugiin Gaimuiinkai Giroku* (Proceedings of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Committee of Foreign Relations, House of Representatives), Vol. 4, No. 2 (Tokyo: Finance Ministry Printing Office, 1952), p. 3.

[20] Ibid. Vol. 4, No. 26, p. 30.

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remilitarizing, revising the new constitution and aiming at the rapid resurgence of Japan as a great military power. But in view of the strong resistance to be expected from opposition parties and the national wariness arising from the bitter experience of the war, this alternative would also have been a very difficult one for the government to take, even if they had wanted to do so.

The third alternative was a middle course, i.e. while cooperating with the US and allowing Japan to be incorporated into the American strategic alliance system in Asia, to slow down the process of remilitarization as much as possible and to avoid as far as possible any involvement with the Chinese problem. This third course, which was in fact adopted by the Yoshida government, was, in retrospect, the one least likely to cause friction, and which would leave most room for diplomatic manoeuvre in the future.

The treaty between Japan and Nationalist China cannot be discussed without mentioning the legal position of Taiwan. I myself subscribe to the theory that its legal status remains unsettled. In my view, the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations are no more than a declaration of the allies' intention to return Taiwan to China, and the contents of these Declarations can be confirmed legally only through a peace treaty embodying an agreement among the victorious former allies. Japan, as a defeated power, has no legal say over Taiwan, to which it has already renounced all right, title and claims.

If from a legal point of view Japan is not in a position to involve itself with the China problem, politically speaking it is better for it not to do so. My reasons for this view can be summarized as follows:

First of all, the history of Japan shows that political involvement with the problems of the Asian continent has always had dire consequences for Japan, especially since the beginning of the Showa era. The first Wakatsuki Cabinet, the Tanaka Cabinet and others, all fell because they could not handle such problems. The less involvement with these problems, the better for the stability of Japan's parliamentary politics.

Secondly, China is very close to the Japanese people, both culturally and geographically, and most of them have so deep an interest in it that the China question is now more a problem of domestic politics than of diplomacy.

Thirdly, because division of opinion among the Japanese on this question must lead to the loss of government leadership in foreign policy, policymaking becomes merely a process of compromise among domestic pressures or more precisely among different groups of the government party of the day. The result can only be a lack of rationality and purpose in the conduct of foreign policy.

THE fourth period extended from 1953 to 1957. During this time Peking's emphasis on a 'revolution in Japan' was replaced by China's growing desire to normalize relations with Japan.

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There was a dramatic acceleration of this trend when Mr Hatoyama came to power, which continued into the years of premiership of Mr Islirbashi and Mr Kishi. In this period a non-governmental agreement on trade was renewed four times, and an agreement on fishing was concluded without difficulty. In addition, governmental negotiations took place in Geneva. Peking, expressing the hope of an 'independent, peaceful and democratic Japan', addressed itself quite seriously to the question of the normalization of relations with Japan. In that process, Chinese views on several important questions became clearer.

From Peking's point of view, Taiwan had become a political symbol of the China still unrestored. It was part of China's inalienable territory which had been occupied by the American imperialists, and which therefore had to be liberated by the Chinese people even if it took 50 or 100 years to do so; there was therefore no room for compromise as far as Taiwan was concerned. That it was part of Chinese territory became for Peking a matter of principle.

The first major mistake in Japan's post-war China policy committed by the conservative government was the official visit to Taiwan by Prime Minister Kishi. His statement supporting Nationalist China's intention of regaining the mainland further disturbed the Peking government. Once Kishi's government had adopted a policy favourable towards Nationalist China, they were forced to take the consequences of it, such as the refusal to allow the Chinese Trade Mission to raise their flag and the change in the restrictive interpretation of the treaty between Japan and Nationalist China.

The fourth non-governmental trade agreement signed at the beginning of 1958 provided for the mutual establishment of trade missions, each flying its flag. However, Kishi's refusal to allow Chinese flags to be flown greatly offended Peking. During Yoshida's premiership, painstaking efforts had been made to give a restrictive interpretation to the treaty; Kishi's government, however, took the view that the treaty had disposed of all the issues arising from the war with China, and that therefore it had settled the war with mainland China as well. This legal interpretation meant that Peking could not negotiate for the establishment of formal relations with Japan as long as the treaty was in force, and in this sense Kishi's interpretation presented an obstacle to normalization negotiations.

AT the end of 1957 China changed its policy of moderation for one of radicalism; this marked the beginning of the fifth period, which lasted until early in 1959, the period of the so-called 'Great Leap Forward', when Chinese foreign policy, in line with domestic policy, became radical and extreme.

It was during this time that the Nagasaki flag incident[21] took

[21] This incident took place on 2 May 1958 when a Japanese youth tore to pieces a flag of the People's Republic of China in public in the city of Nagasaki.

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place and Chinese trade with Japan was discontinued. In the wake of this incident, Mr Fujiyama, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, suggested the possibility of holding an ambassadorial meeting and negotiating a government trade agreement, but relations between the two governments deteriorated still further. (There were rumours in Hong Kong at that time that Fujiyama had repeatedly sent secret letters to Peking with a view to entering into governmental negotiations but that the Chinese failed to respond, saying that the time had not yet come.)

THE sixth period lasted from 1959 until the summer of 1966, when the cultural revolution began. It corresponds to what the Chinese call the adjustment period and Chinese foreign policy at this time may therefore be termed 'adjustment period diplomacy'.

As long as the Kishi Cabinet was in office, Peking, for reasons of principle of one kind or another and to save face, made no compromise with the Japanese government. But with the formation of the Ikeda Cabinet in September 1960, it began to adopt a more positive attitude towards the reopening of Sino-Japanese trade, secretly starting to make contact with Japanese conservatives. Against this background, the L-T trade agreement [22] was concluded in January 1962, by which Japan became the only country in the world to trade with substantial freedom both with Taiwan and with the Chinese mainland. (Some students of China predicted towards the end of Sato's period of office that Peking would again use the change of cabinet in Japan to change its Japanese policy.)

The sixth period did not, however, last long. In autumn 1963, the Chou Hung-ching incident took place and Japan's diplomatic relations with Taiwan almost came to an end. To rectify this situation, Mr Yoshida went to Taiwan and burdened the Ikeda government with the Second Yoshida Letter, pledging that government money would not be used for trade with Peking; this discrimination has been under continuous attack by Peking ever since. I consider the writing of this letter to be another grave mistake. Even if diplomatic relations with Taiwan were on the verge of being severed, the Ikeda Cabinet ought to have refrained from attempting to end this uneasy state of affairs. Even if the pressure from the Taiwan lobby in the government party had turned out to be too strong to resist, the government should have limited the validity of the letter to the year of its issue, 1964. As 1964 saw the takeover of the Ikeda Cabinet by that of Sato, it was rather difficult for the Ikeda government to make such a move, but even so it is unfortunate that it did not do so.

[22] This non-governmental trade agreement between Japan and China was signed on 9 November 1962 by Mr Tatsumosuke Takasaki and Liao Cheng-chi. It is known as the L-T trade agreement after the initials of its two signatories.

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THE seventh period covers the 'cultural revolution', from summer 1966 to spring 1969, during which there was no Chinese foreign policy, and the eighth period began after the Ninth Party Conference when this situation was remedied. In short, this was the period of a return to normality, and along with the rapid restoration of diplomatic machinery, meticulous endeavours were made to promote China's prestige in the world community.

During this period of Peking's return to normality, a third mistake was made by the Japanese government. On 21 November 1969, the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué made specific mention of the fact that 'the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan area is also a most important factor for the security of Japan'.[23] To take a benevolent view of the motives of the Japanese government at the time, one assumes that this reference to Taiwan was motivated by considerations concerning the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. The Chinese Nationalist government had consistently opposed the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, and so, to appease it on this issue, the reference to Taiwan was made as a psychological prop to the Nationalist regime.

As expected, Peking reacted strongly to this reference, taking it as interference with the internal affairs of China, and this soon led to a series of vehement accusations against Japanese militarism.

THE foregoing analysis of Sino-Japanese relations during the last quarter of a century reveals two main characteristics in the policy-making patterns of Peking. Firstly, the hardening or softening of Peking's external policy corresponds largely to the radicalism or moderation of its internal policy.[24] Secondly, the Peking government takes the view that Japanese policy is influenced by the personal character of the Prime Minister and it tends therefore to change its policy towards Japan when there is a change of government there.

One could deduce from the first factor that the current moderation in Chinese internal policy was bound in due course to be reflected in its policy towards Japan. This tendency has been further affected by the *détente* between China and the US, the continued tension between China and the USSR, and by the fact that the ageing Chinese leaders such as Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai[25] must have wished for the stabilization of Sino-Japanese relations before they left the scene. If they refused to deal with the Tanaka government, the chances were that the normalization of relations between China and Japan would not have been achieved during their tenure of power. One might therefore have expected that the

[23] *Mainichi Shimbun*, morning ed., 22 November 1969.

[24] For a detailed analysis of the alternation of moderation and radicalism in Peking's policy, see Shinkichi Eto, 'Moderation and Radicalism in the Chinese Revolution', in James B. Crowley (ed.), *Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970), pp. 337–73.

[25] Mao was born in 1893 and Chou in 1896, whereas Kakuei Tanaka, Japan's new Prime Minister, was born in 1918.

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transfer of power from Mr Sato to Mr Tanaka would be used by Peking as the occasion for a change of policy.

In 1969, Peking's internal policy was already becoming more moderate, and the outcome of the Lin Piao affair consolidated this policy of moderation. However, Peking had indulged in too much abuse of Sato to be able to adopt a moderate line with the Sato Cabinet without losing face. It is in fact probable that the Peking government had been waiting for Sato's resignation because immediately after the formation of the Tanaka Cabinet, it demanded with unusual urgency the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. The prospect of greater friendliness between China and Japan produced a veritable euphoria in the Japanese mass media, in which there was scarcely any mention of Taiwan, which became victim of the normalization process. In the circumstances, the Tanaka regime felt that it could do nothing else but respond to this urgent demand from China, whatever effect the normalization may have on Taiwan, South Korea and other Asian countries. It is more than doubtful whether the present euphoria will permit the government to take a balanced view of what should be done.

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Japan and China

Wolf Mendl

ASK any Japanese today what he thinks is the most urgent problem of his country's foreign policy and he will almost certainly answer: relations with China. The national obsession with China antedates the Nixon Shock of July 1971 and its roots may be traced to the end of the last century.

The leaders of the Meiji Revolution were acutely conscious of the fate that had befallen China at the hands of the Western powers. They were determined that Japan should not suffer in the same way. The geographical environment, the structure of Japanese society and the value system which stemmed from it favoured their policy of national independence. So they succeeded where the conservative and, later, the reformist leadership of China had failed. Japan became the first non-Western society to become a modern nation state. It beat its rivals at their own game in China, although it was forced to give up some of its spoils by a coalition of three of them, in Russia and, almost, in South-East Asia and the Pacific. Little wonder that the Japanese reversed the traditional Chinese view of the world and saw Japan as the elder brother with special responsibility for helping China to withstand the onslaught from the Western world.

Historically, there are many reasons why China should have loomed so large in Japanese thought and policy. Japanese culture has been deeply influenced by Chinese civilization, just as British culture owes so much to Graeco-Roman civilization. However, the Japanese adapted philosophical, religious, social, and artistic elements of a superior civilization to a strong and unbroken indigenous culture to a far greater degree than the British. Chinese institutions and ideas were assimilated to distinctive Japanese institutions and values.[1]

In pre-modern times the Japanese were ready to accept their position as China's younger brother in the cultural sphere, but in the political and economic sphere they were more inclined to stress equality and independence. They had only an intermittent tribute relationship with China, belonging more often to the Outer than the Sinic Zone in the Chinese world order.[2]

China's disarray in the nineteenth century contrasted sharply with the social and political cohesion of Japan whose astonishing success in the power league gave rise to feelings of superiority among the Japanese.

[1] See Delmer M. Brown, *Nationalism in Japan: An Introductory Historical Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), pp. 10–12, 14, 32, 55–57, 61; Takeshi Ishida, *Japanese Society* (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 10.

[2] See John K. Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 2–3; M. Frederick Nelson, *Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1946), p. 93.

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While continuing to admire traditional Chinese culture, they were aware that it had been insufficient to prevent China from falling victim to the stronger Western industrial and technological civilization. Hence, their customary admiration was now tempered with condescension and a certain contempt for Chinese incompetence. It became the mission of idealistic Japanese to try to rescue China from its own weaknesses. Their idealism became a convenient cover for the imperialism of other Japanese.

At the same time, the industrialized economy of Japan looked to China as a source of raw materials and as a potential market for its goods. Britain had dominated China's foreign trade in the nineteenth century. In 1880, Anglo-Chinese trade represented 77 per cent of China's total foreign trade as against a 3 per cent share held by Sino-Japanese trade. The position was reversed by 1926 and in the 1930s China had become the third largest source of Japan's imports after the United States and Korea. It was also the principal market for Japanese exports. Among Japan's imports of primary products between 1934 and 1936, China supplied 34 per cent of iron ore, 38·6 per cent of salt, 68·4 per cent of coal, and 71·3 per cent of soya-beans.[3]

Since 1945 trade with China has sunk to a mere 2·5 per cent or so of Japan's total trade. In 1971, China was Japan's ninth largest customer and its pre-war function as supplier of some of the basic raw materials has been taken over by others. The last year has seen a rush to Peking, partly in the hope of finding an alternative to shrinking markets (this is particularly true of the Japanese chemical fertilizer and steel industries) and partly to beat other Japanese, European, and American competitors. Behind Japanese thinking is the hope that China will again become a substantial source of raw materials, may offer an opportunity for large-scale investment, and will eventually be an important market for Japanese goods and technology. The prerequisite for such opportunities is a substantial change in Chinese economic and social policy. Even then it is very doubtful whether it could ever regain its pre-war importance as Japan's economic partner.

Japan's phenomenal economic development in the past 25 years has been of little immediate relevance to the problem of Sino-Japanese relations. Japanese policy was frozen in the political confrontation between the United States and China.

The communist revolution severed the traditional cultural relationship in every sphere. One could even argue that in their reinterpretation of Chinese history and of the philosophical legacy of Confucianism, the Chinese communists have broken with the past more completely than the Japanese have done through all the process of change and adaptation in the past century.[4]

[3] George P. Jan, 'Japan's Trade with Communist China' (*Asian Survey*, Vol. IX, No. 12, December 1969), pp. 900–01.

[4] See the interesting study by Ishwer C. Ojha, *Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition: The Diplomacy of Cultural Despair* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

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The new Chinese model of society attracts intellectuals and students in Japan but even the most fervent admirers of the Chinese system agree that it is not directly applicable to Japanese conditions. Other Japanese now see themselves as the principal guardians of the traditional East Asian culture abandoned by the Chinese.[5]

In the political sphere there is little opportunity or incentive to adopt a patronizing attitude towards China. In spite of the upheavals of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, China continues to present a solid appearance to the world and there is no sign of a return to the internal disorder which made it such an easy prey to foreign intervention in modern times.

THE inability—or unwillingness—of successive post-war Japanese governments to develop a very clear and coherent China policy is in striking contrast to the great public interest in China. Governmental inhibitions vis-à-vis China have, of course, been affected by the international environment, but they have their roots in the political structure and mood of modern Japan.

Policy towards China has been a popular political football for nearly a century. The opposition has traditionally used the China question as a stick with which to beat the government of the day. China policy has been a symbol for Japanese nationalism of the right and of the left. In the pre-war era, the protection or domination of China by Japan was seen as a policy more suitable to the traditional role of Japan and more in harmony with its historical and cultural heritage than a policy of close ties with the West as the means to establishing and maintaining great power status.[6] Since the war, the fascination of China for the Japanese left has owed as much to the search for a Japanese identity, threatened by American domination, as to ideology.

Unlike the pre-war nationalists, the contemporary Japanese radicals of the left tend to see China and not Japan as the leader of Asia against Western imperialism. However, it is noteworthy that the champions of closer relations with the People's Republic of China are found not only among the Marxists—indeed, the Japanese communists have become severe critics of Peking, caught as they are in the contradictions of Sino-Soviet polemics—but among political moderates, even within the leadership of the Liberal-Democratic Party, and in the Komeito, which professes to be the only true home-spun Japanese party, untainted by foreign ideological importations.

The China issue is perhaps the only foreign policy issue which may yield votes in general elections. It symbolizes some of the basic

[5] See the joint communiqué of the second meeting of the Japan-Republic of Korea Cooperation Committee (*The Japan Times*, 9 and 12 March 1970).

[6] See Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970).

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problems which face the nationally self-conscious Japanese. The communist experiment challenges them to reflect on the nature and purpose of society at a time when they are worried about the 'quality of life' and question the idolatry of economic growth. It also challenges the close relationship with the United States which has been the hallmark of Japan's position since the war. The Japanese are troubled not only by the political and security aspects of this relationship but increasingly by its economic implications. One third of Japan's total foreign trade is with the United States, and its economy is thus vulnerable to developments within the American economy. The raising of trade barriers, the sharpening of American competition in world markets, the threat of a competitive scramble for essential sources of energy and the pressure of American capital to penetrate the Japanese economy raise fears of a new American domination just as the military and political domination is weakening.

THE complex of Japanese interests, attitudes and feelings towards China has its counterpart in the Chinese view of Japan. However, the components of that view have a different weighting.

The Japanese economy clearly has more to offer to the Chinese than vice-versa. Japan accounts for approximately 34 per cent of China's imports. Japanese technology and Japanese capital could have obvious attractions for China if the policy of economic self-reliance is modified. Peking's uncompromising political hostility towards Japan has not been allowed to stand in the way where economic interests are concerned. The Japanese insistence on separating economics from politics was tacitly accepted in spite of declared opposition. For some time before the substantial shift in Japan's policy over Taiwan in February and March 1972, the People's Republic of China encouraged important Japanese firms to develop relations with it in spite of their investments in Taiwan and South Korea.

Economic interests may be one reason for improving relations with Japan, but the political and emotional inhibitions are considerable. Traditional views of Japan and the Japanese may be less important in this respect. The factors which have marked Chinese attitudes most profoundly are Japan's earlier and successful entry into the Western-imposed international system, Japanese aggression, and the experience of the communist leadership in the bitter struggles of the 1930s and 1940s.

Chinese suffering under Japanese militarism is perhaps the decisive influence on Chinese appraisals of Japan today. Premier Chou displays a deep and extremely well-informed interest in the Japanese economy, and it is obvious that the oft-expressed fears of a revival of Japanese expansionism and militarism are based on seeing close parallels with the situation in the 1930s and 1940s.[7] The analysis rests on historical

[7] Masahisa Suganuma, 'Interview with Premier Chou', 8 December 1970 (*Sekai*, May 1971—Translation Services of the American Embassy, Tokyo, May 1971, pp.

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experience rather than on the strict application of Marxist theory with its emphasis on the inherent contradictions within a capitalist society.

The confrontation of Japanese and Chinese interests and attitudes therefore falls into an asymmetrical pattern. On the one hand, the Japanese are psychologically attracted to China but see no great prospects in a bilateral economic relationship. On the other hand, the Chinese are politically and psychologically repelled by the Japanese but could gain very much from closer economic relations with Japan.

This pattern provides the background for their bilateral relationship. The process of the normalization of relations between the two countries will provide its context.

SINCE early 1972 there has been rapid progress on both sides towards formal negotiations. First, the Japanese disposed of some of the major obstacles by recognizing Peking's claim to sovereignty over China and, by implication, over Taiwan,[8] after which Mr Sato—another obstacle—removed himself from the scene. Once Mr Tanaka was installed in office, the arrangements for his historic trip to China proceeded remarkably quickly and smoothly.

The Japanese interest is not in doubt and until recently it was always assumed that progress would depend on whether they found China's terms acceptable. Although it remains true that the Chinese have the initiative in setting the limits of the new relationship, it is apparent that they are in a hurry to have an agreement on general principles and the establishment of formal relations, leaving the settlement of specific matters to be hammered out in subsequent and possibly lengthy negotiations. Accordingly, they have been prepared to make some concessions to the Japanese in both substance and language.

The reasons for the unexpectedly rapid developments during the summer are to be found more on the Chinese than the Japanese side. Mr Tanaka obviously gains from an early diplomatic success which would reinforce his claim to be the dynamic personality who can give a new direction to his country's foreign and domestic policies. Mr Chou's haste may also stem from a need to consolidate his position in China, but the principal benefits from a speedy *rapprochement* are to be gained in the field of external relations. It has had the effect of postponing the Russo-Japanese negotiations for a peace treaty; it has increased the unease in American-Japanese relations; it may prepare the way for a substantial increase in the volume of bilateral economic relations. Above all, it damages Japan's relations with Taiwan. The Japanese may wish to switch their policy of separating economics from

24–35); Chou En-lai's conversation with a Japanese business mission, 18 November 1971 (*The Japan Times*, 20 November 1971).

[8] The Foreign Ministry's formulation of the government's 'unified view', presented by Mr Fukuda to the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives, 6 March 1972. Mr Sato's statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, 24 May 1972 (*Le Monde*, 2 June 1972).

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politics to Taiwan but, at the time of writing, it is doubtful whether the government in Taipei would allow them to do so. Not only are fairly substantial economic investments at stake but a breach with Taiwan will trouble many Japanese who retain an emotional attachment to the island and its government.

The real problem of managing Sino-Japanese relations will begin once the two states enjoy normal diplomatic intercourse. Potential areas of friction are the Korean peninsula, the continental shelf in the East China Sea and conflicting interests in South-East Asia where Japanese competition might threaten China's favourable trade relations with a number of countries. If China and Japan are left alone as the principal major powers in direct competition with each other, then the outlook is, indeed, bleak. It could happen in South-East Asia and, more dangerously, in the East China Sea if the Taiwan problem is not settled satisfactorily.

It is at this stage that the question of nuclear armament is usually thrown into the discussion. How will Japan react to a perceived nuclear threat from China? The same question also applies to a threat from the Soviet Union, which, however, is usually seen in terms of the central strategic balance. Quite apart from the difficulty of meeting threats from a super-power, the Japanese show no sign of wanting to abandon their reliance on the security relationship with the United States as an insurance against pressure from the Soviet Union. The problem of nuclear threats from China is somewhat different. Would the United States intervene against a threat which does not endanger its own security? The Japanese harbour some suspicion that the diplomacy of Kissinger and Nixon is designed to balance Japan's growing power and influence with that of China.

Obviously, China cannot present a very credible nuclear threat to Japan for the time being. However, the growth of Chinese nuclear armament might affect Japanese susceptibilities both in terms of status and the protection of Japanese interests on China's periphery. The deliberate dispersal of Japanese economic interests and the current mood in Japan suggest that Japan will not be ready for some time to pursue an active political and military policy in any of the sensitive areas near China. Nor is there much indication on the strength of present and past Chinese policy that the People's Republic would pursue an aggressive policy apart from the assertion of principle.

Issues of status and 'face', which are important to both parties, will have a significant bearing on their ability to reach accommodation over conflicting interests. The Chinese have on the whole pursued a cautious and pragmatic policy behind a smokescreen of stridently asserted revolutionary ideology. The Japanese have remained acutely sensitive to national status and 'face' behind a very modest and unassuming foreign policy.

The importance of traditional feelings may diminish in the course of time. Within a few years the leadership in both countries will consist

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of men less personally marked by the events of the 1930s and 1940s. They should carry less sentimental baggage into the conduct of international relations. Moreover, they may be relatively unfamiliar with the other country. Many of China's revolutionaries spent some time as students in Japan; many of the older generation of Japanese were soldiers, administrators and businessmen in China. Their successors will lack this personal experience and should be free of the prejudices resulting from it. They may, of course, develop new prejudices derived from second-hand knowledge.

IN the final analysis, the international environment, or multilateral context, may turn out to be the most important determinant of Sino-Japanese relations. The present fluidity of power relationships in the Northern Pacific poses for Japan the problem of how to avoid isolation—historically a not uncongenial concept but dangerous in contemporary circumstances because of Japan's dependence on the world economy. For China it poses the problem of how to keep Japan neutralized and harmless.

Just as it is difficult to envisage really close relations between China and Japan in the near future or even within the next decade, it is equally obvious that Japan can no longer count on a cosy relationship with the United States. Too much has happened in the past year to make this more than a pious aspiration. Individual problems such as trade liberalization, monetary adjustments, or methods of diplomatic consultation may be satisfactorily resolved, but the feelings of distrust and insult, particularly on the Japanese side, cannot be so easily overcome. The United States may become just another friendly power among other friendly powers—more friendly at some times than at others.

Historical experience and popular sentiments make it most improbable that Japan could develop a close rapport with the Soviet Union. Even if the Northern Territories question is satisfactorily resolved and substantial economic cooperation in Siberia really gets under way, this would still be a far cry from an alliance.

The Japanese are certainly interested in tapping the oil of Tyumen, the coal of Yakutsk and the natural gas off Sakhalin, but even the most ambitious development projects may not cover more than 10 per cent of Japan's energy needs in the 1980s. It is also doubtful whether in the long term the Soviet Union would allow itself to become a mere supplier of essential raw materials to Japan. Japanese reluctance to become too dependent on one supplier of essential resources—particularly if it is a super-power—and the limits of the Soviet economy are likely to prevent economic cooperation from becoming close political cooperation.

Finally, at the back of their minds the Japanese must always be concerned with the general strategic situation in North-East Asia. It is not in their interest to encourage an increased Soviet military and naval presence in the region. The building of pipelines across eastern

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Siberia and of improved port facilities in the Maritime Province would not only strengthen Soviet naval power in the Pacific but would enable the Russians to increase military pressure on Manchuria and Korea. A serious Soviet threat to China could easily become a threat to Japan. Within the foreseeable future the military danger from Russia is far greater than that from China.

The Sino-Soviet conflict presents Japanese policy-makers with a delicate problem. They will be tempted to seize any advantage for themselves arising from it, yet they must avoid exacerbating the conflict to such an extent that Japan will be forced to choose between the two contestants. They must also avoid any action which would encourage the two communist giants to make common cause against Japan.

If Japan were to look for new partners whose support would be a welcome insurance against hostile moves by its near neighbours, a politically united European Community might well fill the role against Russia that Britain did at the beginning of this century. That could be the prospect for the 1980s or, more likely, the 1990s, but it seems to have little relevance for the next five or ten years.

A similar search nearer home for partners in the Pacific to balance excessive Chinese influence in South-East Asia might focus on Indonesia and Australia, but that, too, must remain in the realm of speculation.

Finally, we might ask: Why not a Japanese-Chinese alliance? The idea is not too far-fetched from the Japanese point of view. The economies of the two countries could complement each other and the concept would be in line with a long tradition of Japanese thought. Nevertheless, there is a basic incompatibility in the respective social and economic systems of the two countries. It is not merely a matter of capitalism versus socialism or liberal democracy versus totalitarianism, but a matter of two Asian states at very different stages and on very different roads of development. To overcome such incompatibilities would require a determination which is not yet evident in either country.

So Japan must manoeuvre within the 'triangle', nearest to but gradually moving away from the American corner. It is in its interest not to be left alone anywhere face to face with one of the major powers. From the Japanese point of view it is therefore desirable that at least two if not all three of the major powers retain a strong interest in Korea, the China Sea, South-East Asia and the Middle East. For only then can it enjoy the freedom of manoeuvre and lack of direct political commitment which may be best suited to its tradition, its economy and its domestic political system.

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Japanese Intellectuals

Ivan P. Hall

THE challenge facing Japan's intellectuals as they enter the 1970s is, in a word, that of success. Not their own success as a group—for, as a group, they have seen many of the causes espoused by the majority among them fail. The success, rather, has been that of Japan as a whole, both as a society and as a nation among other nations, and it has been a success achieved in the face of considerable political and emotional resistance from some of the most prominent intellectual elements.

The failure, of course, has largely been that of the post-war leftist political opposition, with which Japan's intellectual mainstream has been intimately allied, and in a sense the last two decades have simply witnessed the most recent skirmishes in the Hundred Years' War which Japanese intellectuals have been waging against their government ever since the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Events, however, have gradually undermined their positions on many issues. Spectacular economic growth and the relentless downward movement of tangible affluence have made a shambles of the 'politics of misery'. The reversion of Okinawa, the prospective end of the Vietnam war, the Sino-American *rapprochement*, and the steady trend towards parity with the erstwhile American overlord, have robbed them of foreign policy issues with a broad, and intrinsically nationalistic, appeal. Raising the spectre of 'fascist' or 'militarist' revival in domestic politics wins fewer and fewer points, either with a younger generation that has never known conscription and remains deeply pacifist and hedonistic in sentiment, or with their elders, who keep returning competent if colourless conservative governments which consistently opt for a profitable nuclear and strategic dependence on the United States.

The problems confronting Japan today are not those of weakness, but those of strength, and the negative psychological attitudes of protest which many intellectuals have cultivated in the past are a poor preparation for the sudden challenge of power. Ritualistic incantations against monopoly capitalism will do little to facilitate the difficult policy decisions which a dynamic economy has thrust upon the Japanese in the spheres of trade relations, development assistance, or environmental control. Dogmatic strictures on imperialism or insistence on an instant panacea in the form of abrogation of the Japan-US alliance will be of no practical assistance in the search for an independent and more active political role in a world dominated by American, Russian, and Chinese power politics. Rejection of Japan's far from perfect system of parliamentary government in the name of moral and political perfectionism is more likely to lead to authoritarianism of one sort or another than to greater participatory democracy.

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The game of power and affluence is a new one not only for Japan's intellectuals, of course, but for the nation as a whole. After a century of anxious striving for equality with the West, and of obsession with its own inadequacies, Japan finds it difficult to make the switch in mental attitude from *arriviste* to *l'homme arrivé* increasingly expected of it by its international partners, and the transition is a particularly poignant one for Japan's intellectuals. As conscious guardians of values and shapers of new ideas, they have been more sensitive than other elements in the population to the stresses and anomalies of Japan's rush for modernization, and their discomfiture has been severely compounded by their sense of exclusion from the decision-making process and of distance from the practical levers of power. Imperial Japan and tsarist Russia invented the modern 'alienated intellectual' at approximately the same time, but it is the Japanese version who now has a longer, and totally uninterrupted, pedigree.

MODERN Japanese intellectuals are in many respects the spiritual heirs of the Tokugawa samurai, a broad leadership class comprising five to six per cent of the population at the time of the Restoration—five times the proportion of the nobility and clergy combined in pre-Revolutionary France.[1] The samurai combined very effectively and in a personally meaningful way their dual mastery of pen and sword, took their appointed roles as political and intellectual leaders seriously, and, with their Confucian background, tended as a matter of course to view politics as a question more of the proper moral leadership than of the careful tinkering with institutions to minimize the effects of man's innate perversity.

The first step in the elimination of the samurai-intellectual from the power structure took place between 1869 and the early 1870s with the establishment of a modern central government narrowly based on the leadership of the four *han*, or feudal baronies, which had overthrown the Shogunate. Thousands of loyalist bureaucrats were muscled aside, along with many samurai at the regional capitals who had found scope for their ambitions in the interstices of feudal autonomy. These men quickly found their way into journalism, education, and the nascent political party opposition, three fields still largely dominated by Japan's disaffected intelligentsia.

The second stage followed during the 1880s and 1890s with the elaboration of a state apparatus which, although genuinely meritocratic as to recruitment, remained highly elitist and very narrowly based, and had little room for the extensive new talent emerging from Japan's modern educational system. The limited constitutional monarchy established under the Meiji Constitution of 1889, and the refine-

[1] E. Herbert Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p. 81.

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ment after 1890 of an official, statist intellectual orthodoxy centring on the Emperor, increased the sense of professional and intellectual constriction, while the apparent futility of working within the system to change the system served only to heighten the old Confucian proclivity for moralistic, perfectionist politics.

By the early twentieth century, Japan had produced a workable 'Establishment', a quadrumvirate of bureaucratic, military, business, and conservative-party elites, all jockeying for power within a framework of imperial sovereignty—but with the intellectuals left out. The practical alternatives were not attractive: to join the system as technician or apologist; to abandon politics altogether for literary and aesthetic self-cultivation; or to raise the banner of apocalyptic transformation—utopian socialism at the turn of the century, anarchism around 1910, communism during the 1920s, or national socialist revolution during the pre-war decade. In the fragile ideological centre, liberals and parliamentary socialists who hoped to nurture the shoots of modern democracy within the system and reform it from inside, found themselves hounded off the scene by the same rightward-leaning Establishment which the leftist outsiders accused them of toadying to.

The catastrophic defeat of World War II left the Japanese intellectuals with a feeling of guilt for having let things come to such a pass, with a determination to prevent any recurrence by reclaiming their rightful role of leadership in the nation, and with bitter frustration when the new Japan turned out to have almost as little use for them as the old. The American Occupation had swept away the military elite along with the old imperial orthodoxy, and the new constitution of 1947 had established the sovereignty of the people, the supremacy of the Diet, and the full panoply of formal political freedoms including those of speech and the press, of which post-war intellectuals made prompt and vigorous use. Yet, for all that, the Japanese intelligentsia still found itself up against an impressive and as often as not unresponsive power structure, which the departure of the military had simply reduced from a four-in-hand to a troika. If the new breed of businessmen, civil servants, and conservative party politicians were indisputably more modern, rational and international-minded than their predecessors, and were willing to work within the institutional and ideological framework of post-war democracy, they also seemed at times even more efficiently organized and attuned to each other than had been the case before the war.

There was a much greater degree of institutional and personal continuity from the pre-war period than in the case of Germany, and this contributed more perhaps than anything else to the subjective feeling that little had actually changed. The Occupation had chosen to work through the existing government apparatus; the Emperor and the Diet were retained; and pre-war parties and politicians re-emerged in recognizable form after a brief eclipse during the war or the Occupation purges. The fact that post-war democracy had been decreed from

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outside raised natural fears that it could vanish just as suddenly, and the perplexing tendency of the enlarged electorate to vote conservative seemed to confirm the persistence of the old pre-war personalistic, boss-dominated politics.

Yet a full quarter of a century later, the basic edifice of post-war democracy still stands. As in all today's advanced industrial democracies the power elite, the popular will, and the mainstream of articulate opinion are imperfectly joined, and in Japan the disjunction of power and opinion has been particularly noticeable. Post-war history, however, seems to confirm the verdict that there exists a considerable correlation between the institutions which the Japanese now have, and those which they really want. (The relation between popular will and articulate opinion remains a mystery to bedevil the foreign correspondent in Tokyo who thinks he can divine the future course of Japan by reading the Japanese press.) Accordingly, the most prominent division among Japan's contemporary intellectuals has been between those who accept the post-war heritage and wish to improve it, and those who would prefer to start all over again from scratch. The rift here, basically, is between liberals and democratic socialists whose precursors before the war attempted unsuccessfully to ride the Emperor system, and communists and Marxist socialists with their literary and academic adherents who first entered the pale of political respectability after 1945. The former accuse the latter of wanting to throw the baby of post-war democracy out with the bath-water of existing institutions, while the latter warn against drowning the baby in the very same bath. It is, in short, a fundamental disagreement about the real nature of Japan today and the meaning of the last 27 years of the nation's history; a dispute which requires some sort of resolution before the Japanese can move positively and creatively towards the future.

The introspective, retrospective flavour of much of Japanese thought during the last hundred years was an inevitable result of the prodigious effort to digest huge chunks of alien civilization and to integrate the nation into a world order which was, and remains, profoundly un-Japanese. The particular mix at any given time has never been one to satisfy everybody. Before the war, intellectuals divided primarily over the question of how 'Westernized' Japan had—or ought to—become, and over what was or was not truly 'Japanese'. The nation was measured against a seemingly hostile outside world, and the ideological mainstream—as if to protest, 'too far'—flowed in nationalistic, rightist channels. By way of contrast, the chief concern in the post-war period has been the degree of Japan's 'democratization', and the centre of ideological gravity has now moved to the left—with its typical protest of 'not far enough'. General accommodation to the present level of Westernization has helped deflect intellectual energies from the problems of cultural, to those of political, identity, with most of the yardsticks taken again from abroad. The fissiparous and ethereal quality of Japan's post-war ideological debate owes much to the cultivation

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of idealized and competing Western democratic, Soviet, and Chinese communist models, while the failure to distinguish clearly between the Marxist and the liberal definitions of the central concept, 'democracy', has given the discussion a philosophical fuzziness matched only by the political bitterness engendered by dragging the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet confrontation directly into the domestic arena.

The Japanese establishment is quite capable, as in the past, of making fundamental policy decisions without significant input from the intellectual mainstream. Japan will be the poorer for it, however, particularly at this juncture in its history, when circumstances no longer rigidly limit the range of viable options, and when imaginative choice and action require the maximum mobilization of intelligence and of consensus.

IN some ways, the makers of articulate opinion and the exponents of dissent in Japan enjoy unique and enviable advantages. These include the world's most technologically sophisticated mass media network, the world's keenest and most highly educated reading public, and a leeway with the printed word which in most other free societies would sorely stretch the legal definitions of libel and slander. Residual Confucian attitudes towards education and the educated man continue to envelop the intellectual in a warm cocoon of public esteem. 'Ivory-towerism' is an epithet tossed at the antiseptically academic framework within which some scholars deliberately choose to operate, in proud affirmation of 'pure' scholarship, but there is no native Japanese equivalent of the deeply contemptuous pejorative, 'egghead', as applied to intellectuals either individually or as a class. And the Japanese intelligentsia, although hard to define precisely, remains, like the samurai class before it, a very sizeable part of the population, relatively greater than the equivalent strata in the advanced Western nations. And this holds true whether one counts the thousands who write for the public and are active in the creative arts, or the millions who follow their intellectual gurus in the pages of the half dozen bulging, sophisticated monthly opinion journals, on the seven national television channels, or through the lively columns of the three mammoth national dailies with their combined circulation of over 15 million.

There are also, however, unenviable disadvantages.

The moulding of the national consensus reflects, in Japan as elsewhere, humbler patterns of decision-making. In the West, and most typically perhaps in the Anglo-American political tradition, agreement is achieved through a process (diagrammatically speaking) of vertical fission and refusion. Be it a town meeting or the larger drama of a Presidential election, individuals and groups and points of view confront each other openly in adversary fashion, the tally is taken, and the minority acquiesces in the majority decision as a rough expression of the general will. This rather mechanical division takes place, furthermore, along lines of realistic alternatives. Ideas and power (or poten-

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tial power) tend to overlap. Ideology tends to relate to practical policies, which in turn relate to the serious possibility of attaining power.

Little of this applies to the Japanese situation. Both the adversary and the majoritarian principles run very much against the grain of Japanese social habit and moral sentiment. Agreement is typically reached by an osmosis of divergent ideas upward towards the top rank, where a decision emerges which ideally reflects an organic unanimity. The lines of division in the case of Japan are horizontal, and are drawn between elements entitled to express an opinion, and those responsible for 'discovering' and pronouncing the consensus: between the family heads and the village chief, for instance, in the traditional agricultural community; or between junior and senior bureaucrats in the modern government ministries; or between politically articulate groups and the power establishment as a whole, on the macroscopic level of national politics. Upward petition meets a downward flow of persuasion, with much mutual consultation, and minority opinion expects to be incorporated somehow or other in the final consensus, roughly on a percentage basis. Arbitrary majoritarianism evokes charges of tyranny, stemming not from a Western but from a traditional sense of political fairness, and parliamentary government in Japan has suffered not only from too formalistic an application of foreign blueprints, but also from a failure, quite often, to accommodate the native sense of 'democracy'.

In terms of this horizontal paradigm, the present conservative party has been, properly speaking, an integral part (with the bureaucratic and financial elites) of the upper, or consensus-finding stratum, while the opposition parties—all of them, Socialist, Democratic Socialist, the neo-Buddhist Komeito ('Clean Government Party'), and the Communists alike—have functioned less as a genuine political opposition in the Western sense than as pressure groups, or as safety valves for discontent, within the lower, or petitioning, stratum. In this function they have been joined, of course, by the normal run of pressure groups, the intellectuals, and the media—although it could be argued that Japan's powerful media have a foot in both strata, considering themselves part of the decision-making establishment, and perhaps exercising as much effective political leverage as any of the opposition parties.

The Japanese power structure ever since the Meiji Restoration has been pragmatically oriented, leaning very gently in one ideological direction or another in response to the preferences of its component elites, and the deeper drifts of public sentiment, which it watches with great care. Ideology and articulate political dissent do exercise a sort of peripheral pressure on power, but are not incorporated into the power system as directly as in adversary-style, majoritarian Western democratic politics, which has both a greater need and a greater tolerance for intellectual confrontation. Before the Pacific War a nationalistic public mood, the Imperial orthodoxy, and a powerful military elite combined to give the Japanese establishment a rightward tilt.

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Today, pressures from the leftist parties and the intellectual mainstream have helped to prevent any large-scale abolition of the major Occupation reforms, but have not sufficed to push the establishment towards doctrinaire socialism or an abrogation of the US alliance. Today's ruling Liberal Democrats, for all their obeisances to parliamentary democracy and enlightened free enterprise, retain the essential ideological blandness of the power structure as a whole, which will listen to intellectuals only if they have something useful to say, or if what the intellectuals are saying seems to enjoy broad public support. Articulate dissent, meanwhile, retains all the hyperbole, feverishness, and irresponsibility which come from being banished to the periphery.

The harking after a lost pre-eminence, the fascination with abstract foreign models, and the personal frustrations arising from the persistence of a traditional consensus-making process, have all combined to render it difficult at times for Japanese intellectuals to make a non-emotional, objective appraisal of their own country.

IT was with fascination that the Japanese public watched an all-day, nationally televised, police seige on 28 February 1972, as officers armed with water cannon and a wrecking crane flushed six ultraradical students of the *Rengo Sekigun* (United Red Army) faction out of a mountain lodge, where they had held a local housewife hostage for 218 hours. The death toll (two policemen and a local citizen) was not sufficiently high to arouse particular public indignation, and a leading weekly magazine (the *Shukan Yomiuri,* 18 March 1972) promptly brought out an issue featuring the sex life of young revolutionary activists, a college freshmen's guide to the radical student sects, and the 'New Left' scholars most popular with radical youth, and romanticizing activist student violence in general.

A week later, fascination turned to public horror and disbelief as the police, acting on a student confession, started digging out of the icy soil in a woodland north of Tokyo the bodies of 14 young *Rengo Sekigun* activists tortured, and then frozen to death, by their colleagues after being charged in a kangaroo court with ideological deviation. (The Red Army faction, one of the two groups involved, first came to international attention in April 1970 with the samurai-sword hijacking of a Japan Airlines jetliner to North Korea; and a splinter element of the Red Army was destined to perpetrate the Lod Airport massacre at Tel Aviv on 30 May 1972.)

Despite the bizarre (and patently criminal) nature of the *Rengo Sekigun* lynchings, it was still possible for some of Japan's intellectuals to argue that it would be safer for Japanese democracy not to hunt down and prosecute the offenders, for fear this would open the way to a general anti-leftist vendetta, and the establishment of a police state. Interviewed in the May issue of the liberal monthly opinion journal, *Shokun,* the venerable orthodox Marxist historian Goro Hani (one of the 'New Left' student gurus featured in the *Shukan Yomiuri*) gave

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vent to the deepseated fears of Japan's Cassandras regarding the fragility of the post-war democratic structure:

> Well, now, there has been a lot of talk, in connexion with this incident, regarding the frightfulness of lynching. Of course I find lynching frightful. But what I find far more frightful than that is the fact that, with this incident, we are gradually getting a police state which cannot be budged. In short, the general citizenry is hardly in imminent danger of being lynched, but nothing would be more frightful than the establishment of a police state, on the pretext of keeping the Red Army faction under control.[2]

Hani then argued that the real troublemaker was the power establishment, which should first lay down its own arms:

> The responsibility lies with the man who has trapped the beast in his corner. As applied to the powerful and the powerless, this means in brief that since the powerholders have driven the common people into a corner, the entire responsibility for what happens thereafter rests with the former. Of course, I don't mean to call the Red Army men beasts—I am speaking of it as a logical matter. At any rate, the powerholding side can do whatever it pleases. And the Red Army was left no choice but to do what it did.[3]

The contrasting reaction of Japan's intellectual liberals was summed up succinctly in the same issue of *Shokun* by the Kyoto University philosopher, Michitaro Tanaka, chairman of the libertarian Japan Cultural Congress:

> Instead of saying, apologetically, that: 'We understand their feelings, but cannot endorse their actions,' or that 'Revolution is necessary, but theirs is the wrong way', we would do well to dethrone 'Revolution' from its place of pre-eminence, to think of it as an exceptional evil, and to enthrone rather those qualifying clauses which we have been in the habit of adding after the conjunction 'BUT'. Revolution is a disaster for all the people, one which arises inevitably under special circumstances, and not a thing to be deliberately fomented. It would be a fine thing, would it not, if our professional revolutionaries—those odd merchants who had their beginning in the nineteenth century—were to gradually make their exit from the stage.[4]

IS today's Japan an evolving democracy, or a proto-police state? This basic dispute first erupted on the post-war intellectual scene in the 1949 debates over the Japan Socialist Party platform—along the lines of Japan's main ideological split, which runs not so much between communists and socialists (as in Western Europe) as it does between left- and right-wing socialists. Junzo Inamura, a prominent economist

[2] Goro Hani 'Shinri wa shosu ni aru' (The Truth Lies with the Minority), *Shokun* (May 1972), p. 32. (Passage translated by the present author.)
[3] Ibid. p. 35.
[4] Michitaro Tanaka, 'Hitotsu no giga to shite' (Taking It As A Comic Picture), *Shokun* (May 1972), p. 29. (Passage translated by the present author.)

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and a socialist member of the Diet, argued for the orthodox Marxists of the left wing that class interests, class consciousness, and class struggle were the overriding factors in man's social groupings and political behaviour; that a 'socialist revolution' in Japan—although achievable through 'peaceful and democratic' means—would have to be accompanied by a 'political revolution' in which the 'proletariat' would 'seize complete control over the political authority of the government which supports capitalism'; and that evolutionary socialists by dispensing with the class struggle and the political revolution were courting the 'subsequent rebirth of Japanese fascism'.[5]

In reply, the socialist Diet member and prominent educator, Tatsuo Morita, argued for the right wing that national, humanistic, and moral interests often overrode the class factor in human affairs, urged the Marxists within the party to forswear 'orthodox proletarian revolution' and commit themselves to parliamentary democracy, and warned that the left-wing platform draft implied 'the future establishment of a socialist government that leans towards a parliamentary dictatorship closely resembling a dictatorship of the proletariat'.[6]

Charges of sympathy with communism met countercharges of red-baiting anticommunism, and the debate over the necessity and/or desirability of revolution was quickly joined by 1950 on a broader theoretical plane by some of Japan's leading scholars. Tokyo University's eminent political scientist, Masao Maruyama, called attention to the special function of communism in Japan in hastening the dissolution of the traditional social structure and of the irrational, 'pre-modern', value consciousness which he claimed had spawned the pre-war ultra-nationalism and militarism and which, until torn out by the roots, would continue to prevent the growth of genuine democracy in Japan. Maruyama argued as follows:

> I am of the opinion that, under the circumstances presently prevailing in Japanese society, the Communist and Socialist Parties have a very definite role to play in fostering democratization. I would therefore like to point out forcefully that the attempts being made by the authorities to oppress and weaken the Communist Party pose the threat of Japan's becoming a totalitarian state. . . . When I weigh the possible danger of mass violence generated by the communists and compare this danger with that being brought on by our ruling authorities who, with their pseudo-democracy, are reinforcing an undemocratic state mechanism of oppression, it is clear that the danger of the latter is greater than that of the former.[7]

[5] Junzo Inamura, 'Marxism and Social Democracy', as translated in *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan* (hereinafter *JSPIJ*), Vol. III, No. 1 (April 1965), pp. 32–34. From 'Marukusushugi to shakai minshushugi', *Shakai shicho*, January 1950.

[6] Tatsuo Morita, 'Social Democracy versus Marxism', as translated in *JSPIJ*, Vol. III, No. 1 (April 1965), pp. 28–30. From 'Marukusushugi to taiketsu suru shakai minshushugi', *Shakai shicho*, November 1949.

[7] Masao Maruyama, 'Aru jiyushugisha e no tegami' (A Letter to a Liberal), *Sekai*, September 1950. Quoted passage as translated in 'Notes By The Editor', *JSPIJ*,

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That Maruyama was a non-Marxist 'progressive', and not himself in sympathy with communism as a political system, simply served to show how very far to the right on the political spectrum the fundamental crevasse lay—somewhere between the extreme right-wing socialists and everything to the left of them, including not only the numerical majority of ideological socialists but also a vast number of vaguely 'progressive' or self-consciously 'modern' and 'democratically-minded' intellectuals who shared Maruyama's belief that the crucial arena lay in the value system rather than in formal institutions, and that the reassertion of state power without massive prior infusions of modern, Western-style *Zivilcourage* in the Japanese citizenry, represented a greater threat to liberal purposes in Japan than did any possible left-wing revolutionary upheaval. This idea that Western democratic institutions remain moribund when imported directly into non-Western societies, and require a renovation through proletarian mass movements to give them life, later led many Japanese progressives after 1950 to characterize developments in China, North Korea and North Vietnam as instances of 'democratization', and to take a sympathetic view.

The arguments for or against revolution were linked to differing definitions of democracy: on the opposite side of the crevasse, with an entirely different definition, and in direct confrontation with Maruyama in their 1950 debate, stood a non-Marxist liberal, Professor Kentaro Hayashi, a historian of modern Europe and at present Dean of the Arts Faculty of Tokyo University. Hayashi maintained that proletarian democracy and Western liberal democracy were mutually distinct and antithetical and ought not to be confused, that the former could not possibly provide the groundwork for the latter even in non-Western societies, that Maruyama had in effect rigged his equation by measuring Japan against an ideal type of Western democracy, and that the West no less than Japan has had to make its way up through elements of pre-modernity.[8]

A decade later, and into the 1960s, the fundamental schism remained in place. In the wake of the abortive struggle against the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, Professor Maruyama had called for a return to the 'original principles of peace and democracy' of the immediate post-war period, as embodied in Japan's new democratic, war-renouncing Constitution. Professor Hayashi, writing in 1964, reflected that:

> It is characteristic of Maruyama's thinking to condemn contemporary Japanese politics from the point of view of the 'ideal type' which he has formulated of modern bourgeois democracy. . . . Maruyama's ideal type, however, seems to have been formulated on the basis of the particular value consciousness which prevailed

Vol. II, No. 1 (Aprii 1964), p. 35. The editor's 'Introduction' to *JSPIJ*, Vol. IV, No. 2 (August 1966), pp. 11–15, gives an English-language account of the Maruyama-Hayashi debate.

[8] Kentaro Hayashi, 'Gendai Chishikijin no Ryoshin' (The Conscience of Modern Intellectuals), *Sekai*, October 1950.

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> under the abnormal circumstances of a defeated nation in the aftermath of World War II. With that value consciousness fixed in his mind, he deliberately selects only the defects of our present society and then hypothesizes the exact opposite of those defects.[9]

Nor had the typical leftist complaint against the liberal camp changed. In a broadside directed at the liberal Japan Cultural Forum (of which Hayashi is a prominent member), Professor Toru Miyakawa, a student of intellectual history, could write in 1960 that:

> What they are really doing is taking an anticommunist stand which equates communism with totalitarianism. By so doing they are in reality supporting capitalism in the name of democracy. Their approach would be valid only if the kind of mass democracy found in the capitalism of Western Europe existed in Japan and if Japan's welfare system were as highly developed as those of Western Europe. But such conditions do not exist in Japan. Our parliamentary democracy is on the threshold of crisis because of the tyranny of the majority party and because our welfare system is so inadequate that more than ten million people are on the point of starvation. . . . If we look objectively into their various intellectual strands, we find that, when they sing the praises of the freedoms and welfare enjoyed under the present system of Japanese capitalism, they are in reality defending fascism.[10]

Still another decade later, in 1972, the confrontation of Professors Hani and Tanaka over the *Rengo Sekigun* lynchings showed how very little the basic intellectual positions had shifted, and how very much of a piece were the Inamura-Morito, Maruyama-Hayashi, and Hani-Tanaka disputes. What had been changing very rapidly, of course, were the objective conditions of Japanese society. The Japanese people were far from starving, even as of 1960, and economic developments, shifting political party fortunes, and international affairs have all conspired over the last two decades gradually to erode the appeal of Marxism and of 'orthodox proletarian revolution'.

THE opening years of the American Occupation, 1945–47, witnessed the heyday of communism and of the Japan Communist Party in national affairs. The national mood was one of liberation generally—intellectual, social, political and libidinal—and Marxism competed with a heady if short-lived enthusiasm for American-style democracy and other ideological nostrums of the occupation authorities. The communists, fresh out of jail, successfully claimed from a guilt-ridden intelligentsia their monopoly of martyrdom and ideological purity during the dark years of war and militarism, and with their sympathizers

[9] Kentaro Hayashi, 'How to Approach Postwar Japanese History', as translated in *JSPIJ*, Vol. III, No. 2 (August 1965), p. 70. From 'Sengoshi o do miru ka', *Chuo koron*, September 1964.

[10] Toru Miyakawa, 'The Japan Cultural Forum: Its Logic and Psychology', as translated in *JSPIJ*, Vol. II, No. 1 (April 1964), pp. 67, 69. From 'Nihon Bunka Foramu no ronri to shinri', *Chuo koron*, April 1960.

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promptly surged forward to dominate the trades union movement, the arts, and the academic scene until 1948 or so.[11]

This sudden access to influence, after nearly 20 years' banishment to the underground, rested on a well-laid pre-war base, and cannot be understood without a proper appreciation of the enormous appeal of academic Marxism to the broader ranks of Japanese scholars and university youths from approximately 1920 onwards. Bursting onto the Japanese campuses in the flush of the Russian Revolution, Marxism found a ready market. Its path had been well prepared by the philosophical domination of the Japanese universities since 1890 by German idealism (Hegel in particular), and more basically by what Professor Masamichi Inoki has called the 'monistic' and 'deductive' traditions of Tokugawa Confucianism and the 'gnostic' element in primitive Japanese religion.[12] Intellectually, Marxism offered a comprehensive and entirely secular explanation for predicaments both personal and national in the early throes of modernization—something which Christianity and Anglo-American political liberalism had failed to do, being too firmly rooted in the unique historical development of particular Western peoples. In scholarly terms, Marxism entered an academic void in the social sciences and, with its claim to scientific objectivity, furnished the skeletal peg for most of Japan's fledgling social-science disciplines. Politically speaking, Marxism provided a practical revolutionary strategy for its total attack on the Emperor system, while, on the existential plane, it not only reconfirmed for the Japanese intellectual his traditional role of elitist leadership, but as a Western-bred critique of the West allowed him to feel himself the superior of the West while continuing to bask in the fashionable authority of Western ideas. The role of Marxism as a riposte to the West has been as fundamental in Japan as it has been in China, and the prospect of outstripping the West at one stroke by the establishment of a historically more 'advanced' socialist society, has been particularly tempting.

In the case of Japan the sudden upsurge of Marxism cannot be understood apart from the shattering humiliation of defeat—the first in two thousand years of Japan's recorded history—and one eminent literary critic has gone so far as to accuse Japan's idealistic intellectuals, in effect, of 'sour grapes'. Writing in 1960, Jun Eto remarked that:

[11] For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of Marxism and its rival ideologies in post-war Japan, the English-language reader is referred specifically to *JSPIJ*, Vol. II, No. 1, April 1964 ('Japanese Intellectuals'), and Vol. II, No. 1, April 1965 ('The Left Wing Movement'); and to the following articles in the *Japan Quarterly*: Sho Usami, 'Zengakuren', Vol. XV, No. 2, April–June 1968; Yoshiyuki Tsurumi, 'Beheiren', Vol. XVI, No. 4, October–December 1969; Junro Fukashiro, 'The New Left', Vol. XVII, No. 1, January–March 1970; and Shigeo Omori, 'June 1970', Vol. XVII, No. 4, October-December 1970. For the general intellectual history of post-war Japan, the entire corpus of the *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan* and its successor, the *Japan Interpreter* (combined Volumes I through VII, 1963–71), provides the most complete and authoritative English-language reference.

[12] Masamichi Inoki, 'Marukusushugi to shumatsuron' (Marxism and Eschatology), *Jiyu* (February 1970), p. 17.

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> At the bottom of our intellectuals' extremely unrealistic thinking is their pride, which was hurt during the war when they realized that their country was undergoing its first defeat in history. It was impossible for the idealists to accept the ugly fact that Japan was going to be defeated. Their wounded pride caused them to skirt reality and to plunge into a desperate attempt to create in their minds a make-believe world where Japan never would be defeated. . . . After the defeat the intellectuals came out in passionate support of the new Constitution, which incorporated the principles of pacifism, democracy and internationalism. It is not so surprising that the same people, the absolute militarists who had so passionately supported the war effort, should become absolute pacifists. . . . These same intellectuals are still out to make Japan rank first among all nations, but this time by merely chanting, 'Absolute peace!' Their concept of neutralism is nothing more than the substitution of complete isolation from international power relations for world domination.[13]

The communist bubble burst with the proscription by General Douglas MacArthur of a general strike scheduled for February 1947, which many progressives had anticipated as the harbinger of a Marxist-Leninist revolution. The holier-than-thou exclusivism of the communists had alienated non-communist Marxists, including the socialists, who with the cooperation of the Occupation set out to capture successfully the trades union movement, while Moscow-prompted violence served effectively to alienate the Communist Party from the general public from 1951 onwards.

The second phase (this definition is admittedly procrustean and approximate) covered the latter half of the Occupation (1948–51), and witnessed the high-water mark of theoretical Marxism in scholarly and literary circles. But it was a more diffuse and in many instances a consciously anti-Communist Party brand of Marxism which held sway, and one which drew into its periphery a number of non-Marxists who though critical of orthodox Marxists had been intellectually influenced by Marx in one way or another and remained in general sympathy with the aims of the leftist parties, one notable example being the group of 'progressive pragmatists' who had organized the Science of Study Thought Group (*Shiso no Kagaku*) in 1946—including among others Professors Masao Maruyama, Shigeto Tsuru, Shunsuke Tsurumi and Michio Nagai. Politically speaking, the leftist political balance was swinging to the left wing of the Socialist Party (where it has remained) following a fumbled right-wing socialist attempt at actually forming a government in 1947–48; the ideological balance had also swung from Communist Party orthodoxy, with its central tenet of the 'two-stage revolution', to the left wing of the socialist camp and to

[13] Jun Eto, 'The Bankruptcy of our Idealistic Intellectuals', as translated in *JSPIJ*, Vol. II, No. 1 (April 1964), pp. 104–05. From '"Sengo" chishikijin no hasan' (literally, 'The Bankruptcy of "Postwar" Intellectuals'), *Bungei shunju*, November 1960.

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its theoreticians of the 'one-stage revolution', who had grouped themselves around Mosaburo Suzuki, Itsuro Sakisaka and Junzo Inamura of the Socialist Society (*Shakaishugi Kyokai*), the brains trust of the socialist left wing.

The communist-socialist dispute over revolutionary stages runs bitter and deep, and goes back to opposing interpretations, since 1932, of the nature of modern Japanese society and of Japan's recent history. The orthodox communist, or *Koza* ('Lectures') school (including among others Goro Hani) has viewed the Meiji Restoration as no more than a simple transfer of power from a feudalistic to a modern capitalistic autocracy, and Japanese society as basically pre-bourgeois. It has insisted on the necessity of a preliminary bourgeois-democratic revolution to sweep away monopoly capital, the Emperor system (and, also before the war, the great landlords) before the final socialist revolution could be initiated. Since the war, it has viewed 'American imperialism' (i.e. the alliance) as the chief obstacle to socialistic progress, and has been passionately anti-American. The *Rono* ('Labour-Farmer') school of the left-wing socialists has, by contrast, viewed the Restoration itself as a 'bourgeois' revolution brought about by an alliance of disgruntled lower samurai with rising merchant capital, and has considered Japan ready for a proletarian socialist revolution, while stressing the need for continuing democratic reforms. Its emphasis on mass actions and strikes has not sat well with more moderate socialists, but its targeting of Japanese monopoly capital as number one enemy has made its anti-Americanism a bit more *pro forma*, and its vagueness as to means and as to the political nature of the new socialist state has left it a distant, but uneasy, cousin of parliamentary socialism. It bears repeating, however, that in Japan the dividing line between communists and socialists involves two differing interpretations of revolution, with the more basic question of revolution-versus-evolution dividing the right- from the left-wing socialists.

The shift in favour of the socialists at the expense of the communists was not displeasing to the Occupation, but any prospects of a honeymoon were quickly undone by the decision of the United States from 1948 on to rebuild and protect Japan, both as a Cold War bastion in the Far East and (what few Japanese leftists are willing to admit) as the best way of creating a stable, democratic, and peace-loving nation. Particularly galling to Japan's intelligentsia, and leaving deep scars, were a number of crudely handled 'red purges' of left-wing scholars during the latter half of the Occupation, and progressives watched with dismay as industry was slowly reconcentrated, labour policy stiffened, and embryonic self-defence forces brought into being. By the time Japan had achieved independence again in 1952, the leftist mainstream was poised for battle against the new bilateral Security Treaty in the name of peace, and against the conservative government in the name of preserving the democratic reforms of the early Occupation. And with these two themes, the stage for the 1950s—our third period,

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running from independence to the first anti-treaty struggle of 1960—was set.

The decade of the 1950s may best be described as one of broad overlap between a waning and increasingly diffuse Marxism and the two great 'popular' causes of pacifism and anti-rightism. The leftist parties were still, however, very much in control of the popular movements, and there was considerable mutual reinforcement between the new popular and the traditional party-sectarian programmes and ideological slogans. Orthodox theoretical Marxism and communism received a devastating blow with the denunciation of Stalin in 1956, and their public image was badly tarnished with the crushing of the Hungarian uprising during the same year. The more typical ideological bellwethers of the decade were the 'people's councils' and housewives' leagues for banning the bomb, abrogating the Security Treaty, and protecting the Constitution; some of the more militant unions (such as the Japan Teachers' Union) in their head-on confrontations with the government; and, in their own fashion, the mainstream of the radical student '*Zengakuren*' federation which escaped from its Communist Party tutelage in 1957 and thereafter ran increasingly in Trotskyite, anarchist, Maoist and Labour-Farmer channels. There was still sufficient economic deprivation, however, particularly in the early 1950s, to lend credibility to the slogans of class struggle and revolution. The Korean war, the earlier Indochina conflict, the confrontations in the Taiwan Straits, and American nuclear testing throughout the Pacific —all reflected a high level of international tension in the Far East throughout the decade. And the conservative government did succeed in passing legislation recentralizing the police (1954), the school system (1956), and establishing a full-fledged Self Defence Agency (1954). The slogans of anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-fascism made, therefore, for the nonce, companionable bedfellows. The Socialist Party, reunited in 1955 after a four-year split, and with the left wing still in the ascendancy, showed steady gains at the polls, and there was a broad hope and assumption that the rapid urbanization of Japan would work in its favour and eventually bring it to power. In a decade nearly devoid of overt nationalistic expression, meanwhile, the pacifist and anti-American modes served in subtle ways to accommodate what might best be defined as an inverse nationalism, along the lines so aptly described by Mr Jun Eto.

There was no necessary reason, however, for an indefinite symbiosis of Marxism, pacifism, and democracy, and following the Security Treaty struggle of 1960, the strands began to unravel. Genuine democrats, to begin with, dissociated themselves increasingly from the more violent elements on the left, and began to raise a standard for the moderate left and centre. Opinion polls taken immediately after the treaty disturbances showed, indeed, that the majority of demonstrators had been concerned primarily to safeguard democracy by protesting against Prime Minister Kishi's bulldozer tactics in pushing the new treaty

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through the Diet, and only secondarily with the question of the American alliance, while the press reflected after the storm that the violence of the struggle itself had brought Japanese democracy perilously close to the point of collapse. Secondly, the citizens' and students' groups in the struggle attributed their failure to the incompetent leadership of the leftist parties, and after 1960 pacifist and other 'popular' movements, including the 'New Left' later in the decade, would work ever more independently of (and on occasion in confrontation with) the established socialist and communist left. The moral and ideological leadership of the parties was also weakened with the trade unions, whom they had pushed into a quixotic and disastrously unsuccessful strike at the Miike coal mine—again in 1960, that year of drama, the chief watershed in Japan's post-war history. Theoretical Marxism, finally, buffeted once again by the Sino-Soviet dispute, increasingly became the narrow preserve of certain academic cliques in particular disciplines, and of the theoreticians of the socialist left wing. While retaining a dominant voice among historians, for instance, Marxism has been muscled aside in economics by the young scholars of the neo-classical and mathematical school, themselves the 'disciples' of Japan's tiny band of pre-war Keynesians. A Lot's Wife fixation with Marxist dogma, meanwhile, has been repeatedly cited as one of the major causes of socialist decline during the new decade, and in the late 1960s the socialists who continued to preach class struggle and unarmed neutrality found themselves upstaged by the communists, who proceeded to put Mount Fuji on their campaign posters, promised to retain a 'People's' Self Defence Force, kept their own student cadres out of the violent campus *melées*, and worked hard to create the image of a 'loveable', moderate, patriotic party.

Already at work during the 1950s, and continuing without break into the 1970s, two main forces of erosion may be identified: the growing economy, and the basic stability of Japan's post-war institutions. The economy reached pre-war output levels by 1955, and in 1956 saw the first of the sustained series of economic booms which would give the Japanese worker during the 1960s an average annual increase in real wages of 10 per cent—hardly a recipe for revolution. Politically speaking, conservative tinkering with the Occupation legacy had largely run its course by 1960, with reform and counter-reform reaching a stable equilibrium which has not been significantly altered during the ensuing decade. A second police bill was successfully beaten back in 1958, and the conservatives have never been able to secure the two-thirds majority required to revise the Constitution—something which could conceivably open a Pandora's box of regressions in the area of the Emperor's status, popular sovereignty, and the role of the military. The older generation of conservatives which hankered after a real turning back of the clock was, however, fast slipping out of sight, and the pragmatic regimes of Prime Ministers Ikeda (1960–64) and

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Sato (1964–72) wisely chose to stake their fortunes on a policy of economic growth, of playing down as much as possible domestic and international confrontations, and of anticipating the rising wave of new national pride and pre-empting the most burning issues before the opposition could make too much political capital out of them.

As it turned out, they played their game brilliantly. Ikeda's so-called 'income doubling' plan itself provided the Japanese people with their first positive and viable national goal since the war, and when the results exceeded all expectations, the hosting of the Olympics at Tokyo in 1964 and of EXPO 1970 at Osaka gave the Japanese a tangible sense of esteem and acceptance among other nations which they badly needed. When the opposition had fanned the issue of Okinawan reversion to a white heat, Sato promptly moved in and stole it from them with the November 1969 Nixon-Sato accord. With Okinawa defused as an issue by 1970, the anti-government forces then turned to the normalization of relations with mainland China—something which the new Prime Minister, Tanaka, at the time of writing, seems destined to whisk away from them once again.

The Okinawa agreement is generally credited with having given the government its massive Lower House election victory of December 1969 (300 seats out of 486), while the leading opposition Socialist Party suffered a drastic decline from 140 to 90. The opposition parties were cutting into each others' votes rather than into the conservatives', and were beginning, with continuing communist and Komeito gains, to approximate to each other in size as well as in lack of effectiveness. Since the breaking off of the right wing as the Democratic Socialist Party in 1960, the socialists had remained divided, and the effort of Socialist Party Secretary-General Saburo Eda to push his party in the direction of mass-base, moderate politics with his theory of 'structural reform' was aborted when control of the party was recaptured in 1965 by left-wing scholastics of the Labour-Farmer brand of Marxist orthodoxy.

Intellectual causes, schools, and groupings continued to diversify throughout the 1960s, but the colourful arabesque played itself out across an increasingly shallow surface, given the success and stability of the pragmatic establishment and its increasing monopoly (by default, in many ways) of practical decision-making and responsibility. The gap between ideas and power remained in many areas as wide as ever, with impotence breeding frustration, and a more specific attack on the 'Establishment' itself as evil (using a Japanese equivalent for the newly fashionable term) which revealed the modern Japanese intellectual in his original guise—as fundamentally anti-government, and only transitionally Marxist.

The 1960s need to be seen, however, in terms of two broad phases. The first half of the decade, (the fourth of our post-war intellectual phases) witnessed a rising curve of political and intellectual moderation which, if undeflected for the entire decade, might eventually have

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reconciled a major portion of Japan's disaffected intellectuals to Japan's post-war institutions and to the general course of their government. On the political side, democratic socialism and structural reformism seemed for the moment to be on the ascendant. On the intellectual front the banner of individual liberty and the politics of moderation was raised by the Japan Cultural Forum, (associated with the International Association for Cultural Freedom of Paris), with a small but prominent coterie of liberals and democratic socialists (Michio Takeyama, Kentaro Hayashi, Masamichi Inoki, Yoshihiko Seki and others) contributing regularly to the Forum's monthly opinion journal, *Jiyu* (*Freedom*). The Forum was to be joined in 1968 by a larger, and to some degree overlapping libertarian group, the Japan Cultural Congress, which numbered among its members some of Japan's most prominent figures in letters and the arts (Yasunari Kawabata, Dan Ikuma, Shiko Munakata, Tsuneari Fukuda). The libertarian centre, however, pronounced individualists to a man, proved more difficult to organize than groups further to the left or right, and this ideological middle, scorned by the left as 'reactionary' for its dislike of communism and by the right as 'un-Japanese' because it is rooted to a great extent in Western rationalism, found itself largely ignored by the establishment which, though privately delighted with the emergence of a centrist philosophy, preferred to avoid public displays of support for what still remains basically an intellectually 'unfashionable' position. Finally, on yet another front, a group of younger scholars, for the most part international relations specialists and loosely dubbed the 'New Realists' (Shinkichi Eto, Masataka Kosaka, Yonosuke Nagai, Kinhide Mushakoji, among them), emerged over the decade to rethink Japan's role in the world in terms of practical power politics.

Two developments after 1965, however, brought Japanese intellectuals once again into hostile confrontation with their government. By far the more important was the war in Vietnam, which proved highly unpopular with all strata of Japanese society, and which many Japanese took their own government to be abetting. Just as the economy had begun to prove Marx wrong on the domestic front, Vietnam emerged to confirm, for many, what Marx and Lenin (and Mao) had written about imperialism. The second development was a heightened awareness of and dissatisfaction with a lengthy backlog of bread-and-butter problems—rising prices, pollution, inadequate housing, and a serious lag in social overhead in areas such as hospitals and schools—the awareness itself being largely the product of rising affluence. Particularly acute was the growing restlessness of Japan's brighter youth with the antiquated, elitist, and rigid university system, and the second anti-treaty struggle (1970) on which both Old and New Left focused their energies during the latter half of the decade was preceded by two years of unprecedented campus violence (1968–69), during which the activist *Zengakuren* revolutionaries managed for a while to enlist the sympathy if not the support of large segments of ordinary students.

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The anti-treaty movement of the late 1960s was, therefore, as heterogeneous in its targets—the Treaty, the American bases, the war in Vietnam, polluted rivers, university administrations, 'The Establishment' in general—as it was diversified in its bases of support: the established Communist and Socialist Parties; the old *Zengakuren* sects with a plethora of new sects and 'nonsectarian' radical student groups, plus a violent fringe from young labour; and, as a third element of the 'New' Left, the *Beheiren*, or League for Peace in Vietnam, a broad, moderate citizens' movement.

The Security Treaty was extended without incident, however, in June 1970, and the long awaited bang fizzled out in a whimper. Prior to the Okinawa accords and the general election of late 1969, the government had moved very carefully to isolate the radical students who had built armed sanctuaries out of some of Japan's most prestigious campuses. By patiently tolerating student excesses for nearly two years, excesses which proved a growing annoyance to ordinary citizens, the government managed to keep public sympathy on its side, and isolate the students from the population in general. In August 1969 it passed, with little public protest, a draconian Universities Control bill ordering the universities to set their own houses in order, and in October it met a series of radical student demonstrations with aggressive police charges, making numerous arrests which decimated the radical student leadership, scared off the less committed, and drove an important wedge between the activist and nonpolitical students.

The ensuing letdown and paralysis would drive only the miniscule band of the Red Army group to fantasies of World Revolution, and to murder. Since 1970 the anti-government forces have concentrated largely on the China and environmental issues, but it is difficult at this point to foresee the precise ideological shape which the energies of dissent from the late 1960s—our fifth and final phase—will take in the future. It is clear, however, that the more recent 'New Left' still find the post-war institutions of Japan, including its parliamentary democracy, fundamentally flawed, and that they stand on Cassandra's side of the crevasse along with the old Marxists—although their approach is more emotional and impulsive, and less intellectualistic. It is also clear that they may receive some support from still another force, the dissatisfied right, which has not been discussed in detail here because of the virtually total discrediting and political impotence of the ultra-right in post-war Japan. The thought and suicide of the late author Yukio Mishima, significant for their cultural rather than their political message, were however a dramatic rejection of post-war Japan from an entirely different quarter, yet one which had haunting echoes of the rejections of the left. Mishima could lament that, 'We have had to stand idly by while the policies and the future of the nation were entrusted to foreign powers, while the humiliation of our defeat was merely evaded and not erased, and while the traditions of Japan

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were being desecrated by the Japanese themselves.'[14] But he could also tell the radical *Zengakuren* students at Tokyo University, in a historic confrontation, 'If you fellows would only call the emperor "Our Emperor", I would gladly join hands with you'[15]—and those most deeply stirred by the author's flamboyant departure from this world were the ultraright and the far left.

TO what extent will the rising generation be able to bridge the ideological crevasse we have been describing? The answer to that question will do more than anything else to determine the future fortunes of Japan's intellectuals. Despite recent moves to create a viable opposition movement of the centre, or slightly left of centre, it seems more likely that practical progressive social measures will be carried out under the present conservative regime, as public pressure forces the government into an active welfare capitalism—or perhaps by the more progressive half of a conceivably split Liberal Democratic Party, in alliance with the moderate centre. The socialist millenium seems as far out of reach as ever, and with it one possible way, supposedly, of fulfilling the Japanese intellectual's century-long craving for greater participation in political power. The tone of intellectual life, nevertheless, will largely be set by the proportion of intellectuals who eventually cross the crevasse from left to centre.

If very few cross, it will portend several more years of the same quarter-century-long confrontation, and more of the same political impotence. If great numbers cross, on the other hand, this would raise the even more difficult question of the direction such an unprecedented national consensus might take. Would what we have called the 'inverse' nationalism of the left then dovetail with the pragmatic national self-interest of the Establishment (or even with the traditional ultra-nationalism of the right) to push Japan into a heady new chauvinism? Or would the considerable libertarian and democratic instincts on both sides of today's schism find in unity, at last, the strength to breathe fresh life into Japan's existing liberal institutions? Or would we be likely to get some elements of both: a greater commitment to parliamentary democracy, which would put a greater nationalism in significantly improved perspective for much of the outside world? Or will some as yet unforeseeable circumstances set in motion events which may prove disastrous?

One thing of which we can be certain is that Japan will be searching for a new global role and a new national sense of mission and identity. The formula of economic growth under American political-

[14] Yukio Mishima, 'An Appeal', as translated by Harris I. Martin in *Japan Interpreter*, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Winter 1971), p. 74. From 'Geki', *Sande Mainichi*, 13 December 1970.

[15] Yukio Mishima, in *Toron: Mishima Yukio vs. Todai Zenkyoto* (A Debate: Yukio Mishima versus the Tokyo University All Campus Joint Struggle Council (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1969)), p. 112. (Translated by the present author.)

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military patronage, which worked so well for the 1960s and will remain practically operative in the short run, is increasingly failing to satisfy the emotions. The Japanese have come too far since 1945, however, to return to ready-made pre-war slogans or identities, while the ordinary Japanese citizen has little use for the dominant intellectual slogans of the 1950s or 1960s. With the rapid moves towards relations with mainland China, it seems inevitable that Japan will now spend some time attempting to re-establish and redefine the Asian side of its identity. This may at first produce some throwbacks to its pre-war notions of natural superiority and leadership, but Japan will very soon run up against a wall of solid and viable new nationalisms in China, South-East Asia, and Korea. To the extent that Japan does turn towards a new Pan-Asianism, it will be forced to develop new modes of formal equality and genuine cooperation, and this exercise may take time.

Eventually, however, it seems most likely that Japan will find its identity as an advanced, industrialized, liberal, internationally engaged entity, drawing for spiritual sustenance more and more on its own deep historical roots, while participating on a practical level with Europe and America in a comity of advanced and increasingly interdependent nations. The identity of this comity, in turn, will be less 'Western' than simply 'modern' (or 'post-modern'), with all its members overwhelmed by identical problems of the 'post-industrial' age, and with Japan this time not only getting but also giving in the technological, cultural and social trade-off among the advanced nations. Since 1970, indeed, a new school of self-styled 'futurologists' have suggested that Japan, given its long experience with mass society, crowded quarters and finite resources, may have more to teach than to learn from a Western world which has all but emptied its account of atomistic individualism, infinite space, and unfettered optimism.[16]

The Japanese are so accustomed to thinking that they have little to offer the rest of the world, and that the outside world has little serious interest in understanding Japan (and would probably find that impossible even if it tried), that it may take some time for them to overcome their apologetic/belligerent approaches to their own culture, and move to give of themselves to the rest of the world in a casual, matter-of-course, fashion. And it will no doubt take the West equally long to discover that Japan has something more to teach than an arcane 'Oriental wisdom'—something rather of a practical, vital and mundane interest for the twentieth, or even twenty-first, century. The signs are that intellectual interest there is gradually shifting from concern with the past, and with rigid, closed and imitative systems, to something more flexible, open and creative, to a concern with tangible problems and with the future.

[16] For two thought-provoking articles presenting some of this viewpoint, see Yujiro Hayashi, 'Kogai no nihonteki kaiketsusaku' (A Japanese-Style Solution for Environmental Problems), *Jiyu*, February 1971; and Jiro Sakamoto, 'Ideorogii shohinka no jidai' (An Age for the Merchandization of Ideology), in *Jiyu*, December 1970.

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Solitude and Solidarity in Advanced Industrial Civilization

Mitsuro Muto

'Anticulture'—A Challenge to Socialist Solidarity

Various symptoms of the solitude of man living in modern industrial society have become discernible. Psychologists report numerous cases of such solitude—the solitude of a long-distance truck driver, of an instrument watcher in an automated plant, of a key puncher, of one sitting alone surrounded by the cold walls of an apartment or standing on a crowded street. They illustrate the solitude of modern man, which might be characterized as 'solitude in industrial civilization'.

The sense of solitude is that of a lack of communication, and reflects a longing for communication. One feels solitude because one is anxious for communication, and the sense of solitude makes one's longing for communication all the stronger. This means that modern man, though finding himself enmeshed in the communication network created by modern technology, has a longing for a different kind of communication which cannot be satisfied there.

This desire for a special type of communication is reflected in the 'illusionary commune' of rebellious youth today.

The hippies and the student rebels, who began to attract public attention in the late sixties, have experimented with an unusual kind of collective life in their search for a 'sacred place' in which they would be able to resuscitate their 'alienated selves'. Of course, neither the hippy 'commune' with drugs, rock music, and free sex, nor the 'space behind the barricade' proclaimed by student rebels dreaming of the Paris Commune, can be completely free from the influence of modern industrial civilization, for such places are ultimately sheltered and supported by the latter.

However, in various contexts of advanced industrial society today, the hippy life-style is becoming increasingly fashionable; student riots are creating a psychological climate for 'contestation'; and 'avant-garde' artists claim they have represented in their work an 'anticulture' which totally repudiates the values of present society. Such tendencies towards 'anticulture', coupled with the sense of solitude and the fundamental longing for communication inherent in the psyche of modern industrial society, are causing fissures in its value system.

In historical perspective, to be sure, the idea of building a commune on the ethics of solidarity has been a basic element in the tradition of socialism. In what terms, however, does this traditional ethic of socialist solidarity propose to meet the sense of solitude and the longing for communication lying deep in the heart of advanced industrial

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society? And in what sense do these terms differ from the 'anticulture' appeals of dissident youth and 'avant-garde' artists?

Herbert Marcuse, regarded as an ideologue of 'anticulture', mentions Charles Fourier's concept of a socialist utopia as a forerunner of what he calls an 'erotic order'. Fourier's socialist utopia is based on the idea of 'transforming labour into pleasure'. He insists that this transformation requires a complete change in social institutions: distribution of the social product according to need, assignment of functions according to individual faculties and inclinations, constant mutation of functions, short work periods, and so on. On the basis of this interpretation of Fourier's socialist utopia, Marcuse nevertheless observes critically that Fourier left 'repressive elements' in the blueprint of his idea by permitting organization of labour by the administration. Marcuse on his part argues that if the 'surplus repression' of modern advanced industrial civilization is thrown away and the 'biological dimension of the human being' reactivated, man's libido will sublimate itself into eros, resulting in an 'erotic order' in which 'technology agrees with art, and work becomes play'. Marcuse believes that modern technology already provides for the technological feasibility of such an 'erotic order'.[1]

However, Marcuse's optimistic assumption as to human psychology has not been verified. Examples of the internal breakdown of hippy communes due to jealousy and possessiveness, and of dismal lynching by student rebels in 'the space behind the barricade', make one feel that the assumption of some basic sado-masochistic tendency in human nature which will inevitably obstruct the 'automatic' sublimation of libido into eros is more plausible.

Moreover, liberating what Marcuse calls the 'biological dimension of the human being' will tend to destroy the technological feasibility of the 'erotic order' he expects. Specialists are needed to run modern automated systems, and in order to be a specialist, one has to be abstinent in one way or another.

Some student rebels sympathizing with Marcuse claim they are engaged in 'socialist' movements. If their activities represent the only way in which the ethic of solidarity inherent in the tradition of socialism can appeal to people today, then such activities are reducible to a sort of discordant noise arising from fissures in the structure of modern advanced industrial civilization. On the other hand, if the student rebels succeed in emancipating their 'biological dimension' in the name of 'socialism', such socialism will easily be perverted into totalitarianism by the demagogues who will take advantage of the resulting anarchy dominated by the sado-masochistic complex.

The trouble is that the appeal of the 'anticulture' represented by Marcuse is causing a split in the value system of modern society, which

[1] Cf. H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (1955), Chap. 10, 'Transformation of Sexuality into Eros'.

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has as its sociopsychological background the sense of solitude and the longing for communication inherent in advanced industrial civilization. If modern man is to accept the ethic of solidarity rooted in the tradition of socialism, it should speak to him in a language that comprehends such fissures in the value system. Here one finds a cultural challenge to modern socialism.

Urban Pathology—A Challenge to Socialist Planning

There has been serious talk about the gruesome possibility of the large modern city turning into the 'graveyard of industrial civilization'. Urban space isolated from organic nature by metal, glass, and radio waves is increasingly fouled by exhaust gas, noise, and various wastes. There, 'animate' human beings are enslaved by 'inanimate' machines. The increasing incidence of traffic accidents, mental illness, drug addiction, and crime make one feel as if the 'death instinct' postulated by Freud were dominating modern cities.

Already it is widely recognized that reasonable 'planning' is needed to prevent modern cities from proceeding on this 'march to the graveyard'.

But who should do the planning, and how?

In advanced industrial society today, what J. K. Galbraith calls the 'revised sequence' is at work to adapt the accepted ideas and goals of society at large to the 'industrial system'. Since the deterioration of modern cities is an aspect of this 'sequence', the direction of the sequence should be changed by intelligent planning. He points out: 'Aesthetic goals contest the claims of power lines over landscape, of power development over natural streams or national parks, of highways over urban open spaces, strip mining over virgin mountainsides, shopping centres over antique squares, and high-speed air travel over tranquillity below.'[2]

What Professor Galbraith calls 'the political lead' is required to promote public welfare service and the aesthetic dimension of life, which are often neglected in the operating sequence of the industrial system. But where will 'the political lead' come from? Taking note of 'the incoherent and unfocused dissent by younger people' and 'an ill-defined discontent, especially among students and intellectuals, with the views of "the Establishment"', he hopes that 'the educational and scientific estate' as 'intellectuals with an occupational identification' will give a political lead to such anti-Establishment sentiments.[3]

Does he mean to say that 'the educational and scientific estate' should lead such things as student riots? If he did, he would be close to the political stand of Marcuse and his followers. But that is unlikely to be what he really means. Essentially, 'the educational and scientific estate' as 'intellectuals with an occupational identification'

[2] J. K. Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Pelican Books: 1969), p. 351.
[3] Ibid. pp. 381, 326.

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is an important part of the Establishment, and it is not in a position to represent politically the anti-Establishment sentiments of the student rebels. If 'the educational and scientific estate' is to do so, it will have no alternative but to introduce such sentiments into modern civilization in order to create sufficient momentum for changing the operating sequence of the industrial system 'from within'. But that would be in the nature of a 'reform' rather than a 'revolution'. Professor Galbraith himself admits: 'Social innovation no longer has overtones of revolution, and the academic, like the large intellectual, community no longer engages in disquieting conversation on revolutions.'[4]

If the operating sequence of the industrial system is to change 'from within', a new system of values should emerge from social life to motivate planning. Such a system should reflect the basic sense of solitude of man in modern society. But since the appeal of the emotional 'anticulture' is likely to give rise to a barren anarchy by totally repudiating technology, the system of values now required should be more rational than that of the 'anticulture', and should motivate planning based on technology.

Political initiative for a reform of the modern industrial system should be exercised through such planning. Otherwise, it will be impossible to halt 'the march to the graveyard'. If technocratic urban planning is carried through in defiance of the deep-rooted longing for communication in the urban popular psyche, an intellectual elite highly trained in the handling of computers and electronic information systems is likely to control our cities, creating there a totalitarian society reminiscent of science fiction. On the other hand, if the sense of solitude and the longing for communication of the urban populace drive them to action in a primitive, impulsive manner without the medium of rational urban planning, the bizarre anarchy already foreshadowed by the hippy 'commune' and the 'space behind the barricade' of the student rebels will probably prevail over the entire area of our large cities.

Now, 'rational planning' as well as the 'ethic of solidarity' have been traditional socialist concepts. History shows that socialism tends to be perverted into totalitarianism when such planning enables a vanguard party (such as those of Stalin or Hitler), which has risen to power in the name of 'socialism', to impose its dogmatic ideology on the people. To avoid such perversion and stop 'the march to the graveyard', what kind of reasonable urban planning can modern socialism offer? Here we find another cultural challenge socialism must take up in regard to the impact of modern industrial civilization on human existence.

A value system that will motivate modern socialist planning must be one which reflects the sense of solitude and the longing for communication inherent in advanced industrial society. But one can see

[4] Ibid. p. 294.

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what these feelings are like simply by looking at the self-expression of individuals who feel them. Modern socialist planning should, therefore, provide the individual with opportunities for self-expression.

In urban planning today, 'community planning' is emphasized presumably because inhabitants of the community are encouraged to satisfy their longing for communication through participation in community affairs.

Sexuality and God—A Challenge to Socialist Participation

The idea of finding in 'planning' opportunities for 'self-expression through participation' has been in the tradition of socialism throughout its history, including syndicalism, guild socialism, and industrial democracy. The 'Workers' Council' in Yugoslavia and the 'Mitbestimmungsrecht' in Germany represented attempts to institutionalize this idea. It is also reflected in 'the infra-structure of the welfare state' stressed by Gunnar Myrdal on the basis of historical experience in Sweden.[5]

According to Myrdal, the workers, businessmen, farmers, consumers, youth, women, and other social groups in Sweden are organized democratically through the 'participation' of their respective members. With various occupational and regional ties, they constitute the infra-structure of the state. The planning role of the government merely consists of coordinating these organized groups and attempting to expand the range of voluntary agreement.

Considering the political initiative the country's Social Democratic Party has been taking in the historical process of building up a welfare state in Sweden, it may be said that in this instance the socialist tradition of seeking opportunities for 'self-expression through participation in planning' has been realized rather effectively in the realities of an advanced industrial society.

It seems that the infra-structure of the Swedish welfare state has been based historically and culturally on a system of values developed traditionally through such things as the concept of community reflected in Scandinavian mythology, centring around the Iggdrasill or the tree of universal life, Lutheran faith in the freedom of the individual spirit, and the sense of communal solidarity involving individual spontaneity.

However, even socialist planning in Sweden does not seem to reflect sufficiently the feeling of solitude and the desire for communication with which we have been concerned.

Various facts have been reported as symptoms of this tendency. Here the author would like to quote the following impressive remarks by a Japanese diplomat who served for many years at the Japanese Embassy in Stockholm[6]:

> In Sweden, people generally look at things without prejudice. A sympathetic observer might say that they take a pragmatic view of

[5] Cf. G. Myrdal, *Beyond the Welfare State* (1955), Chap. 4, 'The Organizational State'.

[6] *The Mainichi*, 18 April 1970.

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> everything. Or it might be said that they are unromantic and unspiritual. Religion is a dead formality among them, and their national character is dominated by materialism. Under the socialist regime, grievances are nipped in the bud, and there are few things to complain about. Excitement and ambition have shrunk, and 'sexuality' has become particularly significant as the only way to restore human solidarity.

If this observation is valid, how is such 'sexuality' represented in the value system of modern socialism? If Marcuse's optimistic assumption of the 'self-sublimation of libido into eros' is not to be accepted, in what terms should modern socialism speak to people oppressed by feelings of solitude and need for communication? Should we take the 'sex education' and 'free sex' programmes now being carried out systematically under the Social-Democratic regime in Sweden as modern socialism's answer to this question?

YET even in Sweden there are people like Ingmar Bergman, who uses the best of motion-picture technology to express the longing for communication of solitary modern people as a human yearning in extreme situations in which God has ceased to speak to man. It appears that Bergman is seeking verification of human solidarity in a religious context beyond mere 'sexuality'. Faced with the sense of solitude and the longing for communication of modern people in the religious dimension, in what language does modern socialism propose to speak to them?

The above observations concerning Sweden under the long regime of the Social Democrats suggest that socialism in advanced industrial society is required to return to 'sexuality and God' and other such basic elements of human existence to find a basis on which the traditional socialist values of solidarity, planning, participation, and freedom can be systematized anew.

In this regard, it seems to me that the philosophy of 'existential communication' as expounded by Karl Jaspers (which offers even to the lonely soul of the outsider in industrial society today unlimited communication on a rational level) may act as the fundamental motive force of the new systematization of values of modern socialism.[7]

Pitfalls on the Road to Socialism in Japan

In modern industrial civilization, socialism is faced with 'sexuality and God' and other basic issues concerning the privacy of the individual. This situation inevitably poses some serious questions as to the relationship between socialism and privacy. One is strongly tempted, here, to adopt 'total planning' for controlling the entire area of individual privacy in the name of 'socialism'. The temptation is particularly strong

[7] Cf. K. Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte* (1949). See also *Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen* (1958).

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in the case of a nation which has been carrying out rapid industrialization on the basis of a social mentality deficient in the sense of privacy, a process which throws a glaring light on the more inhuman aspects of advanced industrial civilization. Such a nation has an urgent need for 'planning'.

In the case of Japan in particular, various studies of social attitudes indicate that the Japanese today are strongly 'private life-centred'. This tendency, however, is a post-war phenomenon. In pre-war and wartime days, they were as a whole supposed to constitute a kindred community headed by the Emperor, and its system of values extended over practically all aspects of private life. In this situation, private life *per se* was not ultimately recognized as legitimate, but merely connived at as an area of relief from the constant mental tension with which the Japanese were required to serve the state by sacrificing themselves. In private life, therefore, they were merely emotional and instinctive, and lacked the intellectual discipline essential for the development of a modern civil society.

It was this kind of 'private life' in Japan—emotional, instinctive, and without intellectual discipline—that was freed by the post-war process of democratization. The subsequent growth of the Japanese economy has been motivated sociopsychologically by this liberation of private life. Now, faced with the inhuman aspects of economic growth, the Japanese feel 'solitude in industrial civilization' and have a 'longing for communication'. But their awareness of these feelings is essentially emotional and instinctive since it springs from a peculiar form of private life that lacks intellectual discipline, and such feelings therefore tend to cause the Japanese to develop personal cults or escape into ideologies.

Such a social psychology accounts for the widespread illusion among the Japanese today that their sense of solitude and longing for communication might be met by Marxist-Leninist ideology or by some Asiatic popular faith based on a personal cult.

When socialism with this illusion attempts to plumb the depths of human existence to deal with such questions as sexuality and God, the danger of total planning invading all aspects of individual privacy in the name of 'socialism' is particularly great.

The present condition of Japanese socialism, both as an ideology and a movement, augurs this danger.

In a not very distant future, the small chain of islands called Japan may be completely covered by a close network of high-speed railroads and expressways, and the entire country may turn into a huge megalopolis. Urban pathology, uncanny signs of which are already beginning to be seen, may spread throughout the land, making it imperative to adopt more extensive planning. If all this happens, who will then provide the place of refuge for the sense of solitude and the longing for communication deep in the psyche of the people? Will it be the communists who adhere to the ideology of Marx and Lenin

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or of Mao Tse-tung? Will it be a totalitarian religious group led by an Asiatic mystic? Or will it be the adherents of 'democratic socialism' or 'liberal socialism' deriving from modern Western socialism? As yet, no one knows the answer. But if the last of these alternatives is to be chosen, it will be essential in the overcrowded 'industrial State' of Japan to secure and deepen the autonomous and intelligent sphere of individual privacy, and make this the sociopsychological bastion for breeding among the Japanese people the power to resist the threats to freedom.

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How the Japanese Press Yielded to Peking

Osamu Miyoshi

> The press have complete freedom of information and comment to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, or that it is not prohibited by law. . . . This freedom must be protected by all means as a fundamental human right. (Article 1, Press Code.)

NIXON'S visit to China is already a thing of the past. After July 1971 when Nixon's scheduled visit to China was announced, Japanese newspapers stepped up their efforts to 'return their correspondents to Peking'. The world of mass communications was suddenly charged with a new infusion of the competitive spirit.

To cover one of the biggest diplomatic events of the century in a sensational way, outstripping or just catching up with their rival papers, Japanese papers made desperate efforts to feature dispatches from their 'own correspondents' on their front pages, showing off the credit lines and Peking datelines. The foreign department chief of one newspaper even asserted: 'The stationing of a correspondent in Peking is more important than the freedom of the Press'.

Recent newspaper reporting has aroused the suspicion among some Japanese that the newspapers are filling their space not in the effort to provide the millions of readers with objective information but mainly in an attempt to create the political conditions required to secure the return of their correspondents to Peking. It is known that scores of correspondents from the Japanese mass media applied for entry into China to cover Nixon's visit. However, the Peking government, taking the stand that Nixon's visit was a problem which concerned only China and the US, decided not to admit any foreign correspondents other than American ones, with a very few exceptions.

This abnormal attitude on the part of the Japanese press—giving absolute priority to despatching correspondents to Peking, coupled with excessive commercial competitiveness—has left behind not only disillusionment, but also something more important. It has aroused among a broad range of citizens a growing sense of distrust and dissatisfaction, and has provoked criticism of biased reporting on China by the Japanese mass media, particularly the press. Citizens have been more interested in the quality and objectivity of information than in showy news items. In this way, at long last, a new consciousness—'Who shall guard the guards?'—has been awakened among them.

At an international journalists' seminar on biased press reporting, held in Turin last November, in which I participated, the mass media

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were often referred to as the 'fourth estate' or the 'fourth power' in modern society. If the mass media are really the 'fourth power' in a free society, they should be exposed to free criticism by citizens as are the political powers. However, it is difficult for such efforts by citizens to have sufficient influence without the cooperation of the mass media, because of the unique function that the latter perform. The most desirable solution to this problem is that the mass media should be keenly conscious of their own responsibility as an independent social power and make full reports on various problems within their own community. In other words, the best solution is to take the road to 'the open media' or 'the press without any veil of secrecy'.

With this in view, I proposed in a report on the conference in Turin (*Jiyu* [*Freedom*], December 1971) (1) an objective investigation into the way in which the Japan-China journalist exchange system was actually operating, and (2) a content analysis of the dispatches from Peking in order to determine the degree of bias in these reports.

Taking responsibility as the proposer, I have conducted an investigation into (1) for the past two months. The second proposal was put into effect in a report by Professor Shinkichi Eto (*Bungeishunju*, April 1972).

My efforts in the investigation were concentrated on a thorough study of the history of the Japan-China journalist exchange system, which dates back to the latter half of the 1950s. This history is a succession of agonizing dramas of pride and humiliation, competition and setback, played out between Japan's 'free press' and mainland China, a society where information is strictly controlled by the state.

The reader will, I have no doubt, find here a process whereby Japanese journalism has lost its soundness of judgment, and the 'free press' has been shackled by the bonds of secret agreements concluded between a handful of Japanese politicians and a foreign government.

The reader may also wonder why the same newspapers which are so courageous in exposing secrets concerning political power have long been so timid in reporting secrets within their own power structure.

In making this report, I have used the memos of the people concerned in each case as well as a considerable amount of unpublished material. However, the sources of this information have not been disclosed except where I have been authorized to do so by those concerned. With an open press there should not be any such secrets, but the present state of Japanese journalism is such that I was forced to conclude that it was impossible to arrive at the truth without collecting information mainly on an off-the-record basis. Although the Japan-China journalist exchange system has since its inception been inseparably linked to Japan-China trade, I am convinced that this report will not in the least affect trade relations, having taken safety measures in this respect by seeking opinions in some responsible quarters.

I still belong to the Japanese mass media community and thus had to face an awkward dilemma about publishing this report. However,

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I have put before anything else my conscience as a member of the 'free press'.

Nixon's visit to China opened up new prospects for the development of Japan-China relations. The pressure for normalization of relations between the two countries will be felt more keenly. This being the case, I believe that the present state of press reporting on China should be thoroughly re-examined as a national problem; a state in which some newspapers have accepted by written pledges the political conditions for reporting set out by the Chinese government in order to keep their correspondents in Peking, while others are exercising self-restraint in reporting along the same lines with a view to sending their own correspondents back there in the near future.

The possibility of the exchange of journalists between China and the US has already been aired. I believe it is time that the Japanese press reverted to dealing with China on the same basis as other free countries sending their correspondents there.

The Japanese press has its own lofty 'Press Code' (established on 23 July 1946). This code guarantees the complete freedom of the press in a free society. It is also in the spirit of the code that the press in a free society should not voluntarily abandon its own fundamental principle of the 'freedom of the press' or sell itself out to any government, domestic or foreign. Any such action is tantamount to the death of a free press.

It is desirable and necessary for an organ of the press to have its own resident correspondents in Peking. However, they should not be stationed there if the price is the sacrifice of the 'freedom of the press'. It is my sincere wish that this report may be of some value in bringing about a change in the attitude of the Japanese press towards the issue in question.

THE first initiatives towards establishing a system of journalist exchanges came from the Chinese side rather than the Japanese. In September 1956, the New China News Agency (NCNA) applied to the Japanese government for the entry of two resident correspondents and also asked the Japan Newspaper Publishers' and Editors' Association (JNPEA) to cooperate in securing entry permits for the two. However, opinions on this application were divided within the government authorities concerned in view of the absence of formal diplomatic relations with Peking, and no decision had been reached by the end of the year.

Two NCNA correspondents, Ting Tuo and Wu Hsueh Wen, visited Japan as members of the Chinese delegation to the Third Congress against A and H bombs held in Tokyo in August 1957. They claimed that they had been authorized by the All-China Journalists' Association (ACJA) to conduct talks with JNPEA on the exchange of journalists, and asked JNPEA to obtain for them an extension of their visas. However, the government turned down their application.

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In late October 1957 ACJA chairman Teng To stated in a letter to JNPEA director Minoru Yokota: 'We believe it is time for both the Chinese and Japanese sides to solve the journalist exchange problem according to the principle of equality.'

After some twists and turns, in December of the same year correspondents Ting Tuo and Wu Hsueh Wen visited Japan again as members of a Chinese delegation led by Chinese Red Cross Society chairman Li Te Chuan, and the first direct talks between ACJA and JNPEA took place.

During these talks, which continued into January 1958, the two NCNA correspondents reaffirmed that 'the exchange of resident correspondents should be carried out according to the principle of mutual equality' and expressed the Chinese view that approval for the stationing of two correspondents would be sufficient for them for the time being. Although more than 10 Japanese newspapers wanted to dispatch their correspondents to Peking, it was agreed that the exchange programme should commence with only two correspondents from each side.

Ting and Wu now both wanted to remain in Japan on a permanent basis under the agreement but after overcoming various obstacles, they finally reached a deadlock—they refused to obey the Japanese law requiring that all aliens on an extended stay should have their fingerprints taken. However, since a solution to this problem was in sight with the revision of the fingerprint clause in the Alien Registration Law, to become effective in May 1958, both correspondents returned home, on the understanding that according to the revised law, aliens staying in Japan for less than one year would no longer be required to have their fingerprints taken.

ACJA subsequently sent a cable to JNPEA: 'As soon as the Japanese side has given permission for the entry of the two NCNA correspondents, the Chinese side will admit two Japanese correspondents into China' (16 March 1958). In reply, JNPEA wired: 'It is considered appropriate that the entry of the two NCNA correspondents should take place in or after May' (20 March). With this exchange of cables, the first formal exchange of journalists through direct efforts on the part of the two associations was finally on the point of realization.

However, an incident at the Chinese stamp exhibition in Nagasaki in May involving an insult to the Chinese flag by a Japanese stiffened Peking's attitude towards Japan, and all the efforts for an exchange of journalists came to nothing.

Following this, Japanese journalists' contacts with China through JNPEA were suspended for several years, and the Chinese shifted their emphasis to exchanges with so-called friendly groups such as the Journalists' Congress of Japan (JCJ) and the Japan Federation of Press Workers' Unions.

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At this juncture, it should be mentioned that JNPEA's basic stand in its negotiations with the Chinese was worthy of particular attention. Adhering to the principles of 'mutual equality' and 'mutual guarantees of freedom of information and comment', JNPEA had been trying to conclude an independent agreement on the exchange of journalists, rejecting any interference on the part of politicians, trading circles, etc.

At the talks with JNPEA (12 December 1957), Ting and Wu had both stated: 'If really objective reporting is to be desired, there should be an exchange of resident correspondents through direct contacts between the newspaper associations of the two countries (JNPEA and ACJA).' Thus, it seems that there was no difference in principle, verbally at least, between the two sides.

In view of all this, the flag incident in Nagaski was even more regrettable, representing as it did a grave setback in the development of a journalist exchange system.

IN January 1964, political and mass communication circles in Japan were excited at President de Gaulle's move towards the recognition of China. Amid this political agitation, moves to realize an exchange of journalists at an early date were revived with fresh vigour in newspaper circles.

This time, the Japanese side took the initiative. On 28 February, JNPEA sent a cable to its Chinese counterpart, proposing the resumption of the talks. In March, moves were made to expedite a solution to this problem among pro-Peking groups and some politicians.

On 27 March, it was announced that three Liberal Democratic Diet members, the late Kenzo Matsumura, Yutaro Takeyama and Yoshimi Furui, as well as Kaheita Okazaki, chairman of the Japan-China Trade Liaison Council, would visit China at Premier Chou En-Lai's invitation. Takeyama requested that 'representatives of the press also accompany the mission since it intends to discuss the exchange of journalists with the Chinese in Peking'. At the same time, LDP Diet member Seiichi Tagawa made a tour of the leading newspapers, urging them 'to have reporters accompany the mission who are of division head rank so that they can give responsible views on the question of journalist exchanges'.

Press leaders reacted strongly to such interference by politicians and China trade circles. On 11 March, the Editorial Committee of JNPEA, consisting of the chief editors of various newspapers, reaffirmed the basic position which had been adopted by JNPEA six years previously in the negotiations with the Chinese: 'The exchange of journalists between Japan and China should be promoted solely between JNPEA and its Chinese counterpart as a problem involving the reporting of news by the press. It should be treated completely separately from any problems unconnected with journalism.'

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On 28 March, the day after the announcement of Matsumura's mission to China, a top-level meeting of JNPEA was held, attended by three executive members of the Editorial Committee, namely chief editors Chikao Kano (*Mainichi*), Naoki Iwasa (*Sankei*) and Ichiro Iwatate (*Kyodo*), as well as JNPEA director Yokota. At this meeting, the following opinions were expressed:

> The fact that politicians are interfering in the journalist exchange issue for their own interests and in order to claim credit for themselves (for the improvement of relations with China) has caused great annoyance. Above all, what is most outrageous is their way of acting as if they were empowered to select the reporters who will accompany the mission, demanding representatives from JNPEA or specifying reporters of the rank of division chief for the mission. (*Mainichi* and *Sankei*)
>
> There is a wide range of opinion among senior members above the rank of chief editor and reporters in charge of Chinese affairs in each newspaper as well as among members of the Journalist Congress. Some of these people favour a solution of the exchange problem on the political basis that Japan-China friendship should be promoted. I myself approve of the stationing of correspondents in Peking purely for the coverage of Chinese affairs, but I would reject any move that involved anything political. (*Kyodo*)

At that point, information arrived that as a member of a delegation from the China-Japan Trade Promotion Association (chairman Nan Han Chen), correspondent Wu Hsueh Wen would probably revisit Japan with ACJA's reply to JNPEA's proposal on the resumption of talks. JNPEA therefore confirmed its policy that negotiations on the exchange of journalists should be conducted in strict accordance with the aforementioned principle.

However, many uncertainties remained. First of all, no confirmation was available on whether correspondent Wu had been empowered to negotiate with the Japanese as a representative of ACJA. And secondly, from Akira Arai, then chief of the political department of *Nikkei*, JNPEA obtained information which gave rise to some serious doubt as to the status of ACJA (30 March).

In a meeting with the political department heads of seven major newspapers (Arai was one of them) held on 25 March, Hsiao Hsiang Chien, director of the China-Japan Friendship Association, who was already in Japan in connexion with a China trade fair, was quoted as saying:

> ACJA is merely a private body. The exchange of journalists is basically a problem that should be dealt with by a government-to-government agreement. However, in view of the absence of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries, this problem is unlikely to be settled unless it is left to the good offices of the L-T [Liao Cheng Chin and Tatsunosuke Takasaki] trade agency through a political channel such as the Liao-Takasaki line.

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During the period 1957 to 1958, ACJA had functioned as the counterpart to JNPEA, officially representing China in the negotiations and apparently exercising the necessary authority. When was the status of ACJA changed? Hsiao's statement foreshadowed the beginning of a new phase in the drama of Japan-China journalist exchanges. However, JNPEA decided to adhere to its original policy and the Foreign Ministry supported this stand.

On the morning of 31 March, JNPEA's enlarged Editorial Committee was convened to confirm once again its negotiating policy. In the afternoon, Tsunetaka Ueda, chairman of JNPEA, met Matsumura, who was soon to leave for Peking, and clarified JNPEA's stand to the latter: 'Formal negotiations on the exchange of journalists have already been started between JNPEA and ACJA. Therefore, while we would highly appreciate your support for us in this matter in Peking, please do not engage in any direct negotiations regarding it.'

At the same time, Ueda sent a cable to Wu Leng Hsi, chairman of ACJA, c/o '1631 PEKING' (the cable address for NCNA; Wu was then NCNA representative), urging a reply to JNPEA's cable on the resumption of the talks, dated 28 February. However, there was no Chinese response to this cable. 'The beginning of formal talks between JNPEA and ACJA' was simply wishful thinking on the part of JNPEA.

MATSUMURA'S mission left for Peking accompanied by a press corps representing seven newspapers. The press corps was headed by *Nikkei's* Arai.

On arrival in Peking, Matsumura discussed with Lio Cheng Chin fundamental points concerning the journalist exchange issue within the framework of the trade talks. On the basis of this discussion, representatives from the Takasaki and Liao Trade Offices began talks exclusively on this particular issue. JNPEA's request that Matsumura should not engage in direct negotiations was thus apparently completely ignored.

On 15 April 1964, that is, on the second day of the talks, reporter Fusao Takata (*Mainichi*) sent a cable from Peking: 'The Chinese side stated that on the question of journalist exchanges they cannot take up the matter with JNPEA alone in view of the fact that they have also been in contact with the Journalist Congress of Japan on this matter. The Chinese then expressed their desire to conduct negotiations through the channel of the L-T offices thereafter.' This message was conveyed to JNPEA.

This cable provided the first clue to the change in the Chinese attitude towards the existing relations between JNPEA and ACJA. In any case, the talks between the Takasaki and Liao Offices were concluded on 18 April, and 'A Memorandum on the Talks on the Exchange of Correspondents between Japan and China' was issued on the following day.

The salient points of the memorandum included: (1) the procedural

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work on the exchange would be handled through the two L-T Offices, (2) the number of correspondents to be exchanged would be limited to eight on both sides, (3) the safety and protection of correspondents would be guaranteed, (4) correspondents would be given every facility in news coverage activities and (5) freedom of communications would be guaranteed. These points were generally in line with the basic conditions which JNPEA had set out in its proposal on the exchange of journalists to its Chinese counterpart, and were therefore fairly readily acceptable to the Japanese press.

On the return of Matsumura's mission from Peking, representatives of the Editorial Committee held talks with the mission members on 15 May to seek clarification of some problematical points in the memorandum. In reply, Matsumura gave the following explanation of the circumstances:

> Prior to our departure for Peking, I had promised chairman Ueda that I would not discuss the journalist problem on my own initiative. What I had originally intended to do was merely to find out the situation in Peking and report this to the JNPEA in order to help promote progress in the matter. However, on my arrival in Peking, I found that the situation there was quite different from what we had expected. First of all, there had already been a number of outside interventions. Secondly, the internal situation in China was undergoing an abrupt change. Under these circumstances, I thought it was better to expedite things, and made the arrangements with the Chinese on the journalist problem at my own discretion. We understood that the Takasaki Office was to serve merely as a channel and that it would be JNPEA that would actually implement the exchange of journalists. I feared that various problems might crop up if journalists were exchanged in a random fashion. So after both sides had understood the principle of 'non-interference with each other's affairs regarding differences in political systems' which had been confirmed mutually at the time of the trade agreement, we made it a major precondition for the talks on the journalist exchange problem.

While there were still some members of JNPEA who voiced doubts on the memorandum, the majority tended to accept the *fait accompli*. The general atmosphere in mass media circles was well reflected by Ueda's view, expressed in his meeting with US Chargé d'Affaires John K. Emerson on 5 June as follows:

> ACJA apparently does not have the authority to conduct the negotiations any longer. If the exchange of journalists cannot be accomplished through this channel, we may as well accept the L-T channel. I think the L-T channel is just like a telephone line. What is important is to respect the principles of equality and mutual benefit, and to confine our efforts to news reporting and nothing else.

Although the problem of where the real responsibility in Japan lay still remained ambiguous, it was decided that domestically at least the

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procedural work on the exchange of journalists would be carried on with JNPEA as the central body. At that time, the newspaper and broadcasting organizations who wanted to dispatch their correspondents numbered more than 20. In August, the Chinese side agreed to increase the number of 'talks memorandum' correspondents from eight to nine. As a result, *Asahi*, *Mainichi*, *Yomiuri*, *Sankei*, *Nikkei*, *Nishi-Nippon*, *Kyodo*, NHK and Tokyo Broadcasting were selected to dispatch one correspondent each. In addition, the Chinese side granted entry permits to five more correspondents to cover the Chinese National Day on a short visit basis. In view of the situation in the selection process, the Editorial Committee reached a general understanding that the nine resident correspondents would represent in China not only their respective organizations but the entire Japanese press as well.

In the meantime, the Chinese applied for the entry of seven correspondents representing respectively NCNA, *The People's Daily*, *The Kuangming Daily*, *Takungpao*, *Wenhuipao* and *Chungkuo Hsinwen*, as a temporary measure. On 29 September 1964 Japanese and Chinese reporters simultaneously entered each other's capitals. Two more Chinese correspondents, one each for the *China Youth Daily* and *The Workers' Daily*, joined their colleagues in Tokyo some time later, bringing the total strength of the Chinese press corps to nine. Thus the long-cherished exchange of journalists was realized.

The 'talks memorandum' system (hereafter called the 'L-T journalist exchange system') operated for the next three years without any major trouble. However, there is no denying the hard fact that the L-T system was not worked out with JNPEA as the principal in the negotiations, but was included in the framework of the L-T trade agreement which politicians and trade circles concluded with the Chinese.

At the outset, JNPEA tried to define the Takasaki and Liao Offices as merely relay offices which had no political intentions of their own, referring to them as the 'window', 'telephone line' or 'mailbox'.

However, in the event that any serious trouble should develop in the operation of the journalist exchange system, or if there should be a clash of interests between the trade agency, whose political motive was to promote Sino-Japanese friendship, and 'the free press' which should maintain impartiality, the L-T journalist exchange system, imbued as it was with grave internal contradictions, was most likely to present crucial problems for the Japanese press.

It was Yoshimori Tachibana, then chief editorial writer of *Mainichi* (and currently director of the Asia Research Institute), who as early as 26 March 1964 expressed the following view to JNPEA director Yokota (prior to the visit of Matsumura's mission):

> Trade deals with the exchange of goods. Newspaper correspondents are going to be handled in a package together with merchants and commercial goods. This is liable to prove a source of serious trouble in the future.

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THIS prediction was amply confirmed. With the outbreak of the cultural revolution and the accompanying rampage of the Red Guards, the 'large character posters' (wall newspapers) provided an important source of information. The wall newspapers also gave the Japanese correspondents a prominent role in world journalism because of their ability to read Chinese characters. However, with the turn of the year, the Chinese treatment of foreign correspondents in Peking became cooler and on 17 February 1967, Chang Fen Yen, deputy chief of the Newspaper Section of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, summoned *Mainichi's* Takada and other Japanese correspondents and warned them: '*Mainichi's* recent reports are anti-Chinese and are contrary to the intent of the journalist exchanges between the two countries.' The cause of this warning was apparently a caricature of Chairman Mao carried by *Mainichi.*

Thereafter, information-gathering from the wall newspapers gradually began to be criticized as 'anti-Chinese propaganda by reactionary foreign elements' and the situation grew more and more unfavourable for foreign correspondents.

On 10 September, Chang suddenly cancelled the journalist status of three Japanese correspondents and ordered them to leave China. The three newspapers involved were *Mainichi, Sankei* and *Nishi-Nippon.*

In a notice to the Japanese press corps, Madam Chang strongly criticized the 'reactionary Sato Cabinet' and declared to the three newspapers:

> In defiance of a strict warning from the Chinese, they slandered the Chinese cultural revolution by carrying anti-Chinese cartoons and reports. To cite an extreme case, these slanderous reports were directed at Chairman Mao. Such attitudes can never be forgiven. The Chinese side will not admit new correspondents into China from any of these three papers.

The People's Daily also carried an article to this effect.

However, the deportation of the three correspondents was only a prelude to further trials for most of the remaining Japanese newspapermen. On 12 October, *Yomiuri's* correspondent was ordered to leave the country on the charge that '*Yomiuri* was conducting malicious anti-Chinese activity through the Tibetan treasure exhibition'.

At the same time, the Chinese side made no response to an entry application by NTV to replace a correspondent from Tokyo Broadcasting whose term had expired on 5 September. As a result, the number of Japanese correspondents in Peking was reduced from nine to four.

On 5 June 1968, the Chinese authorities searched *Nikkei's* Peking Bureau and arrested its correspondent, Keiji Samejima. He was detained for about a year and a half, until 20 December 1969. At the time of his release, NCNA reported the charge against him and others as follows:

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> Correspondent Samejima had engaged in espionage activities over a long period, taking advantage of his status as a correspondent. He stole a great deal of Chinese political, military and economic information and handed it to the US and Japanese reactionaries. When examined by the Chinese authorities concerned, he could not help admitting this crime. The authorities have decided to treat him leniently and deport him.

To date, neither Samejima nor *Nikkei* has officially refuted the Chinese charges.

At the time when the three correspondents, including *Mainichi's* Egashira, were deported, China was in the throes of the cultural revolution and xenophobic sentiment was extremely strong. During this period of social convulsion, three of the six Russian correspondents in Peking were deported in December 1966, these being the first group to be deported. Subsequently many other foreign correspondents were either deported or left the country voluntarily one after another. As a result, it was said that the number of foreign correspondents in Peking, which reportedly had at one point been about 30, decreased to nine. It is clear, therefore, that the deportation of Japanese correspondents at that time was not an isolated case.

Neither was the case of Samejima. In July 1967, or one year before Samejima's arrest, Reuters correspondent Anthony Grey was arrested. He was put under house arrest for more than 800 days, until October 1969. His memoirs *Hostage in Peking* have made it clear that his arrest was in retaliation for the prior arrest and imprisonment of a NCNA correspondent in Hong Kong by the British authorities.

The Grey case aroused widespread sympathy for him in England and a demand for his release. Shortly after his release he wrote his book, displaying an attitude which is in striking contrast with that of Samejima, who has been maintaining complete silence regarding his ordeal. There can also be no denying the fact that in its handling of the Samejima case *Nikkei* has failed to treat it as a problem in which the honour and prestige of the whole Japanese press was at stake.

Following Samejima's arrest, in November 1968, NHK correspondent Toshio Shiojima returned home when his visa expired. However, he was not granted re-entry to Peking for some time, primarily because of NHK's coverage of Taiwan and telecasting of the coverage as described later. After this matter had somehow been settled, Shiojima returned to his Peking post in August 1969 after a waiting period of over eight months. Then he left China again in September 1970. However, no re-entry permit has been given to him since, this time, apparently, because of NHK's membership of the ABU (Asian Broadcasters' Union), which has incurred Peking's displeasure. This international organization, which is actually headed by NHK, includes Taiwan as one of its member countries.

On 19 September, the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry summoned *Kyodo's* Hiroshi Nakajima and demanded his departure from China

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on the grounds that *Kyodo* had sponsored the Third General Meeting of OANA (Organization of Asian News Agencies)—another organization which includes Taiwan.

In this way the number of Japanese correspondents resident in Peking had by September 1970 been reduced from the original nine to one (*Asahi's* Akioka). It continued at this lowest level for three months.

Subsequently, however, the number of Japanese correspondents began to increase again. This development should be considered in the light of the following factors: in autumn 1970, the Albanian resolution (calling for seating Peking in the UN at the expense of Taiwan) won a majority vote in the UN General Assembly for the first time in 21 years; in the meantime, the Peking government had started to prepare for its return to the international community. With these changes in the international situation, competition for 'returning to Peking' was further intensified among the Japanese mass media. Thus, in January 1971, *Nikkei's* Inada and *Nishi-Nippon's* Tomoda returned to their Peking posts, bringing the total strength of the Japanese press corps there to three.

The urge to dispatch correspondents to Peking again has been intensified in Japanese newspaper circles by various developments which included the emergence of 'pingpong' diplomacy in spring 1971, the announcement on 15 July of Nixon's plan to visit China, increased pressure in Japanese political circles for the restoration of normal relations with China, Peking's successful entry into the UN, Nixon's trip to Peking, etc. In the wake of these developments, *Kyodo's* Nakajima was again admitted into China in January 1972, increasing the number of Japanese correspondents in Peking to four.

LET me, however, take the story back to the original deportation of the three correspondents. This news, which reached Tokyo on the morning of 10 September 1967, was a shock to press circles. On the afternoon of the same day, a meeting of senior editorial staff members of the nine organizations concerned was called to discuss the situation.

Before discussing the matter, the executive office of JNPEA reminded the meeting that the exchange system was being operated by the nine media organizations as one unit, and that, accordingly, whatever decision it might make should be agreed upon by all nine organizations. Despite this advice, there was an inevitable division of opinion on how to handle the deportation news between the three newspapers affected by the Chinese action on the one hand and the remaining six organizations on the other. As a result, it was decided that each organization should be free to act at its own discretion in reporting the story to the public. According to information given at that time, details of the discussion were at once leaked to Peking by an insider belonging to one of the organizations which had attended the meeting. On the following morning the

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foreign department chief of one of the newspapers concerned received a cable from its own Peking correspondent, warning: 'Be careful what you say at the Association meeting.'

During the ensuing 10 days, at least three sessions of the committee were held. At the beginning of the session on 11 September, because of the leakage on the previous day, the executive office of JNPEA proposed that the members 'not take notes' and therefore no official minutes of subsequent sessions were recorded.

The following is a reconstruction based on pieces of information obtained from several participants. In the initial stage, the highest priority was given to the safety of the three correspondents ordered to leave China. No provocative statement could be made before they had crossed the border. The three newspapers directly involved therefore proposed to request the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry to give explanations for the deportation, but those organizations which were unaffected were unwilling to pass the request on to the Chinese authorities via their correspondents for fear of further retaliations. Finally, it was decided to ask Matsumura, a member of the Diet, to convey the request to the Chinese, and a letter to Peking signed by all nine organizations was prepared. However, Matsumura refused to act as intermediary, saying: 'It is not a good time.'

In the second stage (after the three correspondents had safely left China), the following suggestion was made: a protest should be lodged against the Chinese action, and JNPEA, at least, should publish a unilateral statement in order to clarify its position. *Sankei* maintained: 'Denying freedom of information is a grave problem for the entire Japanese press. It will infringe on our fundamental principle.' The executive office of JNPEA also warned: 'If we fail even to file a protest, the whole press world in Japan may be criticized by the general public.' *Asahi* and *Kyodo*, on the other hand, led the group of those who were more cautious. There was a clear divergence of attitude.

Asahi: 'Even if the Peking correspondents cannot send dispatches, we should station them there at least as witnesses to historical events for the sake of future generations.' *Sankei*: 'If such is the purpose, it can be accomplished by simply listening to Radio Peking.' *Asahi*: 'If the committee insists on issuing a joint statement, *Asahi* cannot help but quit.'

By this time, the conflict of interests between the three newspapers with deported correspondents and the remaining newspapers and broadcasters had become acute, and the agreement about 'the nine organizations acting in unison' had become an empty shell.

In the final session on 20 September, a compromise plan was worked out. The meeting adopted the policy that the six organizations with correspondents still in Peking would cooperate in supplying news to the three without. As a stop-gap measure, *Kyodo* was asked

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to supply Peking dispatches to these three, and it agreed to do so. It was agreed that even if the number of exchange correspondents should be reduced to one, the channel between Japan and China should be maintained.

Since *Kyodo's* service is a contractual matter, the agency has continued to supply Peking news to the organizations affected. However, the pooling of news among rival papers is virtually impossible, and no newspaper with a Peking correspondent has ever effectively carried out the understanding which was reached.

THE deportation of the Japanese correspondents in autumn 1967 was not, as already indicated, an isolated case. But since that time, some new factors have emerged in the Japan-China journalist exchange system.

As their reason for the original deportation of the three correspondents, the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry mentioned 'the slandering of the cultural revolution', 'the caricaturing of Chairman Mao', etc. The Chinese authorities also gave, as the reason for the subsequent deportation of *Yomiuri's* correspondent, the paper's plan to hold an exhibition of Tibetan treasures. In both cases, the reason for the deportation was the editorial attitude towards China of the organizations to which the deported correspondents belonged, and not that of the correspondents themselves. Such editorial restraints had never been required by 'the 1964 L-T talks memorandum'.

A new development which the Japanese press had overlooked was the fact that the trade arrangements between Japan and China which had provided a framework for the journalist exchanges had been shifted from the L-T system to the memorandum trade (MT) system in the spring of 1968. The MT system led to troubles for the Japanese press corps in Peking, the first of which was the arrest of Samejima in June 1968, and the Chinese refusal to grant re-entry to NHK's Shiojima. In Shiojima's case, the Chinese withheld his re-entry permit for some time because NHK had covered Taiwan and telecast the film, a scene in which showed a wall with a Nationalist slogan in large letters 'Counter-offensive against the mainland'.

Since *Asahi* had printed an article on this NHK programme, the Chinese accused the paper, together with NHK, of carrying out 'an act to praise Chiang Kai Shek and Taiwan'. As a result, the re-entry permit for *Asahi's* Akioka, who had left China about the same time as Shiojima, was also shelved.

This incident caused a problem with respect to apologies to Peking by *Asahi* and NHK. According to NHK sources, Seiichi Tagawa, on his return from China in spring 1968, informed the two organizations that Peking was demanding written apologies from both NHK chairman Maeda and *Asahi* president Hirooka.

At a meeting on 7 May 1969, Ninsei Okubo of the Japan-China

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Memorandum Trade Office reported the reaction of NHK and *Asahi* to Peking's demand as follows:

> *Asahi* at once wrote a letter of apology, but NHK was slow in reacting, being reluctant to make an unqualified admission of error. As a result, no invitation to Peking has yet been given to NHK, while *Asahi's* correspondent was again admitted into China shortly after the expiry of his permit in November 1968. NHK thus felt obliged to express its regret to China, drawing up another letter of apology which this time was modelled on *Asahi's*. Nevertheless its correspondent has not been granted entry to China.

Information obtained from sources in NHK tallies with Okubo's account. These sources say: '*Asahi* wrote a letter of apology in strict accordance with the Chinese requests conveyed through Mr. Tagawa. But ours was a more moderate apology which ran roughly as follows: "We apologize to you and regret that we unintentionally broadcast a TV film including a scene which might arouse your anger. We will be more careful in future."'

In this connexion, I would like to add that *Yomiuri* and *Chunichi* are reported to have written letters of apology to Peking regarding the incidents of the Tibetan treasure exhibition and the 'pingpong' diplomacy of April 1971 respectively.

The first clear indication of the change in the journalist exchange system resulting from the switchover from L-T to MT trade was a notice served on *Kyodo* by the Newspaper Section of the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry on 19 September 1970. The notice, concerning the deportation of *Kyodo's* correspondent Nakajima, contained the following charges:

> (1) In defiance of our strict warning, *Kyodo,* of all things, sponsored the Third General Meeting of OANA. The political purpose of this conference was openly to create 'two Chinas' and to contribute to the new Asian policy of US imperialism and the expansionist policy of Japanese militarism. The conference has opened up a new road to the establishment of a new Asian counter-revolutionary military alliance with Japan as its leader.
>
> (2) It represented a serious breach of *the three political principles agreed between China and Japan and the communiqué regarding the China-Japan Memorandum Trade agreement which both the Chinese and Japanese sides must observe without fail in the exchange of journalists.* We were forced to take counter-measures against this act. (Author's italics.)

While the Chinese warnings to NHK and *Asahi* were indirect, having been given through LDP parliamentarians, Peking resorted to a public notice in the case of *Kyodo.*

The Tokyo press received a further shock from an announcement made by Kinkazu Saionji at a meeting in late September shortly after his return from Peking. A news report quoted Saionji as saying:

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> In March 1968 when the communiqué on the talks regarding Japan-China Memorandum Trade was announced, the Japan-China journalist exchange memorandum was abrogated. From the date of the announcement of this communiqué, it was mutually understood that no Japanese newspaper was permitted to have a correspondent in China unless it accepted the communiqué and the three political principles. I thought the Japanese press had already been informed of this fact by Mr. Furui and Mr. Tagawa.

This news was indeed another bombshell to the newspapers in Tokyo.

In *Genronjin* (*The Journalists*) (11 November 1970), commentator Saburo Hayashi, after disclosing the above information, asked the mass media and the politicians concerned to clarify the situation. However, this open letter has been ignored to date. I have therefore investigated this matter, and have found that Saionji made the remarks in question at the Japan Press Club on 26 September 1970. On the same day, after his lecture at the club, Saionji discussed the journalist exchange problem with Yuji Maeda and Masaaki Kasagi, both of JNPEA.

Maeda confirmed Saionji's remarks as reported and said: 'I don't think the contents of his talk were such as to require secrecy.' Kasagi said: 'At that time, Mr. Saionji's secretary, Mr. Shiro Minamimura, made a statement to the effect that Peking correspondents were required to sign a written pledge of acceptance of the political conditions, and I remember that we were surprised at this remark.'

Following these shocking developments in late September, it was agreed that the editors-in-chief of the nine organizations (including *Asahi*, *Mainichi*, *Yomiuri*, *Sankei*, *Kyodo* and NHK) should meet the people directly responsible for the trade communiqué, to get their stories. On 5 October, they therefore held talks at the Imperial Hotel with Furui, Tagawa and Okazaki, with *Sankei's* representative in the chair.

The chairman proposed to 'make the meeting a secret session and not to disclose what is discussed to anyone but editorial chiefs'. I have obtained a participant's memo and confirmed its accuracy, as well as supplemented its contents to some extent, by interviewing some of the other participants. The highlights of the discussion were as follows:

> *Chairman* (*Sankei*): We originally started exchanging journalists with China with nine correspondents on each side. But this exchange has become purely nominal. Some say we should re-examine this exchange system, while others are in favour of continuing it to the last man. Still others insist that the Japanese side should make some sort of declaration of intent at this juncture. I would like to ask your candid opinions.
>
> *Mr. Furui*: L–T trade was abrogated at the end of 1967. We had tried to continue trade with China under this formula. But we were not successful because the other side would not agree. In February 1968, that is during my visit to China, both sides agreed to conduct trade on a new basis, not as a continuation of

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L–T trade. In other words, we agreed to conclude an agreement named Memorandum Trade.

Thereupon, the three political principles, the principle of the inseparability of politics and economics and other conditions were presented for the first time as requirements which both sides should observe. The Japanese side agreed to all these conditions. *Then the Chinese side proposed to hold talks on the journalist exchange problem prior to signing the memorandum trade agreement, and we had a heated discussion with the Chinese that whole day. The Chinese were adamant that they would not sign the memorandum trade agreement unless this* [*the journalist problem*] *was settled. In this way, it was decided that the journalist exchange would also be carried out on the condition that the three political principles, etc. should be observed, and that we* [*Furui, Tagawa, etc.*] *would act as intermediaries for the dispatch of correspondents to Peking.*

Chairman: We never heard of that!

Mr. Tagawa: The Chinese will decide on the entry of correspondents depending on whether the Japanese papers become friendly to China or not. At present, the correspondents of three organizations (*Asahi, Kyodo* and NHK) have been admitted into China on the basis of this criterion. [Note: As of 5 October 1970, only *Asahi* had a correspondent in Peking.]

JNPEA: If the whole Japanese press is to become friendly to China, this may be a problem for the press in a free society. Public opinion polls also indicate that not all Japanese are pro-Peking. Such an attempt could alienate journalism from the mass of the people.

Mr. Tagawa: Conditions are different in Japan and China. What the Chinese are saying is that they can never compromise on the major problem, namely Taiwan. In addition, they say they cannot tolerate insults to, or the caricaturing of Chairman Mao.

Mainichi: If this was the case, Mr. Furui should have immediately informed the Association of it in spring 1968.

Mr. Tagawa: After the deportation incidents, we took up the question of the exchange of journalists. But even before that time, the Chinese had been insisting on cutting the number of correspondents to four because they said eight to nine reporters were too many. During four days in March we discussed exclusively the journalist problem with the Chinese. However, the discussion was mainly confined to the number of correspondents to be admitted into China and almost no reference was made to the terms on which admission would be granted [note: acceptance of the political conditions, etc.].

Mr. Furui: We held out against the Chinese arguments, but negotiations reached deadlock on the third day and we entered into individual talks on the third and fourth days. Since the other side would not budge, we had no choice but to accept their demand for the reduction of correspondents. The Chinese side declared that the number of correspondents should be four, while we insisted on keeping six. *Both sides settled on five and this was put in writing. In view of the internal situation in the Japanese*

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press, it was agreed that the Chinese side would not disclose the new quota figure of five either. The fact that the Japanese correspondents in Peking were actually four at that time was also taken into consideration. . . . .

NHK: As regards the three political principles, do they demand a pledge from each individual correspondent?

Mr. Tagawa: The communiqué for the 1968 agreement confirmed this, but I believe it had been in practice even before that. The agreement on journalists was automatically scrapped when the trade agreement was abrogated. We should maintain the five correspondents in Peking, and we may be able to increase the number as the political situation changes. I think that to increase the present strength in Peking to five is possible even within the year.

IT could be said that this secret testimony by Furui and Tagawa has cleared away the mist which has shrouded the Japan-China journalist exchange system ever since it was subsumed under the Memorandum Trade agreement in 1968. However, the fact remains that the truth has not been revealed to Japanese readers—our people.

It is certain that this secret testimony has clarified the following points:

(1) The L–T journalist exchange system which had been inaugurated in 1964 was scrapped with the conclusion of the Memorandum Trade Agreement in 1968.

(2) The new journalist exchange system means a switchover to the 'MT system' which contains highly political elements to be described below.

(3) With the newly established quota of correspondents from five organizations only, the original journalist exchange system involving nine has collapsed, both as regards the spirit of the system and its practical operation.

(4) The MT journalist exchange arrangement was worked out by politicians such as Furui and Tagawa completely at their own discretion, without notice being given to JNPEA and in the form of a secret agreement.

(5) Neither Furui nor Tagawa informed JNPEA of this agreement for more than two and a half years.

(6) It is suspected that, while keeping secret the existence of these agreements, the two politicians and others have tried to manoeuvre into acceptance of the political conditions included in the MT journalist exchange system various press organizations who are eager to return their correspondents to Peking, by making contact with them individually.

The so-called 'mailbox' or 'telephone line' of 1964 has begun to act on its own initiative.

Their statements suggest that Furui and Tagawa concluded with the Chinese (the China-Japan Memorandum Trade Office) not one but

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two secret agreements. First of all, from their testimony there is no doubt about the existence of 'an agreement dealing with the nature of correspondents'. However, it is not clear if this secret agreement is in writing or just a tacit understanding. Secondly, there is evidently 'an agreement on the limitation of numbers'. With reference to Tagawa's words, the 'four days in March', the question is: March of which year? With respect to this, a remark in Furui's testimony, 'the correspondents were actually four at that time', may provide a clue. The period during which the Peking correspondents were four was from October 1967, when *Yomiuri's* correspondent was deported, to June 1968, when *Nikkei's* Samejima was arrested. Judging by this, the March in question must be March 1968.

Another piece of evidence on this point is available in the memo on the speech by MT Office's Okubo on 7 May 1969, part of which runs as follows:

> In the negotiations for the current Memorandum Trade Agreement [concluded in April 1969], we tried to increase the number of Japanese correspondents by including those organizations whose reporters had been deported at the height of the cultural revolution. The Chinese considered four to five correspondents the limit at that time. Since only two organizations [*Asahi* and *Kyodo*] had their correspondents in Peking, I went to China with two letters addressed to Premier Chou En Lai, one entrusted to me by the representative of *Yomiuri* and the other by NHK. However, while I was negotiating with the Chinese, *Yomiuri* published an interview between Mitarai [a Japanese political writer] and Chiang Kai Shek [in fact, *Yomiuri* carried part of an interview originally produced by NHK], emphasizing the role of Chiang Kai Shek. For this reason, the talks on *Yomiuri's* return to Peking made no headway. The Chinese maintain that Japanese papers should exercise more restraint in dealing with the Taiwan issue.

This statement does not rule out the possibility that 'the agreement on the limitation of numbers' was signed in March 1968. If this assumption is correct, the course of developments seems to be as follows:

At the end of 1967, the five-year (1962–1967) L–T Trade Agreement expired, and a blank period in trade began on 1 January 1968. Negotiations for the new Memorandum Trade Agreement started at long last on 8 February of the same year and it was signed on 6 March. During this period, both sides must therefore first of all have concluded 'the agreement regarding the nature of correspondents' (a secret arrangement), which is an integral part of the new MT journalist exchange arrangement. Subsequently, in March of the same year, another secret agreement, the one regarding the quota of correspondents, appears to have been signed.

Of course, this is merely an assumption based on the materials which I have collected and is therefore subject to further confirmation.

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With these secret agreements in mind, let me follow up some of the 'inside developments.'

Early in February 1971, prior to his visit to China, Tagawa was in contact with *Mainichi*. Throughout several rounds of talks, Tagawa tried to convince the latter of the following: his good offices in introducing *Mainichi's* correspondent to Peking would be in vain unless *Mainichi* agreed to respect three important points in a written pledge. These three points, the significance of which is discussed below, were (1) the contents of the communiqué regarding the 1968 Memorandum Trade Agreement, (2) the three political principles and (3) a Chinese warning issued at the time of the deportation of *Mainichi's* correspondent (in short, this means *Mainichi's* apology).

Kanae Tanaka, *Mainichi's* editor at the time, politely declined Tagawa's good offices, having reached the following conclusion: 'For the sake of its readers, *Mainichi* earnestly wishes to station a correspondent in Peking. But from the standpoint of the freedom of the press, we cannot prostitute our pen to be able to do so.'

Earlier in January, both *Nikkei* and *Nishi-Nippon* had been allowed to return their correspondents to Peking. *Nikkei* sources say: '*Nikkei's* return to Peking was arranged smoothly. Of course, our application to Peking was channelled through Mr. Okazaki. Its contents were nearly the same as those commonly known.' 'Contents commonly known' may well be interpreted as meaning conditions similar to those proposed to *Mainichi*.

Nishi-Nippon presumably made similar arrangements for their successful return to Peking. These facts clearly show how the MT journalist exchange system (secret arrangements) is being operated in practice, and also make it obvious why the reduction in the number of journalists from nine to five had to be kept secret. In any case, since four correspondents representing four organizations are already stationed in Peking, there is only one vacancy left to be filled.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the shift from the L–T system to the MT system in journalist exchanges was accompanied by substantial changes which were fatal to the freedom of the press.

The 1964 L–T Trade Agreement was, in essence, simply a procedural arrangement regarding the establishment of a trade office in each country, and it was nonpolitical in nature. In sharp contrast, the communiqué regarding the Memorandum Trade Agreement issued on 6 March 1968 contained strongly political elements, as can be seen from the following quotations:

> —The Chinese side . . . pointed out that the obstacles standing in the way of improvement of China-Japan relations had been brought about by the anti-China policy jointly pursued by US imperialism and the Japanese authorities. The Japanese fully understood the Chinese position, and stated that hereafter they would make further efforts to eliminate these obstacles and promote the normalization of Japan-China relations.

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> —. . . Both sides confirmed that the three political principles and the principle of the inseparability of politics and economics are the principles that should be respected and observed in the relations between Japan and China, and they expressed their determination to make continued efforts to secure these political foundations.

Following the then Prime Minister Sato's visit to Taiwan and South Vietnam in September 1967, and the announcement of the Sato-Johnson joint communiqué in November, which referred to 'the nuclear threat from Communist China', Peking stiffened its attitude towards Japan and began openly to launch a political offensive against it. Against this background, the MT Agreement concluded in 1968 clearly had a political objective of its own.

In addition, as the secret testimony of Furui and Tagawa suggests, a journalist exchange system closely incorporated into the framework of the Memorandum Trade Agreement could not but assume a highly political nature.

The three political principles are (1) not to pursue a hostile policy towards China, (2) not to participate in any plot to create 'two Chinas', and (3) not to obstruct the return of Japan-China relations to a normal basis. When applied to journalist exchanges, these seemingly innocent principles might impose extensive restraints and restrictions on the editorial and administrative policies of the mass media, such as abandonment of coverage of Taiwan, restrictions over news on Taiwan, withdrawal from all international organizations that include Taiwan, acceptance of the principle that the Japan-(Nationalist) China Treaty should be abrogated, and changes in designation from 'Communist China' and 'Japan-(Nationalist) China' to 'China' and 'Japan-Taiwan' and so on.

The specific content of the three political principles is not fixed either. When the delegation of the Buddhist party, Komeito, visited China, the three principles became five; in trade, they are called Chou's four principles. Those newspapers which have accepted the three political principles therefore have to continue adjusting their editorial policy according to policy changes made by the other side. Moreover, it is likely that these papers will be obliged to exercise self-restraint in their reporting on China, by attempting to read the mind of the other side. A good example is the control of information regarding the Lin Piao affair voluntarily imposed by the Japanese press, including such leading papers as *Asahi*, *Yomiuri*, and this time even *Mainichi*, with *Sankei* the sole exception. The acceptance of the political principles will result in supporting allegations of the revival of Japanese militarism; it will also produce a flood of articles which idealize or mysticize China.

Editorial policies which must conform to these conditions of eulogizing China and excluding news about Taiwan will destroy the balanced analysis of international politics by the press; information and comment on both Japan-China relations and Japanese diplomacy

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will be distorted, and in a subtle way the newspapers and television stations may take part in Chinese political propaganda efforts directed at Japan.

Freedom of the press is indivisible. If even the slightest infringement is permitted, the whole of this freedom is imperilled. This being the case, if the Japanese press once abandons the principle of freedom of information about mainland China, whose influence has been felt more and more in international as well as domestic politics, can it possibly meet the people's demand for fair, impartial information?

* * *

AFTER the publication of the above report in the April 1972 issue of the magazine *Keizai Orai*, LDP Diet member Tagawa published, about 21 April, a pamphlet entitled 'Truth cannot be Distorted—My Rebuttal of the Slanders on the Exchange of Correspondents', apparently intended to discredit the former. However, his rebuttal has paradoxically resulted in confirming the central points of my report by acknowledging:

(1) the existence of a secret agreement signed in March 1968;
(2) the existence of the political conditions imposed on the exchange of journalists;
(3) the fact that the number of journalists to be exchanged has been reduced from nine to five;
(4) the fact that a secret meeting was held at the Imperial Hotel in October 1970.

Furthermore, in an interview with Sam Jameson, Tokyo correspondent of the *Los Angeles Times*, Tagawa confirmed that the secret agreement of 1968 included not only a clause limiting the number of journalists, but also a political clause which reads as follows:

> Both sides (Japan and China) agree that the newsmen's exchange shall be carried out in the spirit of the discussions which led to the signing of the memorandum trade communiqué on 6 March 1968, and should be conducted in such a manner as to promote mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of the the two nations.

Based on this clarification, my original assumption that there might have been two secret understandings seems to have been incorrect. Tagawa's comment indicates that there is only one secret written agreement. Tagawa also confirmed in the same interview

(1) that he and Yoshimi Furui argued for four days with Chinese authorities in March 1968, and finally persuaded the Chinese to fix the limit on the number of Japanese correspondents at five;

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(2) that he had acted as an intermediary, not as a negotiator, in the 1968 arrangement [author's note: 'intermediary', but between whom?];
(3) that he took the initiative to convince the Chinese to keep the arrangement secret;
(4) that 'the individual correspondent is not the problem. It is the policy of the news company itself which is the relevant standard'.

Thus, the main objective which Tagawa has been trying to achieve in his rebuttal of my report seems to be not the denial of the existence of the political conditions, but the attempt to persuade the public that it was not he and Furui who took the initiative in introducing them in the exchange of journalists. Tagawa told Jameson that 'This [the political clause included in the secret agreement] was merely a reconfirmation [in writing] of what had already been understood. The three political principles were in existence from the beginning.'

Kenji Kawamura, foreign editor of the newspaper *Asahi*, and Akira Arai, managing editor of the newspaper *Nihon Keizai*, supported this interpretation of Tagawa, saying to Jameson that the political principles had been accepted tacitly—although not in writing—from the beginning in 1964. But Susumu Ejiri, secretary general of the JNPEA, categorically denied these allegations, saying to the American newsman that 'There were no political principles in the original agreement', although he, too, acknowledged that the JNPEA learned of the secret agreement by chance in 1970. Other newspapers such as *Mainichi* and *Sankei*, and most Japanese correspondents staying in Peking during the period of the cultural revolution, were also unaware that such political principles had been imposed upon them before 1968.

With these clarifications made, my friends and I have openly requested:

(1) that Furui and Tagawa should publish the whole text of the secret agreement of 1968;
(2) that the newspapers concerned should print statements setting out their positions on this issue;
(3) that the JNPEA should convene a special Council of Directors or a general assembly to look into the present state of the exchange of journalists and settle the issue finally and publicly.

Up to this moment, however, there has been no reaction whatsoever from any of the parties concerned.

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Japan's Economy and Foreign Policy

Saburo Okita*

I. Introduction

Japan's economic growth in the 1970s may decelerate somewhat compared to the 1960s. However, there are still many factors which are likely to support rates of growth comparatively higher than those of other industrialized countries. Japan's most probable average rate of gross national product growth in real terms during the 1970s is still likely to be around 9 per cent.

According to a recent study made by the Japan Economic Research Center (JERC) projecting both the Japanese economy and the world economy to 1980, the per capita gross national product of Japan is likely to reach US $8,000 and about equal that of the United States for that year. This will mean that the living standard of the Japanese will have attained one of the highest levels in the world. Further, there is the likelihood of change in many aspects of the domestic economy which will influence the future course of Japanese society and its relationship to the world.

The total output of the economy measured as GNP is projected to be in the vicinity of one trillion US dollars, or about half that of America, in 1980. (See Tables 1, 2 and 3.) This will account for around 12 per cent of the total output of the world economy including communist countries. This implies that the impact of Japan's economic output on the outside world will be felt even more strongly in 1980 than it is at present.

II. Changes in Domestic Economic and Social Conditions

One major change likely to take place in the decade is the urbanization of the population. By 1980, nearly 80 per cent of the total population will live in urban areas. The agricultural labour force will decline from the 18 per cent of 1970 to about 11 per cent in 1980. Because of its geographical characteristics, and due to further progress in the construction of highway and rapid transit railway networks, the country as a whole will come to resemble an urban state. The rapidity and frequency of communications between the various regions of the country, the gradual extension of urban areas into formerly rural areas, the spread of industries and especially heavy industries into areas somewhat distant from big cities—these and other developments will make the national way of living and thinking increasingly urban.

* Based on a paper read at a conference held in March 1972 and sponsored jointly by the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

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A second change is likely to occur in the structure of industry as a whole. As wages continue to rise, labour intensive industries will gradually diminish while there will be a relative expansion in industries based on more sophisticated technology and heavy capitalization. Greater research and development expenditures will become necessary and mechanization of production, construction and agricultural processes will become common.

Such changes in industrial structure will change the commodity pattern of exports and imports. Exports of more sophisticated manufactured products with a high technology content will expand while production of traditional exports such as textiles and other light industry products will be replaced by imports from other countries, especially Asian countries having a relatively abundant labour supply and low wage levels. With the relatively high rate of Japanese economic growth, Japan will tend in this decade to dominate world trade in natural resources.

The changes in the industrial structure of Japan will necessitate further internationalization of the Japanese economy in many ways, including more frequent contact with foreign nations and efforts towards more harmony in international relations. This may sometimes run counter to nationalistic sentiment both in politics and in culture, and the interaction between the economic necessity of further internationalization and a certain revival of nationalism is one of the important domestic issues Japan is likely to face in the course of this decade.

The third important development will be changes in the attitude of the people and their pattern of life. Already priority is being placed on the improvement of living conditions, with a move from the production and export-oriented policy of the past towards the consumption and living standard-oriented policy and ideas of the future. Already the idea of the five-day work week is widely accepted, and in a few years the five-day week will be in use by companies and government offices.

Time for leisure, and disposable income, will increase. Consumption patterns will gradually change. Combined with the higher level of education which a greater percentage of young people are attaining, these developments will cause social and cultural changes which may resemble current tendencies and problems in the United States and Europe. Social problems related to the affluent society will thus emerge in Japan in the course of this decade, and the total effect of such social changes may be a gradual slowdown in the rates of economic growth and export expansion to the level which prevails today, with some variations, among Western countries.

In this connexion, the results of a recent public opinion survey conducted by the Japan Research Centre on the attitude of youth in Japan are very interesting. Among the survey items was the way of living which the young aspire to. As indicated in Table 4, a majority of the young people polled answered that their purpose in life was to live

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comfortably and develop their individual tastes without being overly concerned about the problems of society. More than two-thirds of all replies reflected this individualistic and somewhat self-centred attitude to life.

These attitudes are very different from those held about 15 years ago as revealed in a similar public opinion survey. These changes will be felt as the older generation, born in a very poor society and educated and trained to work hard, build up the economy and increase Japan's international prestige, are gradually replaced by the younger generation who aspire to an easier life.

III. The International Environment

In spite of the monetary crisis and the rise in protectionist attitudes in several industrialized countries, the world economy and world trade as a whole will continue to expand in the course of the 1970s. There will be a basic trend towards closer communication among different parts of the world, a gradual rise in incomes and consumption all over the world and a development of the international division of labour resulting in larger trade flows. The 1960s have seen an accelerating rate of expansion of world trade, reaching over 10 per cent per annum in the last two or three years of the decade. This rate may slow down somewhat, but it may not be unrealistic to anticipate an average expansion of world trade at an annual rate of around 10 per cent in dollar terms during this decade.

As indicated in Table 1, the United States' share of world output will gradually decline from the present third to about one quarter in 1980. The West European nations will account for about another quarter. Japan may increase its share of total world GNP from 6·4 per cent in 1970 to 12·5 per cent in 1980 (or one eighth), and if it does so, Japan's share of the world economy will nearly double in the decade. The Soviet Union's share will also rise, from 13 per cent in 1970 to 15 per cent in 1980. China's growth has been relatively slow, but may speed up in the 1970s. We assume its economic output will reach about 3 per cent of the world total by 1980.

The world economy is likely to be a mixture of state controls and free competition. If major industrialized countries follow a more or less concerted line of action, and if they generally agree to maintain their policies on the basis of the competitive international market, developing in line with the comparative advantage principle, then an improved division of labour among countries will result. The pattern of the division of labour will change dynamically in accordance with particular variations in wages, productivity, inflation and so forth in different countries.

It will also be desirable to introduce a flexible exchange rate system so that when a country falls into a serious payments imbalance (deficit or surplus), adjustments can be made through exchange rates rather than by introducing direct controls on the flow of either commodities or

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capital. A recent meeting of economists from North America, Europe and Japan, convened at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., produced a report, entitled the 'Tripartite Report on Reshaping the International Economic Order', recommending such a set of policies. It was recognized that reversion to protectionism and the introduction of strict controls and protectionist policies in the trade system would be an international disaster.

On the other hand, there will remain the so-called 'industry-specific' problems. Because of relative changes in wages, productivity and other factors, the comparative advantage of a country's economy will gradually change. The structure and pattern of industrial output and foreign trade will change accordingly. Some industries will suffer from foreign competition, but the basic principle should be to introduce adjustment policies so as gradually to reduce the importance of those sectors which are losing their comparative advantage and shift their labour force and capital to other industries in which the country enjoys a comparative advantage in international trade.

Of course politically this process of adjustment is not without pain. But, in the long run, if countries do not follow such measures, there will be less opportunity for expansion of world trade. This will be especially true for the export growth of low-income countries which should increasingly enjoy a comparative advantage in labour-intensive products.

ALTHOUGH world trade and the world economy as a whole are likely to continue to expand during the 1970s, the less developed countries are likely to progress more slowly than the more advanced ones, especially in terms of per capita GNP. This is a continuation of the trend in the preceding decade. In general, trade in manufactured goods expands much faster than the trade in primary products on which the underdeveloped areas depend. Moreover, the rate of population increase during the 1970s is likely to be around 2·9 per cent per annum in the less developed areas of the world against 1·2 per cent in highly developed areas. Per capita growth tends to be slower in the less developed countries than in highly developed ones.

In the long run, the situation may alter depending on changes in the demand for material goods by people in high income countries. In addition, on the production side, labour costs will be rising, there will be pressures to maintain full employment, and in many lines of industrial production, especially in labour-intensive products, high income countries may gradually lose their advantage in relation to developing ones.

Complementing this in the developing countries will be an increasingly strong demand for material output such as food, clothing, shelter, and products such as transistor radios. Further, the marginal social utility of an increased supply of physical products is much higher in poor than in rich countries. If poor countries' labour forces are

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adequately educated and trained, they will contribute more to industrial production.

Such a process may eventually result in an accelerated growth of physical output in both industry and agriculture in underdeveloped countries and a gradual reduction of the income gap between rich and poor countries. However, this is a rather long-term outlook. For this decade, the income gap between the richer and poorer countries is still likely to grow.

One of the measures to cope with this situation is substantially to increase the transfer of resources from rich to poor countries. The outlook seems rather bleak today in view of the political climate in the United States and some other aid-giving countries, but nobody can be sure that the present tendency will not change again in the course of the decade. Economic intercourse and communications between countries are growing ever more intense. The domestic policies of the developed and underdeveloped countries are tending towards a more equitable distribution of income. The logical consequence is that welfare policy should reach beyond national boundaries, to the concept of realizing a welfare world. Sometime in the course of the 1970s there may be a reversal of the swing of the pendulum towards a more positive approach to the increased transfer of resources from rich to poorer countries.

IV. Japan and the world

Japan's role in the world economy is thus bound to increase in the course of this decade. In the past the Japanese economy was relatively small and had little impact on the outside world in spite of a high growth rate. Now the gross national product and foreign trade of Japan have expanded to the point where they can produce major repercussions abroad, and this impact will become even greater if trade continues to expand at a high rate.

During the latter half of the 1960s, Japan's economy enjoyed an unusually rapid rate of expansion. The GNP doubled from $100 billion in 1966 to $200 billion in 1970, as did exports which increased from $10 billion to $20 billion. This extraordinary expansion was partly supported by the fact that the yen was somewhat undervalued, but after the currency realignment measures by the major countries in December 1971, the excessive advantages due to an undervaluation of the currency will disappear. Japan's export trade will expand more slowly and the rate of GNP growth will also be affected.

However, various basic social factors working against production which are more or less prevalent in many of the high income countries are not yet very strong in Japan. This is partly due to a time lag or transition effect produced by the shift from a poor to a rich society. This time lag produces relative advantages in the costs of production, in the speed of industrial expansion and in efforts to improve product quality. Such advantages will gradually diminish during the decade,

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but there are still some years to go before Japan loses the benefit of them completely.

According to the Japan Economic Research Center Projection, the export trade of Japan in 1980 will account for 10·8 per cent of the world total as compared with 6·2 per cent in the year 1970. It has been argued that such an expansion of Japan's export trade will saturate world markets and impose limits on the further expansion of exports. While there may be a growing resistance in import markets to Japanese products, these will not necessarily face very serious obstacles if Japan rapidly expands its own imports from other countries. A world share of 10·8 per cent is not as large as West Germany's present share of world export trade (12·2 per cent in 1970).

The important thing may then be to make new efforts to increase substantially Japanese imports both from industrialized and less developed countries, and especially to increase imports of manufactured goods from worldwide sources. This requires an adjustment of the internal industrial structure, which is relatively less difficult for a rapidly growing economy.

In the past, although the government and the public are not fully aware of this, structural changes in Japan's import trade have taken place at a rapid rate. For instance, imports of textile goods from other Asian countries into Japan increased from $5·8 million in 1965 to $130 million in 1970. Imports of machinery from other Asian countries increased from $2·2 million to $37 million during the same period. Raw silk was an important export item for many decades for Japan, but four years ago Japan became a net importer.

As projected in the JERC forecast, the average wage of Japanese workers will reach about 80 per cent of that of United States workers in 1980. This will make it increasingly difficult to use relatively low-wage workers to produce exports which can be competitive in outside markets. The question arises as to what extent Japan can succeed in introducing highly sophisticated industries, and expanding its own research and development effort, especially in the face of increasing competition in traditional labour-intensive manufactures from Asia and other newly industrializing countries, where labour is abundant and wages are relatively low.

It should also be noted that because of the expansion of Japanese imports, Japan is likely to become one of the largest markets in the world. The share of manufactured items in total imports will probably increase from the present 30 per cent to 50 per cent in 1980. This will mean that by 1980 Japan will import as much as US $40 billion in manufactured items from all over the world.

Manufactured exports from the newly industrializing countries in particular will find a large and expanding market in Japan. At the same time imports of raw materials will increase. More processing can be carried out in areas from which raw materials originate, thus reducing

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possible environmental problems in Japan. According to the projection of JERC, however, out of the total international trade in iron ore in 1980, about half will be imported by Japan and about 20 per cent of the total trade in petroleum will be directed to Japan.

IN connexion with the internal structural changes of the Japanese economy and its world environment, there is the possibility of a sharp increase in overseas investment by Japan. Outstanding private foreign investment as of March 1970 was $2·6 billion. Compared with the figure for investment abroad for the United States, which stood at $70 billion at the end of 1969, the figure for Japan is insignificant. But there are already indications of a sharp increase in Japanese investment overseas. During the year following March 1970, there was an increase of approximately $1 billion. According to a recent projection made by the Ministry of International Trade and Industries, Japanese investment overseas will reach $26 billion by 1980, that is, about 10 times the outstanding investment for the year 1970. The JERC forecast also estimated a similar figure of $27 billion in 1980.

However, this increasing overseas Japanese investment will still lag behind the overseas investment activities of the US, UK, and West Germany. Total overseas investment in 1980 will account for about 3 per cent of the 1980 GNP of Japan. It is estimated that the equivalent percentages will be over 10 per cent for the US and UK and about 8 per cent for Germany.

About half of Japan's total overseas investment is likely to be in the development of natural resources; about a quarter will be oriented towards labour utilization; and the remaining part will be market-oriented. The first category involves the development of natural resources required by domestic industry; even in this case there will be a sharp increase in investment in processing industries in the countries of origin. For the second type, that is, labour utilization-oriented investment, natural pressures will work to transfer technology, capital and management gradually from Japan to the newly industrializing countries, especially of Asia, in order to establish labour-intensive, export-oriented industries. This will strengthen those countries' economies by enabling them to export more manufactured products, at first to compete with similar Japanese exports in third markets and then gradually to increase their sales in the Japanese domestic market itself.

Japanese industries investing abroad will have to introduce policies which harmonize with national feeling in the developing countries. Latin American, and some Asian, countries expect of Japan that it should introduce new forms of overseas private investment acceptable to such sentiment.

It is also likely that the inflow of foreign capital into the Japanese market will greatly increase. So far, Japan has only reluctantly received foreign capital, especially in the form of direct investment. This

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climate will gradually change as Japan itself changes into a capital-exporting rather than capital-importing economy.

In the 1960s, the flow of direct private foreign investment was somewhat one-sided: the United States occupied a dominant position and its multinational enterprises invested in Europe, Japan and all over the world. It is probable that in the 1970s there will be a much larger cross-flow of direct investment, especially among the US, Europe and Japan.

In view of the changes in the structure of the national economy during this decade, the liberalization of imports on a very large scale and encouragement of the cross-flow of capital will become necessary in Japan's own interest. It will have to abandon its reluctance to open the domestic market and begin the positive promotion of freer trade in the world and a freer flow of investment among industrialized countries in particular.

It may be necessary to separate the problems of direct investment among the industrialized countries themselves from those of private investment between them and less developed ones. Important political considerations are involved. Some voices in Japanese government and business are arguing that alternative approaches should be worked out, such as: production sharing arrangements under which repayment for investment is made in the form of sales of commodities; contracts for technical assistance separated from foreign capital and participation in management; or arrangements for phasing out foreign ownership as local management improves in quality and can gradually assume greater responsibility.

IT has often been pointed out by Prime Minister Chou En-lai as well as by scholars in the US and elsewhere that with its rapidly expanding overseas investment and general foreign economic influence, Japan is bound to build up military strength to protect its overseas interests.

In Japanese eyes such views are completely unrealistic, since in the modern world military strength cannot effectively protect private assets overseas. Nobody has argued for US military action to protect overseas private assets which have been nationalized in some Latin American countries. We are living in a century when such military action is no longer viable.

To embark upon a military build-up simply in order to protect overseas private property is also rather absurd in terms of cost-benefit calculations. The best course for the government in case of nationalization or seizure of private Japanese assets abroad is to compensate Japanese investors directly in Japan rather than to spend huge amounts of money to build up military strength.

If Japan tries to build up its military strength, this will have repercussions in other countries in Asia and elsewhere, and will lead to an expansion in military strength of all the parties concerned. Japan's

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decision not to develop nuclear weapons, for example, will help prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons elsewhere in the world, and strongly supports the case for general gradual disarmament.

It has been assumed that military strength is the natural consequence of economic power, but many Japanese feel that this theory is somewhat out-moded and that Japan should try to develop a new model of a country economically powerful but without military strength. This is justifiable and should be feasible in the changed circumstances of security and defence strategy produced by nuclear weapons.

Japan can easily produce sizeable nuclear weapons. But this capacity in itself will not necessarily lead to a strong military build-up, especially in view of the results of various public opinion surveys, in particular among the youth of Japan who are in general primarily concerned with the enjoyment of a better life and are very strongly anti-militaristic.

Japan's foreign aid efforts are likely to be stepped up in the decade. The total flow of resources to the developing world from Japan has been growing rapidly and in 1970 reached US $1·8 billion and accounted for 0·93 per cent of the GNP. The share in this of official development aid is still relatively low—0·23 per cent of GNP in 1970 compared with the average of 0·34 per cent for Development Assistance Committee members of the OECD. This too should increase in view of the favourable balance of payments of Japan, the fact that it is surrounded by the developing countries of Asia and its need of closer cooperation with them in both export and import trade. Japan may not attain the target of 0·7 per cent of GNP set by the Pearson Commission report for official development assistance, but the likely level in 1975 is around 0·4 to 0·5 per cent. By 1980, the total resources flow including private investment and export credits may well exceed 1 per cent of the GNP, about half being official development assistance. If so, the total official aid flow will amount to some $6 billion per year. This is a very sizeable figure in view of the fact that the total world flow of official aid to developing countries was $7 billion in 1970.

V. Japan and Major Areas of the World

(i) South-East Asia

Though this area will maintain close economic links with Japan, its relative share of Japan's total trade is likely to decline further during the decade; Japan's share of South-East Asia's imports, on the other hand, may increase from 25 per cent in 1970 to 40 per cent in 1980. Japan's share in the total imports of the area will become so substantial that the result may be a large Japanese export surplus there and a trade imbalance. Part of this surplus can be offset by increasing Japan's investment flow and foreign aid, but special efforts will be needed to boost the export trade of South-East Asia, and in this Japanese experience will be invaluable.

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It may be undesirable to concentrate Japanese trade, investment and aid too heavily on this particular area. As the economic relationship between the US and Latin America shows, excessive dependence on a single country for economic development may produce undesirable political consequences.

Many of the South-East Asian countries are likely to face very serious unemployment problems in this decade, since their population explosion is leading to the so-called 'labour force explosion', with a consequent shortage of employment. A higher growth rate, especially if it reaches around 10 per cent per annum, as in Singapore, Taiwan, Hongkong and South Korea, will make it easier to provide employment but is not on its own sufficient for progress; direct measures to cope with the problem will be required.

China may provide a model of full employment on a very low income level. One type of economic growth is exemplified by Japan and nearby countries and the other by the People's Republic of China. A very important issue for the South and East Asian countries in choosing their course of development is whether to adopt an inward-looking policy which emphasizes the distribution of income and employment or an outward-looking course taking advantage of the international division of labour and attaining a larger export trade and higher rate of growth, but accompanied by a somewhat inequitable distribution of income. The answer need not be a simple black-or-white choice but a mixture of the two types of development. Closer economic relations with Japan will promote the economic growth and foreign trade of the South-East Asian countries, but if it does not contribute to improvements in the employment situation and income distribution, they may be attracted to alternative types of politics and development. They will be subject to two different types of external influence, one from Japan and mostly economic, the other from China and mainly political. One of the fundamental issues is how they will react to these influences.

(ii) China

Economic relations between Japan and China have been expanding in recent years despite the lack of normal diplomatic relations between them. Japan supplies about one quarter of China's imports, but China only 1 per cent of Japan's. To rectify this trade imbalance, imports from China into Japan must be increased. Apart from trade in raw materials, one possibility is substantially to increase imports of labour-intensive manufactured goods or agricultural and fishery products. But this to a certain degree runs counter to the interests of farmers and small industrialists in Japan. Because of these constraints and China's policies of self-sufficient development, trade with China, though expanding during the decade, will probably stay at about 2–3 per cent only of the Japanese total, increasing more or less in proportion with the expansion of Japanese trade as a whole.

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(iii) The Soviet Union

There is increasing talk of economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Japan, focusing in particular on the development of natural resources in Siberia. The building of pipelines from western Siberia to the Pacific coast with Japanese cooperation is one possibility. A good deal of timber and other raw materials has been exported from the USSR to Japan and the construction of a new harbour facing the Sea of Japan to facilitate expansion of trade between Siberia and Japan is also under consideration.

At one of the Japan-Soviet Union economic committee meetings, a Japanese expert recommended the improvement of the Trans-Siberian railway for use as a connecting bridge between the Far East and Europe. As trade between Europe and Japan is expanding, consisting mostly of manufactured goods, the railway could be used for container transportation. The Soviet Union has indicated interest in this idea, and although such cooperation could raise political problems with China, on purely economic grounds it would be of mutual benefit.

(iv) The United States

The United States is by far Japan's biggest trading partner, and for the US, Japan comes second only to Canada. Trade between the two countries has expanded rapidly in the past decade and while the US share in Japanese world trade has been more or less stable, accounting for about 30 per cent of both exports and imports, Japan's share in US trade has increased rapidly. This is due to the difference in growth rate of the US and Japanese economies. In 1960, Japanese imports accounted for about 7 per cent of the US total, and this increased to 15·5 per cent in 1970. According to the JERC projections, the Japanese share of US imports is likely to increase to about 23 per cent in 1980, while the US share of Japanese trade is likely to decline slightly.

Still, trade between the two countries is relatively more important for Japan than the United States in that, while in 1970 Japan's trade with the United States accounted for about 4 per cent of Japan's GNP, US trade with Japan accounted for only 0·5 per cent of US GNP. But because of the visibility and rapid expansion of Japanese exports to the US market, such as televisions, transistor radios and automobiles (while US imports into Japan are mostly soy beans, various agricultural products and some highly sophisticated technological equipment), their impact on the general public has been much greater in the US in recent years.

This has stimulated protectionist attitudes in the US market. In addition to that there was a wide trade gap between the US and Japan during 1971. Up to 1967, Japan had a surplus of imports from the US, but since then this has turned into a surplus in favour of Japan.

When Japan had a trade deficit with the United States, the government repeatedly requested an increase in US imports of Japanese

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products to balance trade between the two countries. At that time, the US repeatedly told the Japanese that trade should aim at a multilateral rather than bilateral balance. Now that the position is reversed, the US is concerned with the bilateral balance of trade between the US and Japan. This is rather irrational in that a country may have a surplus with some trading partners but a deficit with others. The important thing is that both the US and Japan attain a balance of payments not only in terms of trade but in terms of overall balance including invisibles and capital movement.

In this respect, the recent JERC projection for the year 1980 is based on a calculation of the overall balance of payments of Japan and of the US for that year. The difference in the balance of payments has been adjusted to the altered exchange rate between the dollar and the yen, but even on this assumption, the projection indicates that in bilateral trade between the US and Japan there will still be a sizeable trade surplus in favour of Japan in 1980. But most countries are likely to attain an overall balance in their international payments. With the adjustment of exchange rates with other currencies and also with the strong US tradition of free trade and free competition, the prospects for the development in US-Japan trade of a horizontal division of labour, that is, the exchange of manufactured items between the two countries without excessive restrictive measures, are rather promising.

The US has a natural advantage in the international division of labour in agricultural commodities, items involving research and development and other highly sophisticated manufactured goods. The advantage in agricultural products is due to very modern, high-productivity agriculture. In view of this, Japan will need to liberalize imports as quickly as possible, including agricultural items as well as manufactured goods from the US. If this can be achieved, there is no reason to be over-concerned about expanding trade between the two countries. Rather, it should be welcomed in the name of efficiency.

There will be the issue of the products of specific industries; some industries will suffer from competition with Japanese goods and they will naturally raise objections and complaints. But basically these problems should be resolved on the part of the US by means of adjustment policies and, on the part of Japan, by introducing trade policies to increase the general export rate and avoid too rapid and concentrated an expansion of specific commodities in specific markets, i.e. the government must on occasion place restraints on private business.

There will be opportunities for a cross-flow of direct investment between the US and Japan which will reduce Japanese fears that the economy may be dominated by US capital.

Although some problems are likely to arise in future, basically the interests of the two economies are complementary. There is no reason to discourage the further expansion of economic relations between the US and Japan.

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TABLE 1

Past Record and Future Projection of World GNP and Export Trade
Gross National Product (Measured by current US dollars, billion)/Export Trade (US billion dollars, FOB)

				Annual Average Rate of Growth (%)		Composition (%)						Annual Average Rate of Growth (%)		Composition (%)		
	1960	1970	1980[1]	1960–70	1970–80	1960	1970	1980	1960	1970	1980[1]	1960–70	1970–80	1960	1970	1980
Japan	14·9	196·2	956·9	15·9	17·2	3·2	6·4	12·5	4·1	19·3	92·2	16·9	16·9	3·2	6·2	10·8
North America	547·8	1056·5	2166·0	6·8	7·5	39·0	34·7	28·3	26·0	59·3	161·9	8·6	10·6	20·3	19·1	19·0
(USA)	511·4	976·5	1932·8	6·7	7·1	36·4	32·1	25·3	20·4	42·6	116·6	7·6	10·6	15·9	13·7	13·7
Western Europe	326·9	768·9	1923·5	8·9	9·6	23·3	25·3	25·2	51·5	138·1	369·3	10·4	10·3	40·2	44·4	43·5
(E C)	186·7	470·9	1250·9	9·7	10·3	13·3	15·5	16·4	29·7	88·5	251·5	11·5	11·0	23·2	28·4	29·6
A N S[3]	25·9	55·6	135·5	7·9	9·3	1·8	1·8	1·8	3·9	8·0	17·8	7·4	8·3	3·1	2·6	2·1
Developing Countries	165·8	323·9	700·0	6·9	8·0	11·8	10·6	9·2	27·6	54·1	123·7	6·9	8·6	21·6	17·4	14·6
(East and South Asia)	60·2	102·7	235·6	5·5	8·7	4·3	3·4	3·1	7·7	14·2	36·4	6·4	9·9	6·0	4·6	4·3
Eastern Europe[4]	231·5	562·8	1530·6	9·3	10·5	16·5	18·5	20·0	13·0	30·6	79·9	9·0	10·1	10·1	9·8	9·4
(USSR)	159·5	405·9	1155·4	9·8	11·0	11·4	13·3	15·1	5·6	12·8	40·0	8·7	12·1	4·3	4·1	4·7
China	60·3	79·8	230·1	2·8	11·2	4·3	2·6	3·0	1·9	2·1	5·6	1·3	10·2	1·5	0·7	0·5
World Total	1404·6	3048·9	7642·6 (7255·4)[2]	8·1	9·6 (9·1)[2]	100·0	100·0	100·0	128·1	311·3	850·0	9·3	10·6	100·0	100·0	100·0

Note: [1] Measured by the dollar after exchange rate adjustments up to 1980.
[2] Figures based on the dollar exchange rate as of 9 May 1971.
[3] Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.
[4] Net Material Product (NMP)

For 1960 and 1970: IMF, International Financial Statistics, UN Year Book of National Accounts (for Eastern Europe) and UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.
For China (1970): Estimate by the China Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.
For 1980: Japan Economic Research Center, January 1972.

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TABLE 2

Past Record and Future Projection of Japan's Foreign Trade by Major Areas

	Pattern of Exports by Area (%)			Japan's Share in the Total Imports of the partner (%)			Pattern of Imports by Area (%)		
	1960	1970	1980	1960	1970	1980	1960	1970	1980
World Total	100·0	100·0	100·0	3·2	6·2	10·8	100·0	100·0	100·0
North America	30·4	34·1	32·4	6·1	12·8	18·7	42·7	34·5	31·4
(USA)	(27·1)	(31·2)	(29·0)	(7·2)	(15·5)	(23·2)	(35·4)	(29·4)	(27·8)
Western Europe	11·7	15·1	19·2	0·9	2·0	4·7	9·3	10·9	15·5
(E C)	(4·3)	(6·7)	(9·9)	(0·6)	(1·5)	(3·8)	(5·4)	(6·3)	(9·0)
A N S	5·6	5·5	5·6	5·0	12·1	28·0	9·6	10·4	9·5
Developing Countries	50·5	39·9	34·2	7·4	14·0	25·0	35·5	38·9	33·8
(East and South Asia)	(32·3)	(25·2)	(20·7)	(13·7)	(25·9)	(40·5)	(19·6)	(15·1)	(13·6)
Planned economics	1·8	5·4	8·6	0·5	3·4	9·3	2·8	4·9	9·7
(USSR)	(1·5)	(1·8)	(4·5)	(1·1)	(3·1)	(10·0)	(0·7)	(1·8)	(6·0)
(China)	(0·07)	(3·0)	(2·5)	(0·1)	(28·3)	(40·4)	(0·2)	(1·0)	(2·1)

Source: Same as table 1.

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(v) Western Europe

Compared with the United States, Europe buys a small amount of Japanese products. While total imports of EEC and EFTA countries in 1970 were nearly four times those of the US, Japan's share of them was only 2 per cent. There is much greater scope for expanding trade in manufactures between Europe and Japan.

Should the European Economic Community, especially after four EFTA countries join it, develop an inward-looking attitude, this will be a serious obstacle to global trade and detrimental to third countries. The 'Tripartite Report' already referred to recommended that 'tariffs and quotas on manufactured goods and raw materials should be eliminated

Table 3. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (JAPAN)

(Million US Dollars)

	1961	1965	1970	1980
(1) Trade Balance	* 558	1,901	3,963	16,674
Exports f.o.b.	*4,149	8,332	18,969	92,184
Imports f.o.b.	*4,707	*6,431	*15,006	*75,510
(2) Invisible Trade Balance	* 383	* 884	* 1,735	* 5,965
Receipts	1,016	1,563	4,009	22,766
Payments	*1,399	*2,447	* 5,794	*28,731
(3) Transfers	* 41	* 85	* 208	* 2,738
Receipts	72	63	98	110
Payments	* 113	* 148	* 306	* 2,848
(4) Current Balance	* 982	932	1,970	7,971
(5) Long Term Capital	* 11	* 415	* 1,591	* 7,971
Assets	* 312	* 446	* 2,031	*14,704
Liabilities	301	31	440	6,733
(Direct Investments)	(* 94)	(* 77)	(* 355)	(*4,500)
(6) Basic Balance	* 993	517	379	0
(7) Overall Balance	* 952	405	1,374	0
(8) Foreign Exchange Reserves	1,666	2,152	4,839	

Source: For 1960 and 1970: UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
IMF—International Financial Statistics
For 1980: Japan Economic Research Center, January 1972.

* indicates (−) (deficit balance).

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in stages over a 10-year period' between Europe, the US, Canada and Japan. Such a policy, if achieved, would be very encouraging for the future of world trade.

Table 4. Attitudes of Young People in Japan

Reasons for the selection of jobs	1971	1956
Because the salary is high	5·9	1·2
Because inherited from parents	0·8	0·4
Because suited to his or her ability or liking	64·4	39·6
Because of the possibility of future growth and high security	17·2	52·5
Because needed by society	4·0	5·6
Because of the social prestige	0·4	0·5
No particular preference	6·7	0·2
No answer	0·6	0·0

Source: Wakamono Ishiki Chosa (Analysis of the Psychology of Youth in Japan), January 1972; by the Japan Research Center, Tokyo.

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The 'Japanese Dilemma'

Willard Barber

THE glare of publicity focused on President Nixon's journeys to Peking and to Moscow overshadowed one of the basic realities of power politics in the Pacific. That reality was the role of Japan. Indeed, Japan was not only overshadowed, but suffered two body blows to its position as an ally of the United States. It was surprised and chagrined at the unexpected announcement of the visit to China, and the change in American economic policy announced on 15 August 1971, providing for surtaxes on imports and the anticipation of a changed value for the dollar. The amenities of protocol observed in Alaska when there was a brief meeting between Emperor Hirohito and President Nixon; the explanations given to Japanese officials by the US Assistant Secretary of State after the conversations between Nixon and Chou En-lai; and the attendance of Vice-President Spiro Agnew at the ceremonies on 15 May 1972, celebrating the return to Japanese jurisdiction of Okinawa, hardly served to make amends. Frequently, as in Nixon's address on 6 July 1971 at Kansas City, Missouri ('We see five great economic superpowers: the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, Mainland China, and, of course, Japan'), and in messages to the Congress in 1972, high officials in Washington reiterated in one form or another the important status of Japan. 'At the global level, peace will depend, for the foreseeable future, principally on relationships among the United States, Western Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. That is why we are making strenuous efforts both to strengthen cooperation with our friends, Western Europe and Japan, and to improve relations with those with whom we have fundamental differences, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China'.[1]

At the conclusion of the mini-summit in California in January 1972, the joint statement of former Prime Minister Sato of Japan and President Nixon asserted that 'They recognized that the maintenance of cooperative relations between Japan and the United States is an indispensable factor for peace and stability in Asia, and accordingly they confirmed that the two governments would continue to consult closely on their respective Asian policies'.[2] That the sensitivities of an ally were not entirely mollified was revealed in a subsequent press conference by the former Prime Minister's hint that it might be feasible to establish a 'hot line' between Washington and Tokyo as a means of ensuring timely communications. What gave rise to this publicly repeated emphasis on Japan's big power role?

[1] Secretary of State Rogers' remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 8 March 1972, in Department of State Press Release No. 57 of that date.

[2] The Joint Statement, issued on 7 January 1972, at San Clemente, California, appears in the *State Department Bulletin* (31 January 1972), p. 118.

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A well-reasoned exposition of the factors involved in this situation is now at hand: John K. Emmerson's *Arms, Yen and Power. The Japanese Dilemma.*[3] The product of 30 years of experience with the society, character, language and politics of Japan, Emmerson's volume is timely, utterly relevant to the international politics of 1972, and yields valuable insights into the elements that form the horns of 'The Japanese Dilemma'.

PHOENIX-LIKE, Japan has risen from the fire-bombing of its cities in the second world war, climaxed by the atomic destruction of Hiroshima, to the position of third place among the nations of the world in terms of gross national product, exceeded only by the USA and the USSR. The volume of its textile exports was such as to arouse fears in the United States, and restrictive legislation was urged by some members of Congress before Japan agreed to a limitation of its exports of cotton goods to the US. What may turn out to be more important are exports of automobiles: a quarter of a million Japanese cars were sold in the US in 1969, compared to 4,000 American vehicles imported into Japan. This represented a ten-fold increase within a span of four years. Heavy presses for truck bodies are exported to a Ford factory in Argentina, and to a General Motors subsidiary in West Germany. Trade with the Soviets and with China has doubled in the past five years; Japanese investments proliferate in Latin America; banks have been opened in London; several hundred Japanese businessmen carry on their activities in Dusseldorf. Of some Australian mineral exports, more than 80 per cent go to Japan.[4] After Canada, Japan is the second trading partner of the US, and for each of the Asian countries, Japan is either the first or the second ranking trader. Its tanker and shipbuilding yards are humming while Britain's Clydeside is all but silent. Its favourable trade balances and commercial aggressiveness are considered by some Asians as a reappearance of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, advanced by military measures in the 1930s and 1940s and hence of ill repute. Emmerson observes that the Japanese do not wish to 'revive the tattered and tainted' concept of the 'Sphere'; but in some quarters fears persist that the game, if not the name, will return.

A concurrence of several factors has contributed to the phenomenal increase in Japan's commercial successes in the past two decades. Among those elements are: a public that is 99 per cent literate; racial homogeneity; a national habit of savings; the existence of a widespread 'personal achievement ethic'; the quick adoption of new technologies; and a continuing effective togetherness of business and government circles. But external factors have also been at work: a no-reparations-for-war-expenditures policy by the victors in 1945; massive

[3] Published in New York, by Dunellen Publishers, 1971. A paperback edition, in English, is published by C. E. Tuttle Co., Tokyo, 1972.

[4] See *Australian Diplomacy and Japan, 1945–1951* by R. N. Rosencrance (Melbourne University Press, 1970).

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rehabilitation assistance by the United States; and the protection of national security against both subversion and outside aggression provided by American naval, air, and land forces at bases in Japan, and by the nuclear umbrella.

The strong loyalty of employees to their corporate employers is made clear by Emmerson; it is also emphasised by T. F. M. Adams, who quotes the verse of a company song, rendered in chorus every day by all employees, including company executives, when commencing their day's work.[5] The song is for the Matsushita Electrical Company, one of the two Japanese companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange. (Sony Corporation is the other one.)

> For the building of a new Japan,
> Let's put our strength and mind together,
> Doing our best to promote production,
> Sending our goods to the people of the world,
> Endlessly and continuously,
> Like water gushing from a fountain.
> Grow, industry, Grow, Grow, Grow!
> Harmony and sincerity!
> Matsushita Electric!

The projections for future growth show Japan at the top of the list for gross national product in the year 2020.[6] A sobering statistic is that in *per capita production* it is shown to be in 20th place among the nations of the world.[7]

Among the additional reasons for the economic upsurge, less susceptible to numerical analysis, is the practice of re-hiring employees who pass the compulsory retirement age of 55. Similarly, the positive effect on Japan's export trade of the expenditure for goods and services during the Korean and Vietnam wars made by the American government has been substantial. Occupation expenditures for and by the American military forces on duty at the 120 installations scattered around the country have been at the rate of $400,000,000 per annum. The close collaboration of government with business has resulted in economic planning and intervention in the *national* rather than private interest. Financial institutions have been shored up, bankruptcies avoided, and uneconomic activities terminated by government action. Many international trading operations conducted by Japanese companies have been on a large scale, with advantageous prices and delivery schedules. Nonetheless, sales resistance has been encountered recently, recessions

[5] *The World of Japanese Business* by T. F. M. Adams and N. Kobayashi (Tokyo and Palo Alto, California: Kodansha International Ltd., 1969), p. 92. The first section of the book, 'Through Western Eyes', was written by Mr Adams. A number of statistical tables and charts in this volume contain valuable data on population trends, foreign investments, and production of different industries. Machinery is by far the largest in terms of yen, followed by food products, synthetic fibres, iron and steel, chemicals, and other industrial products: Table 8, p. 307.

[6] Ibid. Table 5, p. 305.

[7] Ibid. p. 284.

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abroad have dried up some markets, and the premium level attained by the yen has attracted both private and governmental counter-actions in other countries. As a consequence, Japan's annual growth rate, previously an astonishing average of 10 per cent, has declined somewhat in 1970 and 1971. Growth continues, but not at a 'boom' rate.

Underlying several of the practices and factors mentioned above is the characteristic reputation of the individual Japanese for hard work, sobriety and responsibility. Many workers belong to trade unions, but long and destructive strikes are rare. When they do occur, loss and inconvenience to the community are minimized, as in the case of a railroad workers' strike, which was conducted between the hours of 1 a.m. and 6 a.m. so as not to disrupt the normal activities of others not directly involved. If production is the key to economic well-being, the individual Japanese's lifetime as an indefatigable worker, and his seeking of further employment after compulsory retirement, are undeniable contributions to the nation's prosperity. Personal frugality, multiplied by a hundred million souls, over a period of a quarter of a century, produced results which are reflected in the gross national product data.

But there has been a reluctance to admit some of the costs that are borne by the Japanese people in attaining the 'economic miracle'. Social welfare, or community development, is the name ordinarily ascribed to these hidden costs, or, to put it more accurately, the shortages, lacks, and delays in supplying what are to most Western countries the amenities of life. Comfortable housing, adequate sanitation and health facilities, less restricted access to higher education, and immediate attention to environmental defects, are amongst the more pressing of these needs. Former Prime Minister Sato summarized previous priorities as compared with future ones when he said: 'Up to now we have had as our primary objectives, first, rehabilitation from the war, and second, the expansion of trade. We have concentrated solely on those objectives. But the future does not lie in expanding trade. It lies in expanding welfare by improving housing and sewerage and taking better care of the environment.' In spite of this statement there is room for doubt as to whether it will be possible to implement a specific programme along these lines.

WHAT are the factors which make the Japan-United States relationship pivotal in the Pacific? During the lifetime of most Americans, all the wars in which their country has been engaged have been in the Pacific: against Japan after the attack on Pearl Harbour, in Korea, and in Vietnam. (The European aspects of the second world war do not grip American memories with the intensity of Pearl Harbour, the death march from Corregidor, the planting of the flag at Iwo Jima, and the surrender on board the USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay.) Statehood for Alaska and Hawaii, and the facility of jet air transportation have served to minimize the geographic distance. American preoccupation with foreign aid

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and the future of less developed Asian countries has directed attention to the Japanese economic miracle. 'Japan has shown that it is possible to build a strong industry with few natural resources and a prosperous agriculture with a very small amount of land. . . . Japan has demonstrated that poverty is not a necessity in Asia and that economic progress does not require a totalitarian system.'[8] To many in the United States, the Japanese experience is but the natural consequence of the democratic political system, the post-war rehabilitation gifts and loans, and the protection of the nuclear umbrella, all contributed by America.

Furthermore, recent developments have confirmed Japanese confidence. Early in 1972, in a public statement immediately after the mini-summit meeting with President Nixon, former Prime Minister Sato voiced the expectation that Japan would purchase oil from the newly found sources on the Alaskan slope. In February Governor McCall of Oregon headed a trade mission to Tokyo to improve marketing opportunities for Oregon's agricultural and forest exports. In April, 11 American State Governors made an extensive tour of Japanese cities. In the proposal of Secretary of the Treasury Connally for congressional action to change the value of the dollar, an entire section was devoted to aspects of the favourable trade and investment arrangements just concluded with the Japanese government.[9] News reports record new Japanese-American commercial ventures in automotive, textile, banking, electronic and other fields. Full page advertisements in American newspapers and magazines extol Japanese goods and services.

Over-confidence or aggressive sales campaigns by Japanese exporters have met with investigations by the US Federal Tariff Commission into allegations of dumping. A congressional subcommittee on foreign economic policy reported that 'Important segments of US industry and labour, including normally trade-oriented groups, increasingly hold the view that Japanese industry enjoys special and unfair advantages in world markets . . . the enjoyment of a large internal market that is to a considerable degree closed to the trade and investment of other countries . . . there is the developing suspicion that the structure of Japanese industry and its close integration with government provides a special advantage in export trade—the popular expression is "Japan Incorporated"'.[10] Beginning on 1 May 1972, at the recommendation

[8] *Japan: Industrial Power of Asia* by Robert B. Hall, Jr. (Princeton, New Jersey and London: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1963), p. 122.

[9] Treasury Department press release of 9 February 1972, containing texts of identical letters from Secretary Connally to the Senate and House of Representatives. The attached background materials, especially part II, pages 3–5, are particularly relevant. Investment, exchange regulations and tariff concessions are topics covered in correspondence between American and Japanese officials, found in the *State Department Bulletin* (3 April 1972), pp. 512–15.

[10] 'New Realities and New Directions in United States Foreign Economic Policy', a report by a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 28 February 1972 (US Government Printing Office), p. 10. See also 'United States Foreign Economic Policy towards Japan', hearings before the same subcommittee, 2, 3, 4 and 8 November 1971.

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of the Tariff Commission, customs duties on ceramic earthenware and related items imported from Japan were doubled by order of the White House. The president of the Export-Import Bank of Washington (a governmental institution) announced upon his return from a trip to Japan that the government in Tokyo were supporting a programme whereby banks and trading organizations would represent United States companies in sales to other countries where medium and small American firms are without representation.

While these and related developments in other countries make a return to the 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' of earlier decades improbable, some of the developing trade patterns are ironically reminiscent of the old European mercantilist system, which was based on accumulation of cash from favourable trade balances, government-sponsored industrialization, the creation of large trading companies, local monopoly of the home market, the export of processed goods, and the importation of raw materials. Japan's present relationship with other countries includes, somewhat incongruously, *some* of these mercantilist practices. Coal, cotton and lumber are exported from the United States to Japan. Australians protest that their country is a 'quarry' (of coal, iron, and copper ores) for Japan; a newspaper editor in Ottawa writes that 'Japan is a huge market for Canadian foodstuffs, minerals, and forest products'. In return, Japan exports heavy machinery, chemicals, automobiles (40 per cent of all cars in British Columbia are of Japanese make; a quarter of a million vehicles enter the United States from Japan in a year), television sets, transistors, electronic products, and canned whale meat for American cats and dogs!!

OVER the last 25 years Japan has been highly successful in rehabilitating its cities and economy from the disaster of military destruction and defeat; maintaining an ascetic home life while reaching the international heights in foreign trade and investments; and devoting less than one per cent of its gross national product to military expenditures. 'The Japanese Dilemma' is clear-cut: can it, and will it continue on this path? Or in view of new realities, and to assure its future, must Japan re-arm, and if so, at what rate, and by what means?

Using 1969 as a year for comparison: Japan expended 0·84 per cent of its GNP on arms expenditure, while the corresponding figures for other countries are: West Germany, 3·5 per cent; France, 4·4 per cent; Great Britain, 5·1 per cent; USSR, 8·5 per cent; USA, 8·6 per cent; and China, 9·0 per cent.[11] While the continuation for a generation of this lean diet for military purposes produced undeniable advantages, fully utilized by Japan in its economic build-up, the consequences are even more spectacular in that this country of more than a hundred million population has held its self defence forces to a total of 235,000 or less. There are many reasons for this. The reaction against the

[11] Emmerson, op. cit. p. 139.

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military ethos of society and government that ended in the disastrous war of 1940–45 was exceedingly strong. In organized groups since 1945, pacifists, youth movements, religious sects, and left-of-centre political parties have oriented the country to an anti-atom-bomb, anti-imperialist, and anti-military consensus.

External forces also came into play. One of these was the strong American influence exerted on the drafting of the new constitution during the post-war occupation of Japan. In Article 9 of that document appears the insurance which General MacArthur (then the occupation commander) felt was necessary against a repetition of armed aggression. It read as follows:

> Chapter II. *Renunciation of War.*
> Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes.
>
> In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Another significant external factor involved in Japan's post-war international policy is the United States-Japan Security Treaty. Adopted in 1951, the treaty was modified in 1960, and by the year 1970 was subject to renunciation by either party, on one year's notification. In essence, the effect of the treaty is to guarantee the security of Japan through nuclear forces. The treaty involves no Japanese obligation to come to the defence of the United States. Bases are authorized, on Japanese soil, for the use of the American military. From time to time, and certainly when triggered by accidents or crimes involving American personnel, complaints against the more than 120 base facilities are registered. Something of an uproar arose in Japan as the 1970 date arrived and passed, without change in the treaty relationship. Both governments, however, seem to be satisfied with the treaty's provisions as they now stand, and there have been no recent indications of the intention of either government to invoke the one year escape clause. It is obvious that the presence of the US military (and the expenditures of approximately $500,000,000 per year) has removed any fear by the Japanese public of communist aggression, and at the same time has made large military expenditures by the host government unnecessary.

However, a new external factor of transcendental importance in its effect upon Japan's security has emerged: the implementation of the Nixon doctrine for a lowered profile in the Pacific and in Asia, which has already involved the reduction of American forces in Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, and, of course, Vietnam; the return to Japanese jurisdiction of Okinawa on 15 May 1972 marked yet another stage. It is inevitable that this trend will reach the home islands of Japan, where the erosion in size and number of American installa-

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tions may throw a different light on the issue of re-armament. Will the reverberations of Chinese atomic experiments and the continued Russian presence in areas surrounding the island of Hokkaido produce a reversal of public opinion, and of government policy? Eventually, perhaps, yes.

The 12th meeting of the Joint Security Consultative Committee in December 1970, however, agreed upon a number of 'realignments' of American forces in Japan, a euphemism for a significant reduction in the use of naval and air base facilities.[12] The naval forces of island Japan boast of a total tonnage of 133,000, and the number of military personnel in all services is small; it follows, therefore, that its defence capability turns on nuclear armaments. Japan has atomic technology, having successfully developed nuclear power reactors, but does not, as yet, have atomic weapons. Emmerson sees 'going nuclear' as a fateful decision; he doubts that such a decision will be taken in this decade. If at a later date Japan should develop a nuclear strike force, this might be viewed as a provocative move by either China or Russia, and might tend to diminish the willingness of the US to come to Japan's aid. The fateful decision is still ahead, inasmuch as the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been signed, *but not ratified.* In view of the costs—presumably including a political struggle over amending the constitution—of rearming, it may be somewhat inconsistent for the Japanese public to be as eager as they are to obtain a diminution of American military power in Japan and even a severance of their country from reliance upon it.

There is no doubt that Japan does not intend to play the role of 'policeman of Asia', but in view of its dependence on long lines of supply (oil from the Middle East) and near-total dependence on raw material imports to run its industry, can it retain its economic prominence without military support? It remembers well the aggressions against Goa, Tibet, Korea, Vietnam, and Pakistan, endemic in Asia. Emmerson, in his final chapter 'Japan's role in the 1970s', leans towards the opinion that the resolution of 'The Japanese Dilemma' will be an increase in foreign trade combined with an improved standard of living, and not the diversion of substantial proportions of national resources to military arms. Or, as he says, 'Japan in the 1970s has the rare opportunity to demonstrate to the world that in spite of Mao Tse-tung's dictum, power does not necessarily come out of the barrel of a gun; that a great power does not have to be a great military power'.

[12] 'United States and Japan Discuss Realignment of US Forces and Facilities' in *State Department Bulletin* (18 January 1971), pp. 77–79.

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After the *Shokku*

G. F. Hudson

ZBIGNIEW Brzezinski, the author of *The Fragile Blossom* *, is Professor of Government and Director of the Research Institute of Communist Affairs at Columbia University. Last year he spent six months in Japan in order to 'explore the likely role that country may play in international affairs in the coming years'. Since a person of his academic standing is expected in America to offer formal advice to the nation and government on foreign policy, the book concludes with 'recommendations' on the question of what Americans should do about Japan; whether or not his advice be considered sound, the main part of the book does indeed show that Japan can no longer be taken for granted in American policy, as it has been for the last quarter of a century, and that some advice on the problems of dealing with Japan as a new emergent force is badly needed.

Professor Brzezinski left Japan 'with a feeling that serious strains are developing within Japanese society and that they will be reflected both in Japanese politics and economics'. He sees the post-war period in Japan as 'ending abruptly in August 1971, when President Nixon's initiatives towards China and in the monetary-economic field ushered in a new era in American-Japanese relations'. That time was indeed a turning-point in which the American government almost simultaneously announced the Presidential visit to Peking, about which Japan had not been consulted (though the Japanese government, at the cost of a growing domestic unpopularity, had previously conformed closely to the American policy of opposition to Peking), and sought a way out of the dollar crisis by means of an import surcharge aimed primarily at Japanese goods. This was what has come to be known in Japan as the *shokku*, 'shock' being one of the English words recently adopted into the Japanese language. It came at a time when developments within Japan were beginning to break up the broad consensus which in spite of much noisy conflict and deep ideological differences in party politics had held Japan together and inspired its astonishing economic success since the year when unconditional surrender had ended the Pacific war and an age of military power and territorial expansion.

This period of 26 years had two main characteristics: an almost obsessive concentration on economic growth—beginning with recovery from the ruin which the war had brought to Japan and going on to an expansion which made Japan the third industrial power of the world—and a close strategic and political alignment with the United States, involuntary at first during the American military occupation of Japan, but voluntary after 1952 as far as the governing Liberal Democratic Party was concerned. The goal of economic recovery and growth and the success in achieving it had a wonderfully stimulating, and at the same time stabilizing, effect in Japan during these years; it absorbed the energies and skills of a nation which had gone down in military

* Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change in Japan* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

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defeat, consoled it for the disasters of a lost war, created a new sense of national pride and self-confidence and by providing full employment and a widely diffused rise in standards of living averted any serious revolutionary unrest. It kept in power a party which made it its primary objective to promote such economic growth through a system of free private enterprise and could point to the annual increases of gross national product as justification for its stewardship. The alignment with the United States was accepted as a corollary of the concentration on economic growth. At the outset American economic aid was essential to Japanese recovery and after the Japanese economy was again on its feet the United States provided its most important export market; at the same time the Security Pact provided Japan with a powerful strategic protection without the need to spend more than a minimum of the national budget—still less than one per cent of GNP—on defence. The alliance with the ex-enemy was prudent and profitable and even emotionally it was generally acceptable, for there was a general repudiation of the pre-war ideas and policies which had led to disaster, and admiration for the United States as the world's model for economic technology and productivity. The socialist and communist Left, having taken over the anti-Americanism of the war years under the new banner of anti-imperialism, kept up a persistent attack on the American alliance, and was able by street rioting to force the cancellation of President Eisenhower's intended visit to Japan in 1960, but it could not change government policy or prevent the renewal of the Security Pact after its initial term expired.

TODAY, however, the picture is no longer the same as it was at the end of the sixties. More than half of the population of Japan has been born since 1945 and does not share the experience of the older generation which remembers the war and the early post-war years. Younger Japanese take an advanced technology and a high rate of economic growth for granted; they are more and more concerned about the social costs of rapid economic growth in the massive pollution of the environment and the shortages of housing, sanitation and public services in the ever-expanding urban areas. The GNP is no longer the god that it was; there is a new climate of doubt and confusion over goals and priorities, and with it a new disenchantment with the American capitalist-democratic model in which the generation of the post-war reconstruction found its inspiration. Not only has the American performance fallen short of what was expected; the Americans themselves have in the last few years indulged in a degree of national self-denigration without parallel, and it has become increasingly difficult to respect, much less to admire, a country subject to so much vilification by its own citizens. In Japan today the decline of faith in economic growth as a supreme and all-absorbing purpose and of admiration for America as the ideal for imitation has led to what Brzezinski describes as 'a mounting cultural uncertainty, a kind of identity crisis postponed or sublimated during the recovery phase'.

In terms of foreign policy the new mood is adverse to the close Japanese-American ties which have existed since the end of the Pacific war. The special relationship is, as Brzezinski says, 'increasingly unacceptable psychologically and questioned also on pragmatic grounds'.

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The shift, however, should not be exaggerated. In a recent public opinion poll mentioned by the author, those canvassed were asked with what foreign nation they thought Japan should strive to be most friendly in the future; 42 per cent were in favour of the United States as first friend, 21 per cent of China and 3 per cent of the Soviet Union. The poll suggests that the American connexion still has strong popular support in Japan, but the size of the vote for China indicates the increasing attraction which the new empire of Peking has for many Japanese, who on the Left are influenced by ideological sympathies for Maoism and on the Right by a sense of traditional cultural affinities. No less significant is the very small vote for the Soviet Union; it fairly indicates what Brzezinski describes as the 'dislike and distrust' which is the normal Japanese attitude towards the Russians.

Brzezinski has a chapter on the question of Japanese rearmament and he makes some interesting points on this subject. At a time when most of the industrially advanced nations of the world spend more than four per cent of their GNP on defence, Japan still gets along with less than one per cent, a figure which has become a symbolic 'peace barrier' for those who oppose large-scale rearmament. There is nevertheless strong political pressure for a substantial increase in the defence budget and there has been a notable decline in the formerly overwhelming objection to nuclear weapons with the dwindling of the generation which remembers Hiroshima. The new generation, it seems, is more inclined to say: 'If China has them, why shouldn't we?' There has undoubtedly been a diminution of the pacifist sentiment which flourished in Japan after the war and enabled the Japanese to make a virtue of necessity after being compulsorily disarmed by their conquerors. The issue is now more and more considered as one of expediency in the context of contemporary international relations. The low rate of expenditure on defence was of great benefit to Japan during the period of economic recovery, but this consideration is less decisive than it was now that Japan has a massive, technically advanced industry able to produce the most sophisticated equipment required by up-to-date armed forces. Two factors are now pushing Japan towards a translation of more of its economic strength into military or naval power. One is the increasing dependence of the Japanese economy on maritime communications which might at any time be subject to interception, e.g. the routing of 90 per cent of oil imports from the Middle East through the Straits of Malacca; the other is the isolationist trend in American politics which has begun to cast doubt on the credibility of the American alliance even for those who are most in favour of it. There is a feeling that Japan may have to rely on itself in future for its defence whether the Japanese people want it or not; as Brzezinski puts it, 'it is almost axiomatic that an isolationist United States will create a nationalist and militarist Japan'. But even if America does not go all the way into isolation and the Japanese-American alliance remains, the present relationship between protector and protected is felt to be too asymmetrical; a stronger Japan would have a bigger voice in Washington and a greater independence in policy than it has now.

The question of nuclear weapons is distinct from the general issue of rearmament; Japan could greatly increase its conventional armaments,

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particularly naval, without acquiring nuclear weapons, and it appears that strategic planners in Tokyo have up to now been in favour of a policy which left the nuclear deterrent to the American partner. On the other hand Japan has the technical capacity to 'go nuclear' in a relatively short space of time and there is always the argument that no country can rely on another to incur the risk of nuclear war on its behalf and that the possession of nuclear weapons is the differential of a great power in the contemporary world. The debate now going on in Japan is tentative and confused, but such a debate could not have taken place at all five years ago, and Brzezinski notes that 'symptomatically, younger people indicate [in opinion polls] a higher indication of Japan going nuclear than older people'. Brzezinski, however, is probably right in his view that production of nuclear arms is 'not likely to be undertaken short of a major international crisis'. He thinks it would require 'some jolting experience, shattering Japanese reliance on the United States and inducing a willingness at some point even to provoke American opposition'. Among such possible 'jolting experiences' he suggests an American capitulation to a Soviet or Chinese nuclear threat or a 'dramatic turn within the United States toward left-wing isolationism'. He does not contemplate the possibility of a Russo-Chinese war, but there is no contingency which would be so likely to bring about the full rearmament of Japan. As things are now, Japan could do nothing effective to influence the outcome of such a war, but there is no doubt where Japanese sympathies would lie, and if the war resulted, as it probably would, in the elimination of China as an emerging superpower, Japan would be in the front line opposite a Soviet-dominated continent and would act accordingly.

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The Other Terror: A Medico-Historical Footnote

B. Williamson

READERS of Mme. Mandelshtam's memoir will not need to be reminded of her ability to isolate the very essence of Stalin's terror. Her comments on other periods of Soviet history, less detailed of necessity, are no less illuminating. In particular she demonstrates a richly paradoxical fact: that for certain Soviet citizens, the early Thaw period was not one of promise but was associated with acute stress and even sudden death. Mme. Mandelshtam writes [1] that these citizens —the licensed murderers, provocateurs, and informers of the Stalin period—had one feature in common. It had never previously struck them that

> their victims might one day rise up again and speak. They also imagined that time had stopped—this, indeed, was the chief symptom of the sickness. We had, you see, been led to believe that in our country nothing would ever change again. . . . It never entered their heads that these ghosts might rise up and call their grave-diggers to account. During the period of rehabilitations, therefore, they were utterly panic-stricken. . . . They were seized by terror.

This heroic witness to her times then describes two cases known to her personally. The first involved one of the vast army of informers, a wretched woman who was so terrified by the rehabilitations and her constant summonses to the Procurator's office to clear the names of those dead and alive that although 'the woman had never had anything remotely resembling a conscience . . . this was more than she could stand, and she had a stroke that left her paralyzed. . . . She's better off as she is now—paralyzed and senile. For her, time has stopped once more.' Much later in the work,[2] Mme. Mandelshtam declares that in the 1960s, the public at large distinguished between outright denunciations and enforced reports. The latter were, relatively, pardonable.

When living in exile in Tashkent, Mme. Mandelshtam became acquainted with Larisa, the daughter of a senior local security official. After Stalin's death, he had been pensioned off,

> but was occasionally summoned to interviews with former victims who had by some miracle survived. . . . [He] could not stand it and hanged himself. I was able to read a draft of his suicide letter addressed to the Central Committee. His reasoning

[1] Pp. 48–49 of Max Hayward's excellent translation, *Hope Against Hope* (Collins/Harvill, 1971).
[2] Op. cit. p. 368.

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> was quite simple: as a completely dedicated young Komsomol member, he had beeen assigned to the secret police and had constantly been decorated and promoted for his work. During all his years of service he had never seen anybody but his colleagues and the prisoners he interrogated . . . it was only after he was retired that he had the time to stop and think about what had been going on. . . . He tried to put the blame on others.

He blamed everyone, from the victims who had so inconsiderately confessed 'thereby misleading the officials in charge of their cases', to the informers who supplied the denunciations and the gentlemen from Moscow who demanded that quotas be fulfilled. His suicide—finally prompted by the reading of Victor Hugo's *Last Day of a Condemned Man*—was hushed up because he had named all the Moscow officials and the informers.

The most revealing aspect of this episode was the reaction it provoked in Larisa who, it emerges from the narrative, was not incapable of kindness towards Mme. Mandelshtam. She was reduced to such rage against those responsible for the change in policy that she threatened to leak the story abroad in order to let people there know how her father had been treated!

> For Larisa it was all quite clear: one could not make such sudden changes because it was so 'traumatic'. . . . 'Who is going to sympathize with you?' I asked, but she didn't understand the question. People had been promised that all change was at an end. . . . 'All right then, let them no longer arrest people, but things should stay as they were.' Let time stand still. The stopping of time means peace and stability. They need it so much, the leaders of our age.

THIS account of the actual fate of a Tashkent secret policeman finds its parallel in a great work of fiction containing similar insights into the psychology of the generation which prospered, as well as suffered, under Stalin. Rusanov, one of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's most powerfully-drawn characters, was a lowlier figure than Larisa's father. He was a member of the secret section in charge of personnel records which is still to be found in Soviet institutions although its title, like that of the organization it serves, changes from time to time. For almost 20 years, the questionnaires he lovingly tended allowed him to interfere in people's lives, getting workers sacked, and forcing wives to divorce their imprisoned husbands.[3] But over and above the call of duty he had secretly denounced his neighbour, Rodichev, who had once been his friend, as well as several other men and women. Now, lying in his hospital bed, the fear that Rodichev might suddenly appear and beat him up was obsessing him. Rusanov contrasts the good old days, when denunciation had not been considered in the least shameful,

[3] *Rakovy Korpus* (*Cancer Ward*), first part, published in Russian (London: The Bodley Head, 1968), pp. 65 ff. (page references here and below to second section).

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with the 'unhealthy' present. Was there reason now to be afraid for oneself? 'What *right* have they got to release [camp inmates] now? How can they cause people such traumas without taking pity?'[4]

The celebrated dream sequence—chapter 16—is symptomatic of Rusanov's barely-repressed panic. His premonitions that the old order was changing had just been confirmed by the bald announcement that the entire membership of the Supreme Court had been changed. In the last chapter of the novel's first part, Rusanov's daughter brings him news from Moscow. She speaks of the returning ghosts and how their denouncers who had been living peaceably for years are suddenly forced to confront them. In one such nerve-racking instance the denouncer had all but hanged himself. . . .

The rehabilitation commissions themselves evidently started work rather earlier than might be expected. Zhores Medvedev, in his monograph *Biological Science and the Cult of Personality,* describes what happened to Yakushkin, a former professor whose 'expertise' on behalf of the NKVD helped seal the fate of Vavilov and many others:

> After 1954, when the mass rehabilitation of the victims of arbitrary rule began, Yakushkin was often summoned by investigators to verify his signature on denunciations and documents attributing sabotage to innocent, falsely condemned people. Unable to stand the ordeal, Yakushkin took to his bed for a protracted period and eventually died.[5]

An earlier version of Medvedev's text[6] contains a few more details of this odious character's biography. There is another reference in *samizdat* to the commissions. In December 1968, the closed trial of Kvachevsky, Gendler, and Studenkov took place in Leningrad. According to the evidence, Gendler had taken part in 'illegal gatherings' with, among others, a certain Danilov, 'a former *gebist* [KGB man] who had worked from 1956 to 1962 in a [or the: the lack of articles in Russian makes it impossible to tell] rehabilitation commission'.[7]

A special study of the literature of the Khrushchev era might well yield further documentation of the phenomenon of panic-induced stress diseases. Evtushenko's poem on *Stalin's Heirs,* with its reference to the heart attacks suffered by the eponymous villains,[8] is of course well-known; at the time it was thought Evtushenko might have had Frol Kozlov in mind, but the poet himself asked for the reference 'to be viewed in a somewhat wider sense'.[9] A novel written in the years 1958–64, A. Rybakov's *Summer in Sosnyaki,*[10] began with the agonizing suicide of an engineer who had been forced to concoct reports on his colleagues

[4] Op. cit. pp. 60, 64–65.
[5] Taken from I. M. Lerner's translation *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 72. Also see note, p. 262.
[6] *Graniy*, No. 70 (1969), p. 160 ff.
[7] *Possev*, fifth special issue, p. 24.
[8] *Pravda*, 21 October 1962.
[9] *Die Zeit*, 8 February 1963.
[10] *Novy Mir*, No. 12 (1964).

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in the days of 'wrecker' mania. Poignantly he had withdrawn 'his depositions in the same house where he had given them 20 years earlier. As then, a panicky desire to leave possessed him. However, he did not emerge cleansed but even more entangled in his crime.' The novel is notable for its portrait of Angelyuk, a character who had performed the same functions as Rusanov.

ALL the testimony so far has been provided by witnesses who could be termed anti-Stalinist. The final piece of evidence comes from the pen of one of the best-known Stalinists in Soviet public life—Vsevolod Kochetov. *Survey* has already published an article about his last novel *What Do You Want*? [11] but it is so richly studded a source-book for the student of Stalinist psycho-pathology that only several full length articles would do justice to its concealed, as well as its barely-hidden, gems. It is no wonder that the three issues of *Oktyabr* in which it was serialized [12] are rumoured to have changed hands for 50 rubles each! The eager Soviet student of world affairs was able to discover from a few of its consecutive pages, for example, that in Sweden trade union members watch union meetings on television for fear of being shot in the street (with any other writer, sarcasm might be suspected: with Mr Kochetov, the reader cannot be sure); that in Italy one does not need to approach an official before starting off on a demonstration; and that capitalists in Africa give their plantation workers free tickets to brothels when they begin to agitate.

In particular, one of the novel's episodes—itself a commentary on the literal derivation of the word 'retrograde'—has not received the attention its supreme symbolism deserves. The autobiographical hero, Bulatov, takes his platonic girlfriend out of Moscow on a very special pilgrimage—to one of Stalin's *dachas*, 'the so-called near one'. They approach on foot because 'in their time it was not just the likes of you and me who left their cars here and proceeded on foot, but even Politburo members did this'. There is little to be seen, however, for the gates are 'locked, alas . . .'.

The novel contains several references to the heart attacks which laid low many of Bulatov's comrades-in-arms. (Military metaphors are particularly apt because underlying the whole work is the suggestion that only a gallant little band of believers remains to fight against the massed forces of internal and external darkness. The very name 'Bulatov' derives from the word for sword-blade: hence the figurative duel between Bulatov and the renegade 'Spada'—the Italian for sword.) While explaining to his girlfriend outside his master's locked and empty *dacha* how Trotsky invented the epithet 'Stalinism' to compromise

[11] Stuart Hood in *Survey* (Winter–Spring double issue, 1970). Mr Kochetov's political predilections cannot be excused but may perhaps be partly explained by the fact that of the eight children in his poor peasant family only three survived, the others dying of starvation or typhoid (*Encounter* (April 1963), p. 37).

[12] Nos. 9, 10, 11 for 1969.

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those who continued Lenin's cause, Bulatov refers to a former *kapo* in a Nazi concentration camp, now the holder of science degrees and the writer of didactic works (truly it cannot be denied that careers are open to talents in the Soviet Union!). The same person 'in those recent years when clamourers demanded that "Stalinists" be punished, bawled louder than the rest and made quite a few people take to their beds with heart attacks—even chasing some into their graves'. The same theme is developed at greater length in a scene set in a railway carriage. The passengers, men of the arts, had all taken part in the last war; none is aged under 45. Their formative years—not irrelevantly in view of the remarkable exchange which took place between them—had thus been spent under Stalin:

> 'Comrades, you of course know my bearded friend, the one I worked with on the last monument. One would have thought him a paragon of health. . . . But now he's in bed with a heart attack and the doctors say his condition is giving cause for concern. By the way, the attack did not come all by itself. . . . You of course know him and know . . . what his political convictions are. . . . Well, at first he was blackballed at the elections for the Board [of the Artists' Union]. He shrugged his shoulders and laughed. Then his latest work was reviled with the aid of a hired pen. . . . Anonymous letters plagued him: some went to the Party committee claiming that when he was drunk he beat up a taxi-driver; others went somewhere else claiming that he was a drug-addict and received drugs from abroad; his wife was regaled with the news that he had set up shop with a young blonde. . . . While he was running about and proving that these were all lies . . . he suffered the heart attack.'
>
> Everyone spoke up in the carriage, it got lively. It turned out that there was not a person there who one way or another had not come across anonymous letters. About one of them it had been written that he, passing himself off for a rock-solid Leninist, had hidden his true social origin . . . : the son of a cossack sergeant. Another had been threatened, no more nor less, with hanging on a lamp-post 'when the time came'. It had been proposed to a third that he shoot himself voluntarily, with his own hand, in order to avoid the 'impending merciless judgement' . . .
>
> 'How much simpler it all was when we fought here' said the sculptor from Moscow, pointing out of the dark carriage windows . . . 'The enemy was there and you were here. . . . But what is one to do with these nasty little letters which lead to heart attacks?'

This then is the final irony: not only were erstwhile denouncers themselves summoned to the judicial authorities to explain themselves, but they were evidently also denounced in the familiar, anonymous manner. Although the ends may have differed, the corrupt means institutionalized under Stalin continued to exist during the Thaw.

Scattered and limited as the quoted testimonies are, they still suggest the crucial reasons—social as much as political—why de-Stalinization can only be a half-hearted process at best until an entire generation has

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ceased to hold power. In the absence of such external factors as those which forced the German people to examine itself and its past actions, Stalin's heirs cannot seriously be expected to inflict voluntary yet severe traumas upon themselves.[13] The limits even to Khrushchev's policy were publicly apparent, for example when he dammed the flood of concentration camp memoirs and blustered out lies about his complicity in public.[14] Mme Mandelshtam's claim that the leaders of our age desperately need stability is fundamental to the post-Stalin situation. Even in official publications naïve gratitude is expressed for 'stable' laws and textbooks—a revealing Soviet usage. As recently as the 24th Party Congress, A. Chakovsky, editor of the weekly *Literary Gazette* and author of a recent novel portraying Stalin in his role of great war leader (with, it is true, the odd wart), spoke in euphemisms instantly understandable to those of his generation. Writers, he declared,[15] 'strongly desired clarity in certain important ideological questions, consistency and the elimination of those voluntaristic upsets . . . of which, to be honest, we had got pretty tired in those [Khrushchevian] years.'

It would be appropriate to end as we began with Mme Mandelshtam's memoir, this time for another medical comment. Speaking of those who survived the camps, she writes[16]: 'Now all in their mid-forties, they died off, one after another, from the heart diseases contracted in the camps. . . . Every case of this kind . . . was part of the systematic destruction of the country's intellectual and spiritual resources.' But that is, sadly, a longer and better-documented story of which the last chapter has not been written.

[13] Even so, one wonders if they have to go quite as far as the former Leningrad Party boss V. Tolstikov (now Soviet ambassador to China) who, after Khrushchev's fall, reportedly took a certain Monakhov under his wing and prevented his expulsion from the Party, let alone the trial which was under preparation. Monakhov, according to the second of a *samizdat* series entitled *Crime and Punishment*, as head of an NKVD execution squad had been responsible for the clubbing to death of several hundred foreign Communists at Solovki after the outbreak of the Winter War against Finland.

[14] *Pravda*, 10 March 1963. Party leaders were allegedly unaware 'that absolutely innocent people were being arrested', only discovering such abuses after Stalin's death and the exposure of Beria.

[15] *Pravda*, 6 April 1971.

[16] Op. cit. p. 364.

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Letter to the Editor

Sir,

Because of its role as the major channel for the broadcast back to the USSR of *samizdat* (literally 'self-published' materials, distributed in typescript in the Soviet Union), Radio Liberty has become the main collection point for *samizdat* materials that arrive one way or another in the West. At the present time Radio Liberty has an archive collection of approximately 2,000 separate *samizdat* documents covering more than 12,000 pages. New documents come in every week. In the past year a systematic archive has been created in the Central Research Department of Radio Liberty in Munich, and the documents are registered under approximately 1085 archival numbers, using the initials AS (*Arkhiv Samizdata*) for identification.

Radio Liberty claims no legal rights to its collection and has adopted a policy and programme to make the material available to the world academic community. The preparation of a multi-volume collection of *samizdat* in manuscript form, *Sobraniye dokumentov samizdata,* was begun in November 1971 by a special research team. It is estimated that this collection will fill 22 volumes when completed some time after the middle of 1972. As individual volumes are put together and as new items appear in the West, xerox copies are being made available to the public institutions listed below at their request under an understanding that they will act as repositories and may reproduce and distribute copies of the documents on request, at their own cost and responsibility.

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The Library of Congress
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